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3Abstract
The thesis is that Aristotle's theory of justice, particularly Particular Justice, is only properly 
explicable in terms of proportion theory. In the innumerable assessments of the theory that have 
been made nods have been given in the direction of analogy, but nods only. Almost always these 
have been accompanied by complaints about Aristotle's persistently dragging in 'mathematical' 
figures, references, and explanations. What these complaints have overlooked is that the theory is 
soaked in the language of proportionality because his conception of Particular Justice is inherently 
(and in a sense only) about greater and less. Hence it is about equality; and hence about the modes of 
equality. I have, therefore, begun by looking at the nature of ratio and proportion; at the models of 
proportion known by Aristotle's time; and especially at the then new Eudoxian theory of proportions. 
Aristotle combines these with his own heuristic development of generic structure. His use of generic 
structure in the life-sciences has become better understood than hitherto, but not so much its 
combination with analogy. In the areas of justice and exchange the combination has hardly been 
appreciated at all.
From the 17th century onwards, both the structure of the theory, and the nature of the forms of 
justice within the structure, have been almost universally misrepresented. The result has been (he 
belief among all commentators that the structure of the theory is unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction 
stems from suppositions that Aristotle presents (in at least some sense) 'Corrective Justice’. These 
(mis)perceptions then result in claims for a third species or genus of justice, or that the given species 
are not firmly drawn, or that, whether there are two or three species, the issues are inadequately 
conceived. Against all these modern interpretations I defend Aquinas's presentation of the theory (of 
Particular justice, not his understanding of justice in general). The detailed analysis of the text I 
offer— giving due weight to the models of proportion which Aristotle uses (and declares) 
throughout—refutes, I believe, all the charges of inconsistency, confusion, and incompleteness, that 
have often been levelled against it.
Aristotle works through his model of justice step-by-step; the last part of the model, the 
doctrine of exchanges, is treated by the last part of the thesis. This doctrine has been maligned even
3
4more, perhaps, than the earlier proposals of the species of justice. What, so far as I can tell, has 
never been grasped is that in chapter 5 Aristotle applies the Eudoxian theory of proportions in detail. 
Although he might not have been writing 'economics', the structure he gives is the deepest model of 
economic interactions that has yet been proposed. What are commonly dismissed as obvious, 
baffling, or unfortunate references to cobblers, variables, and beds are illustrations of the Eudoxian 
general theory of magnitude applied to the interactions which bind the participants into a 
community.
As the issues touched on are inevitably wide-ranging I have attempted to write the narrative 
discussing only the central themes, but I have supplied footnotes (sometimes very extensive) 
elaborating many of the allied issues.
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8Chapter 1
RATIO AND PROPORTION
1.1 Ratio
The notion of ratio was used from the beginning of mathematics but we don't know of a 
definition until one was formulated by Eudoxus towards the middle of the fourth century b c . 
Preserved by Euclid that definition is given in two propositions:
5.3 Aoyoc; bctti 8 u o  p,£Y£0a>v ojioyevcov f) K a x a  7et]^ ik o t t |tcc 7coia a /ec u ;
5.4 Aoyov exew npog a.XXr\Xa p.eye9r| XeyETca a  Suvaxai 7roA,A.ajrX.ama^o|XEV dXXr\Xmv 
bnepE%Eiv
Heath's widely used translation of 5.3:
A ratio is a sort of relation with respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind1
doesn't quite capture Euclid's expression. Two aspects of 5.3 need clarification, (i) ratio is not
merely a sort of relation but the relation with respect to size. The expression "a sort of relation" is
too vague2, for whatever relations there might be, the terms must be capable of comparison.
1 T.Heath The Thirteen Books o f Euclid's Elements II (1926). I.Thomas's translation is the 
same (Greek Mathematics I, Loeb edition, 1934). It is used by B.van der Waerden Science 
Awakening (1954, p. 187); by I.Bulmer-Thomas (in his Euclid, in Dictionary IV, 1971, 
pp.414-37); by P.Dedron & J.Itard in their Mathematics and Mathematicians I p.89 (1973); 
and by D.H.Fowler 'Ratio and Proportion' in Science and Philosophy in Classical Greece, (ed. 
A.C.Bowen, 1991); and by P.Byrne Analysis and Science in Aristotle, (1997) p.252 n.71. 
E.B.Plooij (Euclid's Conception o f Ratio and his Definition o f Proportional Magnitudes as 
Criticised by Arabian Commentators, 1950, p.48) translates Heiberg’s rendering as:
Ratio is some state of two magnitudes in connection with size.
Theon of Smyrna (2nd century a d : Mathematical Introduction to the Study o f Plato p.73, 16) 
wrote:
ratio in the sense of proportion is a form of relation of two homogeneous terms one to 
another, as for example double, triple.
He says that ratio "may be of greater, less or equal". Nicomachus (1st century AD: Introduction 
to Arithmetic II, 21,3) gave "a ratio is a relation of two terms to one another" (Heath p.292). 
In addition Plooij (p.55) translates the definition given by al-NairTzT:
Ratio is a certain relation as to measure between two magnitudes of the same species.
I.Todhunter, in his translation Euclid's Elements (1862), says "a mutual relation of two 
magnitudes". See also § 4.1, note 243.
2 Al-Jayyant's (11 th century) Commentary on Ratio (ibid. p. 18):
Ratio is size of a magnitude as compared with another magnitude of the same species, viz. 
a comparison is made between the two magnitudes for the purpose that the size may be 
known of one of them as compared with the other 
more exactly captures Euclid’s sense of the priority of ratio as the relation at work. (Al- 
Jayyani does not follow up with the definitions 5.4 and 5.5, but moves on to the proposal 
"Proportion is equality of ratios".)
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9Comparison shows, first of all, if the magnitudes are the same or not. If they are different then one
of the terms must be greater than the other. Being equal or, if not, being greater and less, is a
characteristic a pair of terms has which stands apart from (and prior to) whichever 'sort of relation'
or sort of interaction supervenes. Whether or not one term is a division of the other (as in the
definition 5 .1)3 or a multiple of it (as in 5.2)4, if they are magnitudes of the same kind they will be
comparable. And where there is a difference between the terms ratio aims to quantify that difference
exactly5. So whatever the difference between the two magnitudes is is "the relation with respect of
size". As ratio expresses the comparison rather than such interactions as division or multiplication
(or subtraction or addition) Knorr's translation of 5.3 is closer:
'Ratio' is of two homogeneous magnitudes the manner of relation (they have to each other) with 
respect to size.6
Heath joined a long tradition in finding a weakness about 5.37; he said it
is as vague and as little practical use as that of a straight line; it was probably inserted for 
completeness, and in order merely to aid the conception of a ratio.8
Simson thought it was not genuinely Euclid's9, and Fowler complains that "the Elements does not
contain a definition of ratio"10. But Berggren objects to Fowler that Euclid rightly thought it was
exact enough". What seems to be overlooked by the critics (though half-suggested by Heath's
3 5.1 (Todhunter):
A less magnitude is said to be a part of a greater magnitude, when the less measures the 
greater; that is, when the less is contained a certain number of times exactly in the greater.
4 5.2 (Todhunter):
A greater magnitude is said to be a multiple of a less, when the greater contains the less a 
certain number of times exactly.
5 See § 2.3.
6 W.Knorr What Euclid Meant, (in Bowen, p. 125, n.15). (He also objects to Heath's giving 
the indefinite "a sort of..." for fi ... Ttoia axeau;.)
7 He has an extended note (1926 II pp.l 16-19) in which he largely agrees with (and repeats 
nearly word for word) I.Barrow (Lecture III, 1666) on the supposed flaws in the definition.
8 T.Heath A History o f Greek Mathematics vol.I (1921) p.384, and see his extended note, 
1926 II pp.l 16-19.
9 R.Simson Euclid (1756).
111 'Ratio in Early Greek Mathematics' in Bulletin o f the American Mathematical Society 
(1979) p.830. Bulmer-Thomas (op.cit.) and E.Carruccio (Mathematics and Logic in History 
and in Contemporary Thought, 1964 p. 100) also find 5.3 unsatisfactory.
11 J.L.Berggren 'History of Greek Mathematics: A Survey of Recent Research' in Historia 
Mathematica (1984) p.399; he cites I.Mueller (Philosophy o f Mathematics and Deductive 
Structure in Euclid's Elements, 1981), but Mueller attributes the weakness to Euclid, not to 
the translation. Byrne (op.cit.) claims that from Aristotle's point of view 5.3 is redundant 
when placed alongside 5.4.
9
10
comment) is that ratio is defined through the use of two propositions, not one. The objectors to 5.3 
have treated it in isolation from 5.4; this Heath translates as:
Magnitudes are said to have a ratio one to another which are capable, when multiplied, of
exceeding one another.12
It is the combination of these two proposals which yields the notion of ratio. There is nothing 
objectionable in breaking a notion down into principles better presented separately. In the present 
case two distinct aspects of ratio are given by the two proposals—the relation between two quantities 
(5.3), and more exactly what can be done with the relation (5.4)—and these points need to be 
grasped independently rather than run together.
(ii) The second questionable feature of 5.3 is "with respect of size". Augustus de Morgan 
translated 5.3 as defining ratio not as the relation between sizes but in terms of the number of times 
one quantity may be subtracted from the other. He read "7tr|^iK0TT|Ta" as indicating periodicity not 
quantity13. His reading followed Wallis and Gregory14, and was followed in turn by Todhunter in his 
notes15, and by Apostle, for example, who also treats ratio as the number of interactions between two 
quantities16. Heath firmly rejected de Morgan's interpretation, he said that the meaning of ttt|/Uko<; is 
'how great'17. (Aristotle uses the word with this sense in NE V 1134bl 1 when relating a child and 
father: ecoq av rj Ttri^iKov). Eutocius, citing Nicomachus and Heron, used Ttrj/atcoc; for magnitude, 
as did Iamblichus18. Ptolemy also referred to the "size" (or "length"— Flepi xr\c, rcr|XiKOTT|TO<; tcdv ev 
tg> kuk/lCu ebGeicov) of chords in a circle19 Liddell & Scott also give the meaning as "how great or 
large". I believe Heath's comments on 7rr|XiK:oTr]<; must be correct, but that notwithstanding, Euclid's
12 This definition excludes the infinitesimal: for any quantities A and B, where A < B there 
is a ratio where for some natural number n, nA > B. (These became known as Archimedean 
magnitudes). Mueller (ibid.), followed by Knorr (in Bowen 1991), insists that def. 4 treats 
any inequalities between multiples of the terms. This would have to represented differently, 
as e.g., for natural numbers: m, n, p, q, mA > «B, pA  < qB. (5.4 has suffered far greater 
misunderstanding than 5.3; this is reported briefly in § 3.7.)
13 Differential and Integral Calculus (1842, p. 18).
14 J.Wallis Treatise o f Algebra, Both Historical and Practical (1685); D.Gregory 
EYKAE1AOY TA ZC1ZOMENA (1703).
15 1862, p.280, but not, curiously, in his translation (see note 1 ).
16 H. Apostle Aristotle's Philosophy o f Mathematics (1952) pp.60-66.
17 1926, II, pp. 1 16-19.
,s Iamblichus (In Nicomachi, p.8, 3-5). Eutocius (6th century ad) Commentary on 
Archimedes's Measurement o f  a Circle; this and Nicomachus's allusion is given in Heath II, 
1926 p.l 17.
19 Syntaxis 1.10 (Table of Sines: Introduction), Greek Mathematics vol.2 (I.Thomas, 1941 
p.412).
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presentation of ratio, combining 5.3 and 5.4, and when contrasted with, yet related to 5.1 and 5.2, if 
carefully translated, is precise enough to make clear the rules and principles required.
1.2 Two approaches to mathematics
The two ways of reading 5.3 reilect two conceptions as to the nature of mathematics which 
appear to have flourished in antiquity (and indeed still survive). One approach was to focus on the 
performance of regular interactions. This conception might be thought of as (proto)algebraic in 
character—the quantities acted upon being thought of as secondary to the interactive processes. The 
other perception focused on the relations among quantities. Accounting for all the possible relations 
between quantities proved to be the more successful conception in resolving the main difficulty 
which faced the mathematics of ratios (as will be discussed below). The earlier approach centred on 
the periodicity; it gave rise to the mathematics of av8t>cpoapecn<;, and is associated with the work of 
Theodorus and Theaetetus. This earlier conception was unwittingly assigned to Euclid for many 
ccnturies, and wittingly assigned today by Fowler, who argues that anthyphairetic ratio-theory, not 
proportion-theory, was pursued at the Academy; and assigned to Eudoxus by Knorr, who argues that 
a variant of the process was developed by him20.
The conception of ratio that evolved in the Arab world and in Christendom during the Middle 
Ages was closer to dc Morgan's than to Heath's. The "essence" of ratio was sought by such 
mathematicians as Ahmed ibn Jusuf (in the 9th century) and al-Tusi (in the 13th) and declared to be 
the measure of one magnitude by another21. This notion, even though resulting from intensive study 
of the Elements, was non-Euclidean (and more importantly non-Eudoxian). The sequence of 
definitions (1-7) through which Euclid builds up the general theory of proportions in Book V shows
11
2(1 Discussed at §§ 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. Knorr The Evolution o f the Euclidean Elements (1975), 
Archimedes and Pre-Euclidean Proportion Theory (1978a), and (1991). Fowler in several 
publications, in addition to 1979 and 1991: 'Anthyphairetic Ratio and Euxodan Proportion' in 
Archive 24, pp. 69-72 (1982), and The Mathematics o f Plato's Academy (1987). 1 have found 
that A.Thorup also sees this distinction:
The ancient [sc. anthyphairetic] concept is the assertion of equality of two processes, the 
Euclidean concept is merely an equivalence relation of two pairs of magnitudes.
(pp.3-4, 'A Pre-Euclidean Theory of Proportion', in Archive 45, 1992 pp.l -25; my italics).
21 Plooij, p.65.
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that his notion of ratio was quite different in character from the interactive principle: it covers all 
cases of quantity, as prior to, and quite apart from, whether or not they measure one another22.
Two terms are in ratio where a multiple of either term exceeds the other; this is expressed 
symbolically as a : b (for this symbol see below, § 1.6). To be in ratio the terms must be comparable; 
the principle of making a comparison determines quantities "as to the more or the less". (And of 
course when they are equal the terms are neither greater nor less than each other.) Such comparison 
has built in to it the constraint that the terms refer to objects which fall within the same genus (we 
would not recognise as making sense a claim that a given angle, say, is greater than a quarter of an 
hour, or that a scalene triangle is less than 53). So unless the terms refer to homogeneous 
mathematical objects there can be neither equality nor any relation of greater or less; nor could a 
multiplication of either meaningfully be said to exceed the other.
The possibility of a comparison's being made forms the core of Aristotle's account of exchange 
value in chapter 5, Book V of the Ethics (and the subject-matter of chapter 6 below). It is also the 
platform upon which the biological writings are based (below, chapter 3), and Aristotle also 
considers the issue in such other places as Physics VII chapter 423 In all these the concept of equality 
is intimately connected with the possibility of the application of the notions of greater and less. For 
there to be a comparison as to the greater or less the senses in which the words are used must also 
not be equivocal. Degrees of sharpness, for instance, could be meaningfully compared only where 
the same sense of the word is used: sharp angles can be compared, and sharp sounds, but not a sharp 
angle with a sharp sound (Aristotle is also especially keen to exclude figuration from careful, 
analytical and scientific language24).
22 Definition 5.5 is given at § 2.7. 5.6 (Ta 8e tov ccotov exovtoc Xoyov jj.eye9t| avaXoyov 
kcceictSco) corresponds exactly to Aristotle's assertion at NE V 1131a32 "proportion is the 
equality of ratios". 5.7 gives the case for ratios (not magnitudes) being "greater or less".
23 There is a useful discussion of this in W.van Leyden's Aristotle on Equality and Justice 
(1985, chapter 2, and an appendix).
24 Topics 158b9 (Pickard-Cambridge):
The hardest, however, of all definitions to treat in argument are those that employ terms 
about which, in the first place, it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or 
several, and, further whether they are used literally or metaphorically by the deliner.
See also § 2.5.
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1. 3 Terms in ratio
Having noted that the terms need be used in the same sense, and must refer to homogeneous 
entities, what entities are they that might be joined in ratio? An expression was sought which would 
cover all candidates: lines, planes, weights, periods of time, angles, and volumes. The name 
'magnitude' (p.e'yeGot;) applies to them; what they have in common is that they are all continuous 
extensions. Greek mathematicians and philosophers were acutely conscious of the differences 
between all these and plurality25. Plurality per se is conveyed by numbers. (By 'number' is meant 
cardinal number, i.e., of separate extensions or discrete units of any sort the answers that would be 
given to the question "How many?"). Characteristically we count separate units but we measure 
continuous extensions. Measuring involves counting, and in both there is a continuous and a 
separate element: in measuring the continuous seems primary (and the separate secondary), and in 
counting it is the reverse. Geometry studies continuous quantities as such magnitudes, and 
arithmetic studies separated units purely as discrete quantities. The interconnectedness of the 
continuous and the discrete is also evident in that though the term 'magnitude' applies to continuous 
extensions it has the virtue that we can also make sense of it applied to separated units as well; we 
could refer to 'quantities of any magnitude'26. Despite the interconnectedness Aristotle prefers to 
keep the branches of mathematics apart; he regards quantity (noaov) as the genus for the study of 
mathematics27 but is reluctant to endorse it as a generic title28. He disallows magnitude as the
25 Nichomachus (op.cit. II 21, 5; 23.2,3) says that the basic division in mathematics into the 
continuous and the discrete was Pythagorean. Aristotle Categories 4b20 (Ross):
quantity is either discrete or continuous;
Metaphysics A 1020a7 (Kirwan):
we call a quantity what is divisible into constituents each of which has the nature of a one 
and a this. A certain quantity is a plurality if it is countable, a magnitude if it is 
measurable.
26 Plato is sometimes translated as applying the notion of magnitude to both numbers and 
continuous extensions. In Gorgias 451b, in a passage distinguishing arithmetic from 
calculation (apiB^riTi.KTi from Xoyuttikti), "odd and even numbers of whatever magnitude" is 
given (by W.Hamilton) even though the word |j.£Y£0o<; does not appear in the text. J.Klein 
(Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin o f Algebra, 1934-36, pp. 18-19) argued that the 
distinction between dpi6(ir|TiKT| and Ao'/io'ikti was not between number theory and practical 
calculation but between counting and calculation. (A view widely supported, e.g. by Annas, 
1976 pp.5-6—see note 29.)
27 See also J.Lear ’Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics' in Philosophical Review 61(2) 
(1982) pp. 161-91, and § 2.8, note 145.
28 Perhaps his outlook was connected with the use of variables. Aristotle is the first writer we 
know of to make use of them; as the variable abstracts from any given ’quantity' all actual 
quantity, leaving a sign to stand as proxy, then if these were to form part of mathematics, the 
term 'quantity' could not be sufficiently universal. The modern custom of referring to
13
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gcneric term because it implies divisibility, and divisibility is not a property of points or units qua 
units. Although he speaks of a universal mathematics29 he is not satistied with any term to represent 
the objects of mathematics as a whole30 (with good reason as it turns out— see § 3.6). However, if we 
may take "quantity" as the term for the objects which mathematics of every sort deals, then quantities 
(as the entities capable of being greater or less31) will be in ratio when compared to other quantities of 
the same sort.
Fowler holds that natural numbers were differentiated not only into cardinals and ordinals, but 
what we would call cardinals included series which could be named 'adverbial numbers' (once, twice, 
three-times, ...) and 'repetition numbers' (half, third, quarter, fifth, ...); these, he says, should not be 
confused with ordinals32. It seems rather unnatural to speak of ordinals as magnitudes; qua ordinals, 
numbers would not be comparable as to the greater or less, hence they could not be in ratio (the 89th 
in a series, for example, is not greater or less than the 4th in virtue of being the 89th). However, any 
of the mathematical entities capable of being in ratio could have been used by Aristotle in models for 
application to non-mathematical topics, so the care which would be needed to assess the dillering 
mathematical terms if this were a mathematical inquiry would add little more that is helpful to the 
present subject. What is of importance for Aristotle's use of ratio is the requirement to observe
variables or constants as "quantities" is metaphorical, so would have been anathema to 
Aristotle for scientific terminology (Topics IV  123a33-123b, VI 139b 12-18, 140a9-16, VIII 
158b8-24). The need for some term to convey a notion conceived of and used strictly apart 
from whatever quantity it might replace, in addition to the need for some term to convey 
separated and continuous quantities qua either separated or continuous, perhaps ruled out any 
known word.
29 Categories 4h20-25, Metaphysics K 1064b8-9, M 1077a9-12 (see § 2.8 and note 146), and 
notably at b 17-22:
Just as general propositions in mathematics are not about separate objects over and above 
magnitudes and numbers, but are about these, not only as having magnitude or being 
divisible (Annas).
J. Annas in her notes to chapter 3 of Books M and N  of the Metaphysics (1976), Heath (1949, 
pp.223-26), and P.Byrne (1997, chapter 6), all discuss the metaphysical reasons why Aristotle 
is wary of labelling the objects of universal mathematics. It is an important issue to his 
philosophy of mathematics, and indicative of his aim in metaphysics in general, but the lack 
of a universal term is only marginally relevant to our present study; that relevance appears in 
§ 3.6.
30 Post. An. 74a21 (Tredennick):
but since there was no single term to denote the common quality of numbers, lengths, time 
and solids, and they differ in species from one another ...
31 Categories 6a26-35. Of course quantity per se does not vary in degree: 32 is not any the 
less a quantity than is 98,328 (see 6al9-25).
32 1979, pp. 14-15.
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homogeneity for any given ratio33. Ratios (to repeat) bind mathematical objects of the same kind, 
hence 18°: 6° and 453 : 802 are possible ratios, but 18° : 453 is not.
1. 4 P o larity
The Greek word for ratio was Xoyoq; its origin appears to have been "something said". It was 
the term used for account, argument, assertion, communication, computation, definition, discourse, 
doctrine, explanation, expression, inference, language, measure, message, narrative, proposition, 
rationality, reason, reckoning, speech, and word34 (De Morgan translated it as "communicating 
instrument".) Even as a technical mathematical expression we should not entirely neglect its other 
senses; i.e., it still retains some of the character of this enormous range of uses. It is not too difficult 
to see that the spirit with which the word is used in all this vast range of cases is that something (the 
subject to which it applies) is brought into the realm of knowledge35. It was contrasted with aXoyov, 
in which the subject is left in a world of ignorance. 'AXoyoq is used by Aristotle, as it had been by 
Plato and other thinkers such as Democritus, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Leucippus, Parmenides, 
Philolaus and Protagoras for absurd, contrary to reason, groundless, inexplicable, irrational, 
speechless, unaccountable, unintelligent36, unintelligible, unreasoning, unutterable, without 
expression and incommensurable1,1. I am not here concerned with the obviously enormous 
differences between or among these terms, but to indicate that they broadly share a common force: 
they can, by and large, be mutually substituted with the senses of the sentences in which they occur 
intact. (Not, of course, where their differences are being in some way underlined—as when a 
contrast is made between groundless, say, and inexplicable— but in general terms.) The word 
Xoyoc,, then, indicated the presence of reason in any of its appearances, and aXoyov the absence.
33 An issue treated in §§ 3.4 and 3.6.
34 Liddell & Scott.
35 Questions as to the possibility of there having been an original or a focal usage for A,oyo<;, 
or a use upon which other uses rely, or a cluster of overlapping meanings and uses, which 
might or might not be explicable analogically do not, I think, need to be explored in order to 
make the rather general claim that the context and associations of a novel term should be 
borne in mind as giving clues when attempting to grasp its significance.
36 Philolaus (Fragment 11) included this among the titles of xo arceipov.
37 In Physics 188a5, 252a25; On the Heavens 289a6, b34; Meteorology 355a21, 36, 362aI4,
366a9; NE 1095bl4, I102al8, 34, b l3, 34; Politics 1334bl8-21; EE 1218a29; Economics 
1343b 13; Rhetoric 1370al8; Poetics 1460al8, I461bl4; MM 1 198a 17. See also Fowler 
(1987 p .194).
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For the Pythagoreans, as for later mathematicians, the presence of reason was shown by an
exact calculation or measurement, or else a rule whereby these could be performed. In view of the
litany of polysemes above, the term Xoyoq looks to have been a natural choice to convey the
rationale— the exact, ac(countable) manner in which quantities will be linked. And indeed the use of
Xoyoq in mathematics and formal reasoning already had a long history before Plato’s time. It went
back to Pythagoras (about 53()bc) at least. The terminology used in the learned discussions was
largely Pythagorean, with one notable characteristic: it was a language of dichotomies. Rational
thought was taken to be embodied in polarities; the issues surrounding such polarities as 'one/many',
’limiting/unlimited', 'odd/even', 'bounded/boundless', 'countable/uncountable', and 'rational/irrational'
continually absorbed Plato and the Academy. Whatever we think of rational enquiries couched in
terms of such grand-looking polarities (and we tend not to think much of them) nevertheless, distaste
for the style of thought and language, or suspicion of their worth, should not lead us to reject out of
hand the respectability of the thought developed through the dichotomies. (By which I mean good
sense and clear thinking about the nature of the world evolved through the use of them.) These
pairings had their source in the idea of a primary dichotomy, often called the contrariety of
n:epa<;/a7teipov. Philolaus's (Pythagorean) tract opens:
Nature in the cosmos was fitted together of peras and apeiron, the order of the all as well as of all 
things in it.38
Aristotle says the Pythagoreans used ten primary Ttepa^-arceipov contraries, the table he gives is:
limited/unlimited, odd/even, one/many, right/left, male/female, rest/motion, straight/curved,
light/dark, good/bad, square/oblong39. The jtepag-ajteipov dichotomy
appear in the traditional table of opposites and were important opposed first principles in 
Pythagorean theory ... apeiron receives the traditional Pythagorean characterisation as that 
without beginning, middle, or cnd4H.
Throughout the Philebus, where Plato treated the contrariety as 'determinate/indeterminate' 
and as the 'differentiated/undifferentiated', the extent to which something was known was the extent
38 Quoted by G.dc Santillana The Origins o f Scientific Thought (1961 p.60).
39 Metaphysics A 986a24. Whatever doubts there may be as to Aristotle's reliability in 
reporting the doctrine are irrelevant for the present purpose; even had he been completely 
wrong about the Pythagorean doctrines he nevertheless acquired any 'misinformation' during 
his twenty years at the Academy or at the latest from Aristoxenos (see note 55). Hence even if 
the tradition was false it is still true that it was the tradition that reached Aristotle.
40 J.Gosling (1976, p. 166) in the notes to his translation of the Philebus, relerring to 31 a9- 10.
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to which it was not indeterminate or undifferentiated. Knowing and limiting were treated as in 
important ways equivalent: to define a concept was to set its limits. To Ttepa<5— what is finite 
(limited, determined, bounded, differentiated or known)— was understood as what is rational, as 
Xoyoq. To number, itemise or list were the paradigmatic methods of coping with the unlimited41. 
Progress in knowledge was to be had through the application of t o  rcepoa;— notions of counting and 
measuring— to the unlimited ( t o  ccTteipov). (Indeed Aristotle brings up this "old Pythagorean 
imagery" of "good" being a form of t o  nepaq and "evil" a form of t o  aneipov when setting out the 
nature of virtue in N E II  1106b29.) Correspondingly, what could not be tamed through t o  7tep<X5 fell 
outside the limit of knowledge, there, where exact order failed, only the uncountable 
(unaccountable), immeasurable, realm of ignorance was left.
Note that the 'one/many' dichotomy was not seen by Plato, as might be supposed, as expressing 
this 'rational/irrational' (Xoyoq-aXoyov) division. The one did not figure, properly speaking, as 
indicating knowledge (with many then designating ignorance or the irrational) but the dichotomy 
gave the prerequisite for the possibility of knowledge. The same term "many" is used by Plato for 
two importantly different spheres: the countablv many, which enjoy the virtues tov> 7iepaTO<; (of the 
rational, ordered, limited, differentiated), and the uncountablv many (which are unlimited, 
unbounded, undifferentiated and irrational). On the border between the countably and the 
uncountably many, the bounded and unbounded (hence eventually the border between the rational 
and the irrational) are methods of approximation. These are invoked where exact measurement or 
calculation is not available. An approximation gives (from the Platonic viewpoint) a bogus 
exactitude where properly there is only 'the unlimited'42. Hence approximation has irrationality and 
ignorance built-in. In the early days the notion of ratio gave precision to the contrariety 'greater/less' 
(e.g. 3 : 2). The mathematical processes of approximation43, by contrast, were pursued from a default
41 To "count" was pre-eminently to differentiate, determine or "account for". The puns 
"giving an account", "what counts as" ("a count") were as obvious in the Greek as they are in 
English.
42 Issues of the "indefinite dyad" arc explored at length by Plato, notably in the Timaeus, and 
may be associated with the 'heavenly tradition' in the Philebus.
43 See O.Neugebauer The Exact Sciences in Antiquity, chapter 2 (1957), or J.H0yrup 
Babylonian Mathematics in Companion (1994) for Egyptian and Babylonian methods of 
approximation. The Babylonians had developed methods of approaching what was, in effect, 
the value of V2. The notion of proof was a definitively Greek contribution to rational thought, 
and a proof was associated with exact demonstration which rests on the assumption of an 
exhaustive application of known, delimited, principles. Hence there was an unsatisfactory air
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position: only where the exacting standards of knowledge and reason— supposed to be exemplified 
by ratio—could not be met.
1. 5 Greater and less
The polarity which the notion of ratio embodies is that of 'greater/less', but it is not found in
Aristotle's record of the Pythagorean decalogue. For Aristotle, to differ by the more or the less
characterises comparisons between species within a genus (and correspondingly what cannot be
accounted for in terms of degree is the mark of heterogeneity). Aristotle consciously develops his
own ideas against the background of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines. For example at
Metaphysics A 986b25 he points to a contrast between Pythagoras and Plato where Pythagoras saw
the great and the small as 'unity' made by mixing the elements to which they applied according to
some ratio: so many parts dry to so many wet; so many parts fast to so many slow; the vibration of
strings in a certain ratio for the octave (2 : 1)— and 4 : 3 for the fourth, 3 : 2 the fifth44. Plato had
objected (Philebus 24-25) that 'more' and 'less' are not mixtures (which would require exact
quantities) but comparisons. They form a dyad falling within t o  arceipov (the unlimited), the
application of which is always indefinite, unlike the notion of equality, or that of any given quantity
or measurement45. Indefinite, that is, except in one important respect: the comparison is definite in
relation to the other term. In a comparison there is always one limit; one of the comparables is
larger or faster or hotter, wetter, longer, louder or sharper than the other. With respect to its
correlate what otherwise falls within the realm of ignorance is capable of yielding some exact
knowledge. In relation to its counterpart, and only in relation to it, it is limited (determined, known
and rational). Hence the greater/less relation alone delivers only the minimally precise account of a
subject; the only precision or boundary it has (i.e., the only knowledge it yields) is with respect to its
counterpart. In ratio, on the other hand, the aim was to bestow on this 'greater/less' opposition a
surrounding demonsiration or proof through approximation. (Even Eudoxus's infinitesimal 
analysis could only aim for precision via approximations— this 'method of exhaustions', 
however, sometimes achieved exactitude: with it Archimedes was able to square the 
parabola.)
44 Recorded in Philolaus Fragment 6 (K.Freeman Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A 
Complete Translation o f the Fragments in Diels 'Fragmente der Vorsokratiker', 1948).
Diogenes Laertius Lives o f Eminent Philosophers (8, 26) also reports Alexander of 
Aphrodisias's account of the Pythagorean concept.
45 Philebus 24C-D.
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bounded and exhaustively precise value. Ratio was to specify exactly the degree by which one 
measure differs from the other. To be able to quantify and measure exactly, and to be able to display 
the precise relation to another object that is equally precisely accounted for, gave ratio the status of a 
paradigm for rationality (conveyed by the very term Xoyoc,), but the 'greater/less' polarity was merely 
the ground from which this hoped-for precision sprang.
1 .6  Proportion
Ratio and proportion are often spoken of interchangeably46; this is harmless enough much of 
the time, yet for the present purpose we need to observe a cluster of important logical differences 
between them. Ratios take quantities as their subject-matter, whereas proportions do not take 
quantities directly for their subject-matter, but take these same ratios (ratio 'acts upon' quantities, but 
proportion 'acts upon’ the action). In ratios any inequalities between quantities are formalised, but 
proportions make formal the equalities between the ratios. In taking mathematical objects as the 
subject-matter ratio may be seen as a 'first-order' process. Proportion then is to be seen as a 'second- 
order' process acting upon the activity of the first.
Proportion is shown formally as a : b :: c : d. The difference of the formal expression of 
proportion from that of ratio helps to show the logical difference between them. Ratio (a : b) is the 
relation between two quantities in which something is done to the magnitudes {a, b). The colon-like 
dots (":") shows the ordered linking of the objects; each dot standing for a term. (Originally pebbles 
would stand for terms, these would be arranged as here, or in rows or squares or triangles, with lines 
drawn between them. The lines indicated the relations between the terms.) A proportion is a 
relation between relations, i.e., something is done to the something that is doing something to the 
quantities. The doubling of the symbol ("::") indicates this recursion—the doubling of the 'colon' 
expresses the doubling up of the relation. What survives in the squared dots is a relic of ancient
46 Translators of Aquinas tend not to distinguish them, see e.g., the Blackfriars editions of the 
Summa. Similarly G.Phelan (St.Thomas and Analogy, 1943)—see § 1.9 below. (For the 
mediaeval evolution of the terms see § 2.2 note 103.) A.Jones refers to "Eudoxus's ratio 
theory" (p.48 Greek Mathematics to AD 300, in Companion vol.l pp.46-56), and A.Wilson 
(The Infinite in the Finite, 1995, pp.253, 255) refers to proportion as ratio whilst analysing 
inferences in Book V of Elements. Meikle (p.7) also calls a ratio what is in fact a proportion. 
(For the terminology of ratio and proportion, § 2.2.)
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geometric demonstration; they indicate the universality of formulae, standing for units or quantities 
of any kind47.
In this thesis the terms 'analogy' and 'proportion' are used interchangeably. The Greek word 
for proportion was avaXoyia: the word Xoyoq prefixed by ava . By Plato and sometimes by 
Aristotle the prefix is still kept separate: a v a  A,oyo<;48 This early usage perhaps shows the then 
novelty of the term together with its logical character— that some additional process is applied to a 
ratio49. Like Xoyog a va  was a highly polysemous word5”, though it usually conveys some notion of 
'higher than’. Analogy is some process ’higher' than ratio which processes ratios. Where ratio 
makes a comparison between two magnitudes, analogy, in the pairing of a pair of terms, compares 
that comparison with some other two.
In focusing on (and re-iterating) the first- and second-order difference between ratio and 
proportion I aim to emphasise a feature of analogy that is often overlooked even in discussions of 
classical proportion: the logical character of analogy. It is often stated that (classical) analogy is the 
equality of ratios, and requires four terms; although this is perfectly correct it does not bring out the 
logical significance of the difference between the two. Fowler, for example, pursues the notions of 
mathematics attributed to Theaetetus as essentially ratio-theoretic, not as proportion theory51, even so 
he does not bring out the distinction between the two that I wish to emphasise: that there was a 
difference in character between ‘first order’ ratio and ‘second-order’ proportion. Fowler treats 
proportion as holding among four terms, but applying to four rather than to two terms, whilst central 
to the principle of analogy, does not, o f itself, indicate any great logical distinction. Ratio compares
47 The square created by the four dots had a related use as the "square of opposition", a 
format greatly used in antiquity and the Middle Ages, and widely thought to be used by 
Aristotle in chapters 3 and 5 of the Book on justice (see § 6.3 figure 3).
48 For example Timaeus 37a and Republic 51 lE. At 509d, in the same discussion as 51 1e, 
Plato has the expression a v a  t o v  ai>xov Xoyov. Liddell & Scott say the jointed and the 
disjointed uses were "plainly equivalent".
49 The significance of the prefix is often missed; de Santillana, for example, says "Logos 
means 'discourse', 'reason', 'argument', 'inference', and also 'proportion'." (op.cit. p.65).
50 Liddell & Scott record: on, upon, upward motion, from the bottom to the top, spreading all 
over, throughout, increase, improvement, arise!, up!, continuous.
51 1979 p. 16; 1987 p.31. Fowler adopts the same notion of ratio as de Morgan, though 
without following, or even referring to him. He avoids anachronisms such as 'continued 
fractions' or 'Euclidean algorithm' when speaking of the anthyphairetic processes of ratio; see 
§ 2.5, note 119.
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(and counts) quantities, but proportion compares the comparisons, rather than counting the steps 
between the terms.
1. 7 The modes of proportion and the mean
The early Pythagoreans developed proportion theory in association with their interest in 
music52 For them a proportion was generated where a point (corresponding to a place on a string) 
divides a line into two parts such that they will be in some sense equal. Indeed discovering equality 
where equality is not apparent links all the threads associated with proportion theory; Theon of 
Smyrna wrote:
Eratosthenes says that ratio is the source of proportionality and the origin for the generation of 
everything which is produced in an ordered way. For all proportionalities arise from ratios and 
the source of all ratios is equality.53
The point at which the division was made was called the "mean" ("the mean between the extremes").
Three points were found which generated an equality, hence there were three "means". Archytas
defined these three classical proportions:
There are three proportions in music, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the sub-contrary or so- 
called harmonic. We have an arithmetic proportion when three terms are related with respect to 
excess54, as follows: the first exceeds the second by as much as the second exceeds the third. ... 
We have a geometric proportion when the first term is to the second as the second is to the third. 
... The sub-contrary proportion, which we will call harmonic, is that in which the terms are such 
that if the first exceeds the second by a certain part of the first, the second will exceed the third by 
the same part of the third.55
52 A.Szabo {The Beginnings o f Greek Mathematics (1978), and endorsed by Berggren (1984 
pp.395-96)) presents philological arguments for the origins of the terminology for proportion- 
theory in music and sacred ritual.
53 Quoted by van der Waerden (1954 p.231); he goes on to quote Pappus:
Proportionality is composed from ratio, and equality is the origin of all ratios. Geometric 
mediety indeed has its first origin in equality; it establishes itself and also the other 
medieties. It shows us, as says the divine Plato, that proportionality is the source of all 
harmonics and of all rational ordered existence.
Plato mentioned here is mediated through the eponymous character in the dialogue Platonicus 
by Eratosthenes.
54 The expression "with respect to excess" prefigures Aristotle's explanation of his use of the 
mean in the Ethics.
55 M.Cohen & I.Drabkin A Source Book in Greek Science, 1948, pp.6-7. (See also § 6.3 and 
notes 372 and 374.) In his book on justice Aristotle relies on the Archytan definitions of 
proportion. His familiarity with and closeness to Archytas is evident when we recall that 
Archytas was a friend and supporter of Plato, and that Aristoxenus, disciple and biographer of 
Archytas, joined Aristotle when he opened the Lyceum. Aristotle also wrote three books on 
Archytas's work. (See G.Allman Greek Geometry' from Thales to Euclid (1889) p .107.) 
Iamblichus (op.cit., p.100, 19-25) also records a definition ol proportions:—
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(i) The "arithmetic" is the simplest equality, the mean was struck in the middle, mid-way between 
the extremes, producing two equal lengths. This creates plain every-day equality—the sort of 
equality which anyone will recognise as what equality means. It is at once both the simple 
quantitative equality (and as such appears to stand apart from, and prior to, notions of proportion) 
and a mode of proportion56. The very simplicity of this analogy has proved disastrously misleading 
to commentators on Aristotle's use of it in the Ethics. (It is the outstanding simplicity of this 
proportion that Aristotle relies on to distinguish the justice of exchanges from that of distribution, 
which characterises [ii], the second mean.)
(ii) This was called the "geometric"; here a line is divided at a point where the difference between 
the two lengths created have an equal multiple, i.e., the mean is located where it exceeds the first 
term by the same multiple as it is exceeded by the third. Where the arithmetic was the simplest, the 
geometric is the purest mode of proportion. It is often taken to be proportion per se. This elevation 
of the species 'geometric proportion' to the genus 'proportion' has also proved seriously misleading to 
commentators of both the Ethics and the Politics57.
(iii) The third mean was the first sub-contrary, and because of its strong musical associations, 
sometimes called "harmonic" (notably by Archytas, though not by Plato or Aristotle)58. 'Ap^ovia 
referred, in Pythagoras’s time, to the arrangements of parts in a whole59. This mean is located where 
it exceeds the first quantity by the same part (fraction or division) of that quantity as it falls short of 
the third. (This mode of proportion may have a role in Aristotle's theory of exchange value.)
'Middle' is the origin of (j.eaoTr|<; ("mean"); the mean being in some sense the mid-point of a 
set-up which is in balance. (Liddell & Scott give "balance" as a translation of jj.ectott|<;.) The mean
In antiquity, in the time of Pythagoras ... there were only three means, the arithmetic, the 
geometric, and a third in order, that which was once called sub-contrary, but was later re­
named harmonic by Archytas and Hippasus.
56 Discussed below in §§ 2.1, 5.6, 5.11, 5.12.
57 §§2.1 ,4 .9 ,4 .10.
58 See §§ 2.1, 6 .6 .
59 Liddell & Scott give it a considerable range of meanings, including: means of joining, 
fastening, joint, union, adjustment, framework, covenant, agreement, settled government, 
order, musical scale, stringing, due arrangement, remedy; and as the Pythagorean term for 
three.
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can be seen as the point which generates the given mode of equality. Aristotle defines the mean (NE
2 1106a30):
By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme.
It is, as it were, the fulcrum or centre-of-gravity of a weighted body or line. The proportion is the 
whole set-up (as it were) of the line balanced at the fulcrum. Although the notion of the mean has 
generated extensive debate60 it is its role as the point of balance in a proportion that needs to be 
retained when considering Aristotle's theory of justice. The mean provides the balance; it is (as it 
were) the position of the fulcrum for differently weighted lines. (The distinction between mean and 
proportion needs to be kept in mind for the resolution of the errors attributed to Aristotle discussed in 
chapter 2 .)
1. 8 Continuous and separated proportions
The Archytan definitions and the early Pythagorean studies treated the proportion of 
continuous magnitudes. For such extensions there were three terms, the two extremes and the mean 
(a, m, b). If the three terms (the mean and the extremes) are not treated as, or expanded to four, then 
it is better not to speak of a proportion (there will not be a relation between ratios). Hence Pappus's 
remark:
A mean differs from a proportion in this respect that, if anything is a proportion it is also a mean, 
but not conversely.61
Euclid's definition 5.8, which stipulates the minimum of three terms, is possibly an interpolation62.
but whether it is or not, dividing the magnitude into two related extensions generates four terms
where there had been three: a : mean, and the mean : b (a : m :: m : b). To compare the relations
between the magnitudes which the application of the mean creates, the mean is given twice.
Aristotle explains this point in NE 1131a34-b3:
That a discontinuous proportion has four terms is plain, but so also has a continuous proportion, 
since it treats one term as two, and repeats it: for example [pointing to a diagram] as the line 
representing the first term A is to the line representing the second B, so is B to the line
60 See for example the introduction to any edition of the Ethics.
61 Commentary on Book X o f Euclid's Elements, III, p.70, 17.
62 Elements Kdcf. 8: ’Ava^oyicx 5e ev xpiaiv opou; eXaxiarri eaxiv. Heath (1926 II p. 131) 
reports Hankel's view that it is a later, unnecessary, addition. The definition is very similar to 
Aristotle's remark (NE V 1131 a31) that a proportion has a minimum of four terms; in either 
case Aristotle clarifies the terminology in the lines which follow.
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representing the third term C. Hence B is mentioned twice, so that if it be counted twice, there 
will be four analogates/’3
Treated as a proportion the mid-term is repeated64, and the four terms created could be separately 
labelled. (Letters (A, B, V, A)65 were convenient for this purpose.) Aristotle is usually careful to use 
analogia for the 4-term proportion. Now the 4-term proportion, being 4-term, looks discontinuous, 
and so does not appear to have a mean, but there is a mean to all proportions in that there is a mid­
point in the equality of the ratios. I.e., understood as equivalent to aRb = cRd, the mean is located at 
the sign for equality66.
Pythagoreans assumed an equivalence between geometric and numerical values; for them the 
elements of all things could be accounted for, i.e., counted (arithmetically) and arranged 
(geometrically) in ways such that comparisons of continuous magnitudes were expressible in whole 
numbers. For example, for the arithmetical proportion, by 2 : 4 ; 6; for the geometric by 2 : 4 ; 8; 
and for the harmonic by 6 : 8 : 12.67 For these examples treated as continuous proportions they will 
be: 2 : 4 :: 4 : 6 (arithmetic), 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8 (geometric), and 6 : 8 :: 8 : 12 (harmonic).
63 Translation adapted from the Loeb edition which doesn't translate the letter-labels, and 
Ross who does. MSS differ in preserving, on the one hand, letter-labels (not alphabetical 
numerals—see P.Keyser 'A Proposed Diagram in Aristotle EN V.3, 1131 a24-b20 for 
Distributive Justice in Proportion', Apeiron 25ii, 1992, pp. 135-44, and §§ 4.10 and 6.7 
below), and adverbial numbers (rather than ordinals— see § 1.3 above) on the other. (Ka, 
CCC, and Ha have irpcoxepou, 8ewepou, xpixou, as do Pb and Nb, in the main. Letter-labels, 
or cardinals, appear in Lb, Ob, Q, and Mb. NC and Bi have adverbials in three places and 
letter-labels in others). Jackson, p.81, Stewart, pp.426-27, and J.Burnet (The Ethics o f  
Aristotle, 1900 pp.21 If.) discuss the mathematical representation in the various surviving 
manuscripts. Jackson changed his mind between 1872 and 1879; earlier he felt that labels 
standing for cardinals was the original text, but on reflection he thought that ordinals, which 
had been the usage since Michael of Ephesus (11th century), was correct. Using the same 
language as Aristotle uses here Archimedes (and later Theon) distinguished continuous 
(crovexTig: 3-term) proportions from separated (8iripr|)i£vr|.' 4-term) ones. Continuous 
proportion has the consequent of one ratio as the antecedent of the next. This is not so with 
separated proportions. Nicomachus (II, 21, 5-6—see Jackson, p.81, and Heath 1926, II 
p.293) refers to "connected (a'ov'np.jxev'n) and disjointed (SieCeuyjjxvri) proportions". Euclid 
often uses "proportional in order, or successively" for numbers in continuous proportion.
64 Aristotle's use of the diagram explains his concern with the distinction between the 
separated and continuous quantities— see § 4.10 below.
65 M.N.Tod 'The Alphabetic Numeral System in Attica' in The Annual o f the British School at 
Athens 45, pp.126-39 (1950), and 'Letter Labels in Greek Inscriptions', ibid. vol. 49, pp. 1-8. 
(1954). Phoenician letters were used for alphabetic numerals, rather as we use Greek or 
Latin. These were as the Greek alphabet but with three additional signs; the first of these, the 
digamma "f"  appeared sixth, in place of Z. As the digamma was obsolete in Greece its use as 
a numeral is clear. (See P.Keyser, op.cit., and § 4.10.)
66 This contrast in the uses of the mean is put to use by Aristotle when defining virtue and 
justice in Books //  and V of the Ethics (§§ 4.3(vi, vii), 4.5, 4.6 below).
67 8 exceeds 6 by 1/3, and falls short of 12 by 1/3. This proportion is generated by the 
formula C = 2(AB)/A+B.
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For discontinuous proportions the ratio between one term and a second, and between the 
second and a third, will be the same as that between two quite other terms. In the arithmetic 
proportion the ratio 2 : 4 is not only the same as the ratio 4 : 6, but for any integers m : n. Similarly 
with the geometric proportion the ratio of 2 : 4 is the same as 8 : 16 or 25 : 50. The harmonic 
proportion preserves the same part of the third term (in the fourth) as the second is of the first (e.g., 
if the first term is 20, and the second is, say, 3/4 of that (15), the same relation— the same portion or 
division— will hold for 48 (36), and for any other quantity, say, 16 (12), so that 48 : 36 :: 16 : 12)68.
The distinction between the separate and the continuous was observed for proportion theory 
throughout the classical period; Euclid gives his account of these in different books (V and VII). He 
is content mainly to edit the differing traditions and preserve the differing sources69. Yet what may 
have contributed to the difficulty commentators have found in Aristotle's writing connecting 
proportions with means (discussed in § 2.1) is the difference between 3-term (continuous) and 4-term 
(separate) proportions. (Indeed misplacing and misunderstanding Euclid's treatment of differences 
between continuous and separated proportions seriously distorted the mediaeval reading of Elements
V, and prevented the understanding of the definitions 5.4 and 5.5 for hundreds of years—this is 
outlined in § 3.7.) Properly, as has just been said, analogia requires four terms; the old 3-term 
proportion (with "the mean between the extremes") treated as a proportion needs four terms. The 
analogical principle whereby the same ratio holds between the second pair of elements as the first is 
more generally expressible by four terms than with three, even where the proportion is continuous 
and the mid-term repeated, hence analogy came to be expressed as "the first term is to the second as 
the third is to the fourth".
68 See §§2.1 and 6.6.
69 Euclid as an editor preserved the formulations of his originals and did not re-cast them 
without very good reason. Knorr (1975) p.303 writes:
He sought to change as little as possible of the completed treatises which were brought 
together in his compilation. Such is claimed by Pappus, apparently on the authority of 
Apollonius.
The repetitions in the structure of the Elements show that Euclid presents overlapping issues 
from different originals, and hence from different perspectives. See also Artmann (1991, p.2).
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1. 9 Mediaeval and modern conceptions of analogy
In classical proportion the format a : b :: c : d  is equivalent to aRb = cRd (the same relation
holds for both pairs of analogates— there is "an equality of ratios"). Conceptions of analogy which
have emerged over the last few hundred years differ significantly from this equivalence. At bottom,
modern notions of analogy suppose some form of ordered resemblance in disparate phenomena or
ambiguities of expression70. The difference between this and the classical conception needs to be
recognised in order to avoid misunderstanding as to the nature of the inferences involved71.
Thomists have written on analogy at length, especially in connexion with metaphysics, and often
relating univocal to equivocal uses of language72. Thomists such as Phelan hold that mathematical
analogy is not strict analogy because it applies only to quantifiable entities:
mathematical analogy — although the word analogy was first used to designate the proportion of 
one quantity to another — cannot be regarded as a strict analogy since it is valid only within the 
genus of dimensive quantity.73
He says, however, that St Thomas's treatment of mathematical analogy coincides in the essentials of
the Euclidean doctrine, and cites several passages to support this. Most of these turn out to be rather
vague74, but certain of Aquinas's remarks do clearly show a grasp of the essential mathematical
principles of analogy75. He also says that analogy relates two [not four] things, and that:—
70 As an example of current general philosophical conceptions of analogy (as apart from the 
specialist treatments in the following pages) analogy is defined by P.Angeles in the 
Dictionary o f  Philosophy (1981, p.8):
Originally a mathematical term ... The Greek term came later to mean the (usually 
linguistic) comparison o f similarities in concepts or things. 1 The pointing out o f 
similarities or resemblances between things. 2 A form of (usually inductive) inference in 
which from the assertion o f similarities between two things it is then reasoned that the 
things will probably also be similar in yet other respects.
(My italics.)
71 Misunderstanding classical inference damages accounts given of Aristotle’s use of it in 
such fields as biology and ethics (chapter 3 below).
72 Influentially Cajetan (De Nominum Analogica III and De Ente et Essentia Commentaria) 
elaborated (but departed from) Aquinas's uses of analogy. He divided analogy into differing 
types: those of inequality, attribution, and proportionality. Those of proportionality are 
further separated into the 'improper' and the 'proper'. (In the improper the analogates form 
into one pair which have the same formal meaning, but in the other pair there is a 
'metaphorical' predication. In 'proper' proportionality all the analogates are formally 
'proportional'.) See D.Burrell [1973] Analogy and Philosophical Language (1973) pp.l 1-12; 
G.Phelan (op.cit), R.M.McInery The Logic o f Analogy (1961) or B.Davies The Thought o f  
Thomas Aquinas (1992).
73 Ibid. p .18. Burrell (ibid. pp.10-11) also explicitly rejects classical analogy.
74 Ibid p.52 n.36; the commentaries on Ethics I, ref. § 96; Physics, lect. 10, n.7, 13, n.9; On 
the Heavens, lect. 14 nn. 3 ff., which Phelan mentions, do not clearly show the precise 
mathematical basis of analogy.
75 See § 4.1.
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The basic proposition in the doctrine of Thomistic analogy, in its strict and proper meaning, is 
that whatever perfection is analogically common to two or more beings is intrinsically (formally) 
possessed by each, not however, by any two in the same way or mode, but by each in proportion 
to its being.76
which takes the term "analogy" into fields far removed from Aristotle's use of it.
A great deal of work has also been done in cognitive science and related disciplines assuming 
the modern conceptions of analogy. The emphasis has not been on the equality of ratios, or on the 
principle that a comparison is to be compared, or on the condition holding among four terms, but 
rather on:
statements about the number of properties in common or about the degree of similarity between 
particulars77
sometimes between "large and complex domains of information"78. Both in modern Thomist 
philosophy and in the development of cognitive models analogy is taken to be a mapping procedure 
which specifically excludes classical analogy1'*. Models of classes or domains are favoured (often 
referred to as the base and target domains), in which it is hoped one will map onto the other. These 
are models of two terms or classes, not of four. It is curious, perhaps even ironic, that the notion of a 
mathematical model itself was generated by the initial application of the classical notion of analogy 
which has been so comprehensively ditched—the rules in Elements VI to determine the conditions to 
be met for two geometric figures to be similar, when generalised, were the rules for one complex of 
terms to map onto another80
76 1943 pp. 12-13.
77 J.Weitzenfeld 'Valid Reasoning by Analogy', Philosophy o f Science Journal 5 (1984 
pp.137-149). A recent text which treats analogy as essentially 'noticing similarities’ is Fluid 
Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models o f a Fundamental Mechanism o f 
Thought, by D.Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (1998).
78 M. Keane Where's the Beef?: the Absence o f Pragmatic Factors in Pragmatic Theories o f 
Analogy, Human Cognitive Research Laboratory Technical Report n.28 (1987).
79 (Ibid. p.2) Keane traces the history of research on analogical inference for cognitive 
science:
I shall begin by considering the work of Winston (1980, 1982, 1986) rather than with the 
seminal work of Evans (1968). My reason for excluding Evans lies in the fact that his 
concern lies with a special type of analogy (i.e., proportional analogies).
(T.Evans 'Program for the Solution of a Class of Geometric Analogy Intelligence Test 
Questions', in Semantic Information Processing; P.H.Winston 'Learning and Reasoning by 
Analogy', in Communications o f the Association fo r  Computing Machinery (1980), 'Learning 
New Principles from Precedents and Exercises', in Artificial Intelligence (1982), 'Learning by 
Augmenting Rules and Accumulating Censors', in Machine Learning II (1986).)
80 See § 2.8.
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An inllucntial approach in the modern investigations into analogical inference has been taken
by M.Hesse81 who bases analogy on a principle of similarity, not of identity. Her notion is that
analogical inference rests on a similarity of relations, not their equality; in this respect hers may be
taken as representative of modern conceptions of analogical inference. She regards this position as
traditional, but it is a tradition which excludes Aristotle and Kant (and stems ultimately from
Aquinas's attempts to reconcile differing treatments of 'substance' in Aristotle's writings). It might
be thought that it is from Kant that the application of analogical inference to empirical inquiry as a
form of systematic resemblance is derived, but this is not so. What he says is
In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in 
mathematics. In the latter they are formulas which express the equality of two quantitative 
relations, and are always constitutive; so that if three members of the proportion are given, the 
fourth is likewise given, that is, can be constructed. But in philosophy the analogy is not the 
equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations; and from three given members we 
can obtain a priori knowledge of the relation to a fourth, not the fourth member itself. The 
relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth in experience and a mark whereby it can be 
detected.82
Kant retains the equality of the relations. Outside mathematics the character of the fourth term is 
not guaranteed but there is no weakening of the relation. He does not view analogy as a treatment of 
similarity but as 'perfect similarity' (as with similar triangles). I.e., although Kant's use of analogy 
differs very greatly from Aristotle's, like Aristotle he uses it as a structure to locate the appropriate 
equality. He goes further, he regards analogy as the form of inference which operates exactly where 
there is no resemblance:
Such knowledge is knowledge by analogy, which means not, as the word is commonly taken, an 
imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of two relations between quite 
dissimilar things.83
If we take the classical (Aristotelian) format of a : b :: c : d, it displayed the same relation between 
the two pairs of terms. Like Kant's Aristotle's use of analogy is perfectly applicable to "quite 
dissimilar things" without any requirement to discover some common property or degrees of 
resemblance in virtue of which disparate clusters of phenomena will be found to correspond. (This 
application forms the core of Aristotle's solution to the problem of exchange-value; a solution which 
students of the history of economics have failed to grasp exactly because of the lack of familiarity
81 ’On Defining Analogy', in Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society (1959-60 pp.79-100).
82 Critique o f Pure Reason A179 (trans. Kemp-Smith).
83 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, s.580 (trans. P.G.Lucas). (Berkeley had issued a 
similar warning in Alciphron, fourth dialogue.)
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with Aristotle's use of the Eudoxian proportion theory84.) For both Aristotle and Kant the
correspondence of the relations among wholly dissimilar clusters is quite often the virtue of analogy.
The analogical relation in its classical format is expressed as aRb = cRd. With Hesse's
conception of analogical inference the equality is reduced to a mere similarity of relations. The
classical formula does not hold, and must be replaced by some other formula which connects aRb
with cR'd. Hesse says (p.80):
for the assertion in the case of an analogy of the relation between a and b, and a relation between 
c and d, was always qualified by the remark that these two relations are not identical, but only 
similar in some relevant respect .... thus it seems that we should make the analogy equivalent to 
the existence of two similar relations R, R', such that aRb and cR'd.
For the question "How are R and R ' connected?” Hesse gives a 'distributive lattice'— which is an
algebra of lattices drawn from set-theory85 For Hesse an analogy occurs where a sufficient number of
properties are found to correspond between classes. The lattice is to enable an adequate match for a
qualifying number of such properties86.
In addition to the weakening of the relation from equality to one of mere similarity ("an
imperfect similarity") the modern conceptions of formal analogy, such as those of Hesse,
Weitzenfeld, Winston, Keane, and Hofstadter, imagine a connexion between two clusters, i.e., they
attempt some comparison between a base and target. Mathematical models are used, but by not
isolating the relations in the models from the properties, the comparison reduces to a 'first order'
comparison between two clusters, i.e., to a direct comparison between two (groups of) things.
Together, the reduction of the relation to some principle of similarity, and the similarity being
between "two things", not merely departs from Kant’s formulation but inverts it. He objected that
analogy is not an imperfect similarity of two things but a perfect similarity of the relations between
things. In classical and Kantian analogy the comparison must be indirect exactly because a direct
comparison may not be available (e.g., 47° is not directly comparable with any number of square
feet). The outstanding value of analogy for Aristotle and Kant is its capacity to draw into an exact
84 Many writers on the history of economic thinking, as a result, grossly undervalue 
Aristotle's proposals. Even his greatest admirers, such as Karl Marx, could not recognise the 
nature of Aristotle's argument (see chapter 6).
85 Lattice theory uses principles modelled on intersection (join) and union (meet) which 
allows for differing levels of sets.
86 See also Burrell's comments on Hesse's proposals (from a very different stance from mine),
1973 pp. 18-19.
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account things which cannot be compared directly. This virtue is lost where the first- and second- 
order distinction is blurred into a 'sufficient' resemblance of properties and an inexact "equivalent to 
the existence of two similar relations". (This supposition that analogy is the pursuit of an imperfect 
similarity of properties has had an adverse effect even on the study of Aristotle’s use of it; see note 71 
and §§ 3.4-3.6.)
In origin analogy was a mathematically technical notion; this was later loosened up to be used 
to indicate (mere) resemblances between things. This weaker, vague sense became so widespread 
that, in turn, technically mathematical programmes were devised to capture it. The original rigour 
and sophistication of mathematical analogical inference was then replaced by cruder and vaguer 
methods to treat this shallower understanding. Its no use complaining that the concept of analogical 
inference as it has developed is "wrong", but we may insist that, in becoming once again 
mathematical, as it is normally conceived and practised in several fields, it is a much more feeble 
mathematically technical conception than it had been, or as had been used by either Aristotle or 
Kant.
There is an outstanding exception among current researchers into analogical modes of 
inference: Dedre Gentner, with her collaborators, isolates the relational character of analogical 
mapping processes; i.e. they take the relations between objects in the "base" to project onto the 
"target". This treats the very feature which I have said distinguishes proportions from ratios. In 
proportion it is the relation between the terms, i.e., the ratio itself, that is mapped, not the terms. 
Gentner’s method*7 captures this central distinction. Her work has been very influential, but that has 
been despite her understanding of this central feature of analogical inference, not because of it.
87 Known as the Structure-Mapping Engine (it is proposed in several articles, see under 
'Gentner' in the works cited). Where Hesse borrows Irom set theory, Gentner borrows rules 
from the predicate calculus whereby the properties (one-place predicates) of the objects in the 
base domain arc disregarded and only the relations (two or more-place predicates) between 
them are preserved; these are then mapped onto the target domain. The mapping will fall 
under a higher-order relation acting as a higher-order lunction taking the lower-order 
relations as arguments.
An earlier exception to the general approach to analogy (from a very different standpoint) is 
found in Fr. S.Brown's The World o f Imagery (1927) in which he argues for the open-ended 
hierarchical character of analogical comparison.
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Chapter 2
IRRATIONALS
2. 1 KYPIttZ AN A A O n  A
Interpreters have often objected to Aristotle’s expression "arithmetic proportion"; Heath says it
is not an expression we would use now, nor one used by Euclid nor Apollonius nor Archimcdes88
Heath overstates this; we don't know if they did or not, very little of what they actually wrote
survives. Commentators have tended not to see the arithmetic proportion as a proportion but as mere
quantitative equality, and complain that Aristotle's repeated uses of the arithmetic proportion (in the
Ethics especially) are really demonstrations of arithmetic progression89. This insistence has led to
difficulties for the interpretation of the theory of justice. The main difficulty has been the vagueness
and seeming inconsistency in Aristotle's 'proportion' language; problems have arisen partly because
Aristotle’s terminology looks anomalous and partly because he used the three then contemporary
senses of the term dvaA-oyicx, one of which became obsolete. These commentators indicate that
Aristotle's usage is both mathematically incorrect and needlessly complicated. But Archytas's
definitions show Aristotle's usage was the standard mathematical vocabulary of the age. His
definitions (§ 1.7 above) show that Aristotle was not alone, we know from Iamblichus that
"the most perfect proportion" consisting of four terms and called 'musical', which, according to 
tradition, was discovered by the Babylonians and was first introduced into Greece by Pythagoras. 
It was used, he says, by many Pythagoreans, e.g. (among others) Aristaeus of Croton, Timaeus of 
Locri, Philolaus and Archytas of Tarentum, and finally by Plato in the Timaeus.9(1
So the mathematicians had more than one form of proportion, and they called the other sorts
something other than "geometrical". When at NE V 1131bl3 Aristotle says
this kind of proportion is termed by mathematicians geometrical proportion
88 Mathematics in Aristotle (1949) p.273.
89 Grant (ref. Book II 1106a35) insists on "arithmetic progression" as against geometric 
proportion, but raises no objection to the expression as used in Book V chapter 4. Burnet 
(1900 pp.216-17) and H.Rackham (NE 1926 pp.91 and 274) object to the arithmetic 
proportion as a proportion.
90 Heath 1921, I p .86 referring to In Nicomachi p. 118.
The Timaeus reference is 36a, though Plato does not name the proportion. He says:—
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he is reporting the mathematicians own usage. As Iamblichus refers to "the most perfect proportion"
he must allow that there are others, even if less perfect. Nicomachus (as Iamblichus indicates) also
commented on the arithmetic proportion, as did Proclus. Nicomachus used the term 'proportion' to
cover more than one mode of connexion; he wrote (op.cit. II, 21, 2);
Proportion, pre-eminently, is the bringing together to the same (point) of two or more ratios; or 
more generally of two or more relations, even though they are not subjected to the same ratio but 
to a different or some other (rule).
Proclus said that Eudoxus added three new proportions, and a further four were found later91— and
were all spoken of as "proportions". Thrasyllus also said there were the three proportions92.
Difficulty emerged because, as Iamblichus said,
it is premissed that it was the geometric which the ancients called proportion pre-eminently, 
though it is now common to apply the name generally to the remaining means as well.
Again
the second, the geometric mean has been called proportion pre-eminently because the terms 
contain the same ratio, being separated according to the same proportion.93
And of the proportions Adrastus (reported by Theon94) said:
the geometric was called both proportion pre-eminently and primary ... though other means were 
also commonly called proportions by some writers.
What seems to me to be the anachronistic objection to Aristotle's expression "arithmetical
proportion" has its source in the comments found in such authors. Falling in with them Burnet
treated the geometric as pure proportion, he wrote95
originally avaXoyia. was confined to geometric proportion (ratio) but that by Aristotle's time it 
was already extended to series in arithmetical progression (1106a35) and later it was used for all 
manner of series.
there were two kinds of means, the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of its 
extrem es,.... the other being that kind of mean which exceeds and is exceeded by an equal 
number. (Jowett.)
91 Proclus (A Commentary on the First Book o f Euclid's Elements, p.67).
The three Eudoxian additions were (i) (a -  b) : (b — c) = a : c; (ii) (a -  b) : (b -  c) = c : b;
(iii) (a -  b) : (b -  c) = b : a. The four later discoveries were (iv) (a — c) : (a — b) = b : c;
(v) (a — c) : (a -  b) = a : b; (vi) (a -  c ) : (a -  b) = a : c; and (vii) (a -  c) : (b -  c) = b : c. 
(See van der Waerden 1954 p.232.)
92 Heath, who reports this (1926 II p.292), thinks that Thrasyllus was confused.
93 On the Pythagorean Life (p.98; I4 ;p .l00 , 15; p. 104, 19).
94 Heath, ibid.
95 1900 p.216; Burnet refers to J.Gow (i.e., to A Short History o f Greek Mathematics, 1884, 
p.93) to support his view.
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But despite Theon and the conflicts in Iamblichus's account this does not accord with what is known 
of mathematical principles from before Aristotle's time. Of the original three proportions the third 
(the first sub-contrary or harmonic) could have been discovered only in the presence of the simpler 
modes96. Since all these explorations took place before Aristotle's day (evidenced by Archytas’s 
definitions) Burnet has inverted the history of the subject; the sub-contrary proportion, in particular, 
was explored by early Pythagoreans in connexion with their harmonic researches. Contrary to his 
earlier remarks that avaA-oyia originally applied only to the geometric proportion Burnet later, in 
his Early Greek Mathematics (1930 p. 106), says that the first sub-contrary was associated with the 
discovery of the octave, and almost certainly went back to Pythagoras himself. (Any 'original' 
mathematical use of non-geometric avaXoyioc would then, on his own account, have had to have 
been even earlier than Pythagoras.) That the geometric proportion was spoken of both as pure 
proportion and as one of the classical modes of it has been a confusing feature of Aristotle's uses of 
analogy. He frequently presents the very same mathematical objects anaglyphically as contrasting:
(i) proportional vs. quantitative equality, 
with
(ii) geometric vs. arithmetic equality.
Spoken o{qua (ii) both terms are proportional, but qua (i) only one term is proportional. Aristotle's 
vagueness in borrowing these mathematical contrasts has more to it than mere vagueness. The 
whole of Particular justice is conceived in terms of proportionality yet, at the same time, proportion is 
invoked only when it is needed (Aristotle does not, as he is routinely accused, drag in proportional 
and mathematical principles where they do not apply). In some instances plain equality expresses 
perfectly well the circumstance in which justice prevails. Even though the plain equality is also the 
arithmetic proportion, there would have seemed to Aristotle (and his audience, who were familiar 
with discussions couched in terms of proportionality97) little need to bring-up the more complex 
principle when the simpler contrast would work. Yet properly speaking in terms of his theory,
96 The Pythagorean interest in the different forms of proportion, not merely ratio, is seen in 
Philolaus's exploration of geometric figures. The cube exhibits the harmonic proportion 12 :
8 :: 6 : 4, i.e., 12(edges) : 8(corners) :: 6(faces) : 4(sides to each face). See also §§ 6.3 and 
6.4.
97 The language of proportionality would have been very much 'in the air' at the Academy and 
the Lyceum.
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Aristotle ought to speak of the terms qua their mode of proportion: the arithmetical mode in the case 
of plain equality, and the geometric mode where only 'proportion' is mentioned—even though to do 
that might seem pedantic. This running together of two ways of construing the same terms is the 
single most complicating factor in Aristotle's theory of justice.
There has been a second difficulty in respect of means and proportions. Concurring with
Jackson, Heath (1926 / / p .292, commenting on Elements VII.20) accepts that there were differences
of definition of proportion among the writers of later antiquity, yet his decision (p.293) that:
the natural conclusion to be that of Nesselmann, that originally the geometric proportion was 
called analogia, the others, the arithmetic, the harmonic, etc. means; but later usage had 
obliterated the distinction98
cannot be correct; the three modes were clearly differentiated from at least the time of Pythagoras—
and Archytas, we have seen, referred to the "three proportions in music". It seems most likely that
the wider notion covering the three classical forms were spoken of as proportions alongside the more
limited geometric usage. The habit of referring to the geometric, arithmetic or harmonic proportion
interchangeably with mean was quite unproblematic and unambiguous whenever the difference
between a mean and a proportion was not the issue99. When it becomes an issue the distinction
between a mean and a proportion (indicated above at § 1.7) will need to be kept in mind. Those
objecting to the language of arithmetic and harmonic proportions—such as Iamblichus
(intermittently), Theon of Smyrna, Nesselmann, Gow, Grant, Burnet, Heath100, Rackham and
Soudekm—tend to mistake what is merely the position (as it were) of the fulcrum for the equilibrium
of the whole structure it supports. To say of one such set-up— the geometric—that it is "properly" a
proportion but that the harmonic and arithmetic set-ups are not is to misconceive the nature of means
and proportions (the mean being, as said earlier, the central point of what is in balance rather than
the whole). What probably led commentators to elevate the Geometric was the success of that
98 Heath and Jackson (p.87) both refer to G.H.F.Nesselmann (der Algebra der Greichen, 1842 
pp.2 10 -2 12 ), who claimed that the geometric was a (presumably the) proportion, and the 
others |ieaoTT|TE<;.
99 See § 1.7 note 56 for Iamblichus's reference to the three proportions in music.
1(10 In his remarks on Elements V.6 (1926 II p .129) Heath defends from M.Simon (Euclid und 
die seclis planimetrischen Bucher, 1901 p.l 10), the translations "proportion", "in proportion", 
and "proportional" as all suitable for avocXoyov, on the basis that the meaning in each case is 
perfectly in order. Simon claimed the translation should express 'standing in the relation of 
proportion', and asked 'What is proportional to what?'; Heath thought this too fussy, but he 
didn't extend an equivalently laudable flexibility in usage to the ancients.
101 Pp.54-58.
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proportion when expanded into the general theory of magnitudes. Thereafter the capacity to bear an 
equal multiple became a vital criterion in deciding a proportion. The difficulty for the distinction of 
forms of proportion from forms of equality, and between means and proportions, have arisen 
because, in both cases, it was simultaneously convenient to use the terms both narrowly and broadly. 
But the fact that it is no longer the custom to employ the notion of the arithmetic proportion is not 
reason enough to cavil at Aristotle's use of it. Neither is there reason to suppose that the original 
users were unable to discriminate the uses102.
2. 2 Terminology
The note of uncertainty over the correct terminology for means, proportions and ratios that 
was sounding by later antiquity increased during the Middle Ages, and has unfortunately been 
projected forward, we have seen, to more recent times. But that uncertainty should not be projected 
back to the classical period. In his theory of justice Aristotle employs proportion theory throughout, 
and assumes a familiarity with it in his audience. The confusion which arose—even before the onset 
of the Dark Ages—has been in part due to terminology, but reciprocally, what generated the unclear 
language was the confusion in the ideas. The doctrine of proportion in Euclid's Elements, especially 
Book V, upon which Aristotle relies, is the very text which suffered the most subfusc 
misapprehension for so long. The vicissitudes of Elements V have a bearing on the understanding of 
the theory of justice in that it is only through the awareness of Aristotle's use of proportion theory 
that the cogency of his argument may be seen. Correspondingly, unfamiliarity with the true classical 
proportion theory made use of by Aristotle vitiated both the translation and the interpretation of Book
V of the Ethics. The tale is also instructive in demonstrating just how elusive the central principles 
of analogy have been103.
1(12 There is no lack of clarity when Aristotle speaks of ratio rather than proportion (such as at 
N E II  1 106a35, V 1 131bl3, 1131 b34-l 132a).
103 Of the several routes by which the Elements have survived:
(i) Theon of Alexandria (4th century AD) produced an edition of the Elements which differed 
somewhat from the original. All the Western and most of the Eastern editions stemmed from 
this version until 1809 when Peyrard discovered a more accurate manuscript descending from 
a pre-Theonine script: all modern editions are based on this more reliable text.
(ii) The oldest direct Greek-Latin translation to survive into the Middle Ages was Boethius's 
(5th century a d ) through Cassiodorus's Institutiones, Book 11 (8th-9th century; see J.Murdoch,
The Transmission o f Euclid, in Dictionary IV  p.437-59).
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We might expect the Latin for ratio to have been ratio, but it became proportio; and for 
proportion proportionalitates (which can be a little confusing104). Roger Bacon noticed that in his 
Special Edition of the Elements /Ethelhard calls medietates what he called proportionalitates in the 
initial translation and his earlier abridged commentary105. The principles and terminology of the 
theory of proportions were so muddied by Bacon's time (mid-13th century) that he could gain no idea 
of what the theory was. (The errors of interpretation which undermined the theory will be reported 
briefly after the theory itself has been given at §. 2.9.)
(iii) There were two distinct sources of the Arabic translations and commentaries, (a) a 
Theonine copy of the Elements was sent by the emperor Constantine V to the Caliph in AD 
760. About 40 years later Haroun ar-Raschid's vizier had it translated into Arabic by al-Hajjaj 
(who translated it twice). From this many Arabic translations (and also translations into 
Syriac, Hebrew, Persian and Armenian) were derived. /Ethelhard of Bath translated the work 
from this Arabic tradition in Toledo in 1126 (where he also made use of the Boethian text), 
followed by an abridgement (Commentum) and later a fuller Editio Specialis. (M.Clagett 'The 
Medieval Latin Translations from the Arabic of the Elements of Euclid, with Special 
Emphasis on the Versions of Adelard of Bath' in Isis 44, 1953, pp. 16-42). The second Arabic 
source (b) is of unknown but pre-Theonine provenance. This was the tradition used in the 9th 
century school of Ishaq ibn Hunain and Thabit ibn Qurra. (J.Shonbeck Euclidean and 
Archimedean Traditions in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, in Companion /, pp. 173- 
84.) Gerard of Cremona translated both variants in the mid-twelfth century—the Theonine 
text taken from a renowned commentary by al-NairTzi. Campanus produced his re-working of 
/Ethclhard's Commentum (not the more extensive Specialis text) in 1259; this became the 
most widely used of the many versions of the Elements in the West during the Middle Ages.
(iv) The Byzantine emperor Manuel I sent a number of ancient works to Sicily with 
Aristippus as a gift to King William the Bad. (G.Sarton Introduction to the History o f 
Science 2i, 1931.) Of these Aristippus translated the Phaedo, Meno and Book IV  of 
Aristotle's Meteorology, but not the Elements nor Ptolemy's Almagest. These were translated 
shortly after 1160 by an anonymous ex-medical student from Salerno. His was the most exact 
translation of the Elements there has ever been. (Murdoch 'Euclides graeco-latinus: A 
Hitherto Unknown Medieval Latin Translation of the Elements Made Directly from the 
Greek', in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 71 (1966) pp.249-302). Unfortunately this 
fine work was little known.
(v) Cardinal Bessarion had three Greek MSS of the work in his great library, in addition to 
the (by then traditional) Campanus recension. In 1468 Bessarion gave to Venice his 
collection of nearly six hundred texts saved from the fall of Constantinople. In Venice in 
1505 Zamberti used these manuscripts for the first printed translation of the Elements from 
the Greek (the text from the Arabic-/Ethelhard-Campanus tradition had been printed there in 
1482). Thereafter innumerable translations were printed, even in the sixteenth century; of 
these Tartaglia's commentary (of 1543) was of special importance in that Vincenzo Galilei 
knew it (see § 3.7, note 239). (It was first translated into English in 1570 by Billingsley.)
I1>4 Murdoch keeps to this usage (The Medieval Language o f Proportions: Elements o f the 
Interaction with Greek Foundations and the Development o f New Mathematical Techniques, 
in A.C.Crombie (ed.) Scientific Change, 1963 pp.237-71). Translating Xoyoc, as proportio 
rather than ratio seems to stem from Boethius's Arithmetica and De Institutio Musica—see 
L.Minio-Paluello's response to Murdoch in Crombie p.309. Ratio came to be used for 
'character' or 'essence' through a development which traces back to Empedocles. In PA I 
642a20ff. Aristotle speaks of the essence of bone as a Xojog, i.e., that it is composed of 
elements combining in a given ratio, rather as we think of chemical elements. This was a 
principle of Empedocles.
105 Roger Bacon Communia Mathematica (trans. R.Steele, 1940, p. 125).
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2. 3 The problem of the irrationals
The earliest Greek mathematicians had supposed that every ratio of continuous magnitudes 
would correspond to a ratio of whole numbers106. A pair of lines provides the simplest example 
where such an equivalence was expected. Any pair of lines should be exactly measurable by some 
smaller length, but at some stage it was discovered that it this is not always so. Neither was the 
absence only from remote cases, but in the plainest, most unavoidable examples. The side of the 
square was found to be incommensurable with its diagonal, and the circumference of the circle with 
the diameter. The line divided in "extreme and mean ratio"107—the "golden section" as Kepler later 
called it— was also found to yield incommensurable lines. The construction of the regular pentagon 
used the golden section, as did the dodecahedron, icosahedron108, and the inscribed pentagram109. 
Attempts to locate the mid-point of the octave also led directly to the discovery of V2."° The kind of 
problem which the discovery generated can be seen most vividly with the simple example of a 
rectangle of 1 x 9 units compared with one of 1 x 8. A square 3 x 3  units covers exactly the same 
area as the figure 1 x 9, but no square can be constructed which precisely covers the same area as 1 x
8 units. The fact appears counter-intuitive, and yet in a physically obvious way it demonstrates how 
the rational understanding of the world was undermined. To account for the world through reason 
had meant, fundamentally, that it was exhaustively and precisely ordered, both numerically and 
geometrically. It was not merely that Pythagoras had concocted some 'mystical' view of the world 'as
106 Philolaus, Fragments 4, 11, and Aristotle in Metaphysics A 990al8ff., N  1090a20-25.
107 Elements VI def.3 (Heath):
A straight line is said to have been cut in extreme and mean ratio when, as the whole line 
is to the greater segment, so is the greater to the less.
VI, 30 gives the procedure to cut a given (finite) straight line in mean and extreme ratio.
108 Elements XIII, 16 gives the rules to construct the icosahedron, and XIII, 17 the 
dodecahedron.
109 The pentagon with inscribed pentagram creates an infinite regress. The pentagram with 
inscribed pentagon was an emblematically Pythagorean figure. The early Pythagorean 
interest in the figures associated with the pentagon is confirmed by coins from Chalcis of 480 
bc  showing the five-pointed wheel. Other coins from Metapontum from 440 b c  have been 
found—Metapontum was a Pythagorean stronghold until they were ejected at about that time 
(see Artmann 1993). R.Herz-Fischler A Mathematical History o f Division in Extreme and 
Mean Ratio (1987), and The golden number, and division in extreme and mean ratio, in 
Companion, vol.2, pp. 1576-83 (1994) examines issues of mean and extreme ratio. See also 
J.H0yrup Babylonian Mathematics (ibid. vol.l, pp.21-28). Von Fritz ('The Discovery of 
Incommensurability by Hippasus of Metapontum' in Annals o f Mathematics, 1946) claims that 
it was the anthyphairetic process applied to the lines in extreme and mean ratio which 
revealed their irrationality (see Knorr 1975 pp.29-30).
110 A.Wasserstein 'Theaetetos and the History of the Theory of Numbers' in Classical 
Quarterly (1958).
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number’, and that this pseudo-science was threatened by the irrational. On the contrary it was the 
most mundane facts of experience (two straight lines) that defied a complete rational explanation. 
The side and diagonal of a square taken together meet the requirements for ratio in Euclid's 
definitions (V 1-5): they were related with respect to size, they were of the same kind, and they were 
capable when multiplied of exceeding one another. And yet the relation was indefinite, inexact and 
inexhaustive. Even though the definitions imposed a limit (rapai;) on the contrariety 'greater/less' 
(which fell under t o  a 7teipov— § 1.4 above) the ratio of no two numbers whatever could show the 
relation of the two lines, \oyoq , the paradigm for the rational, was found unavoidably to contain 
a.Xoyov (as with the methods of approximation). This is why on page 9 I said that where there was a 
difference between the terms ratio only aims to quantify that difference, rather than "ratio quantifies 
the difference exactly". At the heart of the most exact science lurked t o  ccTtetpov, the inexact, 
irrational, unlimited unreason. Aoyoq had failed.
2. 4 The discovery
Speculation about the discovery of the problem has been enormous111 but who discovered it, 
and when, is of marginal relevance to our inquiry. The speculations are relevant in only one respect: 
the impact the discovery of the irrationals had on philosophical, not strictly mathematical, issues. 
The accounts of the discovery by scholars have been bound-up with their views on the nature of 
Greek mathematics. The more traditional view has been that the discovery had a shattering effect on 
the Pythagoreans in that it undermined their unified account of the world112. They were faced with 
problems which could not be tackled arithmetically; it was beyond the hope of numbers to double the
111 The ancient references to the discovery are found in Iamblichus (circa a d  250-325), On 
the Pythagorean Life; Pappus (circa a d  320), Commentary on Book X o f Euclid's Elements; 
and Proclus (circa a d  410-85, op. cit.). Speculation as to the discovery is found in Tannery 
(1887), Zeuthen (1910, 1915), Heath (1921), von Fritz (1945), van der Wacrden (1954), 
Neugebauer (1957), Wasserstein (1958), Burkert (1972 ch.6), Knorr (1975 ch.2), Fowler 
(1979 pp.294ff.).
112 Zeuthen, Tannery, Heath, Neugebauer, van der Waerden and Burkert felt that the 
discovery brought about a shift from arithmetic and (proto)algebraic thinking which had been 
absorbed from Egyptian, Phoenician and Babylonian sources. The Mesopotamians had an 
ancient tradition of what largely corresponds to algebraic mathematics (including quadratic 
equations of considerable sophistication). After the appearance of the irrationals it was found 
that arithmetic or algcbraic techniques could only ofler methods of approximation, not 
exactitude.
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cube113, trisect an angle, or square the circle. So the world could not be explained by, nor correspond 
to, natural numbers. Not only was the irrational found in the most inconvenient places, a proof 
appeared which showed that any attempt to explain certain magnitudes numerically leads to a 
contradiction114
More recent historians115 have tended to minimise the impact of the discovery; they claim that 
the mathematical evidence (such as it is) appears unperturbed by the presence of irrationals. But 
even if we were to accept the views of those who say that the irrationals presented no embarrassment 
to Greek mathematics, numbers and spatial magnitudes could no longer enjoy a common set ol rules, 
or fall within a single general theory. As a result, over and above any difficulties that might be faced 
by the philosophy of mathematics, cosmology was deeply affected. The Pythagorean aim was more 
than mathematical, rather it was to achieve a comprehensive account of reality116. Since magnitudes 
were found to which no number would correspond priority could no longer be assigned to arithmetic,
113 Apollo, as god of both music and mathematics, set this problem: to double the size of His 
insufficient altar at Delos. The problem reduced to the location of a second mean: a : x :: x  : 
y :: y : b. Plato also speaks of the question of a second mean in the Timaeus 32b (Jowett):
as the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by 
two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have 
the same proportion-so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is 
to water so is water to earth).
114 Aristotle refers to this proof in Pr. An. 41a27-29. Using the odd/even polarity, with a 
reductio argument, it is assumed that the side of a right isosceles triangle is commensurable 
with its diagonal. Odd numbers result in being equal to even numbers. A variant of the proof 
is given by Euclid in Elements X; this is equivalent to the demonstration that given a right 
isosceles triangle (abc) with the hypotenuse (ah) held to be commensurable with the sides (ac, 
cb) of mutually prime integers (h and s), then h > 1. h : s => h2 : s2; but from Pythagoras's 
theorem h2 = 2s2. Hence, as h equals 2 x something, h is even; and as they are mutual primes 
,y must be odd. Now h being even, let h = 2n; again, from Pythagoras, (2n)2 = 2s2, so 2s2 = 
4n2; then 2n2 = s2. As s2 equals 2 x something, s must be even. As the assumption that the 
hypotenuse is commensurable with the side results in the absurdity that the side is both odd 
and even the assumption must be false, and the terms must be incommensurable.
115 Such as Szabo (1978), S.Unguru ( On the Need to Rewrite the History of Greek 
Mathematics', in Archive 15 pp.67-1 14, 1975), Knorr (1975, ch.2), Mueller (1981), and 
Fowler (who reviews the evidence, 1987 pp.294-308). The tenor of their approach is that 
mathematicians, then as now, liked to get on with the mathematics leaving foundational crises 
to Sunday afternoons.
116 Reported by Aristotle in Metaphysics A 985b23ff (Ross):
Contemporary with these philosophers [sc. Leucippus and Democritus], and before them, 
the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the 
first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles 
were the principles of all things. Since of these principles numbers are by nature the first, 
and in numbers they seemed to see many resemblances to the things that exist and come 
into being ... since, again, they saw that the attributes and the ratios of the musical scales 
were expressible in numbers; since then, all other things seemed in their whole nature, 
they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things.
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nor to any 'arithmetic geometry'. The sudden appearance of the proof of the impossibility of their 
aim being met could not but have been of central importance: their single comprehensive account of 
the world had evaporated. Those thinkers whose interests went beyond purely mathematical 
questions117 were inevitably concerned at the impossibility of giving an exact value to magnitudes 
arithmetically, and by the lack of correspondence between numerical and spatial quantities. Exact 
integrated and exhaustive knowledge was now felt to be impossible to attain (the pursuit of 
exactitude now leading to an infinite regress). Only methods of approximation were available where 
it had been confidently assumed that precise and complete knowledge was within reach.
I have so far treated irrational and incommensurable as equipollent, but properly speaking 
incommensurable terms do not share a common measure, whereas 'irrational' applies where the value 
of a term is not expressible as a natural number. Irrationals lack precision. It is misleading to refer 
to irrational 'numbers', numbers, to be numbers, had to be exact. The failure to locate any exact 
measure is what most concerned Greek thinkers; the term they used (aXoyog) indicates the 
profoundly disturbing character of the issues their discovery raised (see § 1.4). Treated 
geometrically, if not arithmetically, all magnitudes will have some exact measure, but even where an 
exact measure was possible an exact and complete account was not. When incommensurable 
magnitudes are in ratio (i.e., where they are of the same kind, and a multiple of the lesser will exceed 
the greater) all that could be shown (as with methods of approximation) was the minimal information 
required to count as knowledge. I.e., that no more than the principle 'greater than' applies. The 
precise measurable comparison was missing.
Whether the discovery was early or late, shattering or a mere anomaly, the conflicting 
aetiologies agree on at least one thing: the irrationals were known prior to Plato’s establishment of 
the Academy (about 387bc)118. A major aim of the Academy was to bring a higher standard of 
rigour to mathematics; three of the mathematicians associated with it—Theodorus, Theaetetus, and
117 I.e., mathematicians such as Archytas, Eudoxus, Euclid.
118 That the issue was an entirely familiar, standard, subject is shown by Plato's joking about 
irrational quantities in the Republic VII 534d. He says that children who arc to become the 
rulers should not be irrational quantities, as in geometry. (But Plato treats commensurability 
very seriously in Laws VII, 819 D ff..)
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Eudoxus—were concerned with the problem of the irrationals, and it is clear that these issues were at 
the heart of the mathematics associated with the Academy.
2. 5 ANTANEIPE2I2 vs. AN©Y<J>AIPEZIX
The earliest method of dealing with irrational magnitudes was that of reciprocal subtraction 
(avGtxpaipecK;)119. Berg translates this term as "removing of the immediate opposite"12"; Liddell & 
Scott give a less restricted meaning: take away again or in turn. Augustus de Morgan interpreted 
the definitions of ratio with which we began (Elements 5.3 and 5.4) as (in effect) definitions of the 
anthyphairetic process. In his view "the relation is with respect to quantuplicity not size" (i.e., ratio 
tells how many times one quantity may be taken from the other). Against a foundational status for 
dvGixpaipeaic; Becker argued that the anthyphairetic definition of proportion was developed solely to 
extend the numerical notion of proportion to cover incommensurable magnitudes'21. Knorr also 
claims that Theaetetus developed it as a necessary part of his exploration of irrationals, but with no 
programme to resolve the difficulties which the irrationals posed to mathematics as a whole. But 
whether it was foundational or not, when applied to incommensurable magnitudes the anthyphairetic 
technique does not escape the flaw that it is only a method of approximation; it must count or match 
an unending sequence. (Given any pair of natural numbers the process of reciprocal subtraction will 
terminate, but given a pair of continuous extensions the process might be unending; in such cases the 
magnitudes are incommensurable.)
Zeuthen, Dijksterhuis, and Becker122 each independently deduced that what we call the 
anthyphairetic theory of proportion was the source of the definition which Aristotle refers to in 
Topics:
It is easily proved, for instance, that the line parallel to the side and cutting the plane figure 
divides similarly the base and the area. But once the definition is stated, what is said becomes
119 Later known as continued fractions or as the Euclidean algorithm, though Fowler (e.g.,
1987, p.31) objects to these terms as harmful anachronisms for discussion of classical ratio or 
proportion theory. The ancient processes of ratio were, he says, subtractions not divisions, 
and continued fractions tend to be associated with more sophisticated fractions and with real 
numbers rather than with the original, principally geometric, methods.
120 C.Bcrg Grcesk-Dansk Ordbog, 1864.
121 O.Becker 'Eudoxus-Studien 1', Quellen und studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, 
Astronomie und Physik, Berlin, 2B, 1933 pp.311-333 (summarised in Van Der Waerden 
1954, pp. 175-179). His reading was accepted by the later Heath, and by Plooij and Szabo.
122 Discussed by van der Waerden (ibid.).
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immediately clear. For the areas and the bases have the same mutual exhaustion [avxaveipeau;]; 
such is the definition of the same ratio.123
But commenting on this passage Alexander of Aphrodisias said:
What is said expressed in such-like terms is not familiar, but it becomes familiar once the 
definition of "in proportion" is stated, that the line and the space are divided analogously by the 
drawn parallel. Now this is the definition of proportionals which the ancients used: these 
magnitudes are proportional to each other of which the reciprocal subtraction [avBixpaipean; | is 
the same. But he [Aristotle] has called reciprocal subtraction "mutual exhaustion" 
[avxaveipECTu;]. But those which are proportional to each other are also said to be connected in a 
similar manner | 6(iokb^| to each other. For this reason he has said "such is the primary 
definition of 'same ratio1" instead of "this is the definition of 'proportion'" .124
’Avxaveipeait; was a much commoner word than dvGucpaipeaiq, with a wider range of uses; Berg
translated avTavevpean; as 'cancelling out’; van der Waerden (who discusses Alexander’s remark)125
says that it was drawn from balancing against each other. Liddell & Scott say it was used for
corresponding diminution, alternate removal, cancellation, to be struck-off, cancelling opposite
sides o f an account, and to be cancelled correspondingly. In their record the two words look pretty
interchangeable, and indeed commentators have often assimilated them126. But if we take Berg's
more exacting translation there is a marked difference between the terms: on the one hand (with
dvGtxpaipeaig) there is an interactive process, and on the other (with avxaveipeau;) only a
corresponding sequence.
The extract from Topics is taken from a passage in which Aristotle reviews the difficulties in 
capturing ’first principles' in exact definition. Here, more than anywhere, we should expect Aristotle 
to be precise in his choice of expression (the need for exact terminology being the point of the 
discussion127). The mathematical illustration is chosen to display the care necessary when
123 158b29, as quoted by Knorr (1975 pp. 157-58).
124 In Topica, p.545. Translation by Walleis, slightly modified (Walleis left dvBtxpaipeaiq, 
avxaveipeau; and 6)j.oico<; in the Greek).
125 1954 p. 176; he reviews the writings of earlier commentators such as Heiberg, Zeuthen, 
Heath, Dijksterhuis, Becker, Plooij (1950). The issue was later treated by Szabo (1978, and 
earlier), Knorr (1975 p.290 n.26), Larsen (1984), Thorup (1992), and extensively by Fowler 
(1979, 1982, 1987, 1991).
126 Though not Heiberg or Heath; Heath attributes to Heiberg the proposal that in using 
avxaveipeau; rather than avBixpaipeait; Aristotle highlights the supposed fact that the rule 
could not supply a general proof in the pre-Eudoxian model (it treated commensurate 
magnitudes only), whilst he himself takes advantage of the new general theory. Heath thinks 
this interpretation unlikely (and needlessly complicated) whereas (1926 II pp. 120-21 n.22):
though Eudoxus had formulated the new definition, the old one was still current in the 
textbooks of Aristotle's time, and was taken by him as being a good enough illustration of 
what he wished to bring out in the passage of the Topics referred to.
127 It is by means of first principles that exact definition is achieved; How then, asks Aristotle, 
are these first principles themselves to be decided? Equivocation, polysemy and figuration are 
particularly to be guarded against for the correct rendering of the definitions of scientific
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determining first principles. Aristotle's preference for ocvTaveipeai^ is well chosen: unlike 
dvBixpaipeaic; mutual exhaustion figures in both reciprocal subtraction and corresponding bisection. 
When the measures are correspondingly bisected dvTaveipem<; is plainly seen. But equally, when 
measures are reciprocally subtracted mutual exhaustion is present. In both techniques the quantities 
correspondingly diminish, but there is interaction in only one. Consequently dvTaveipeCTK;, which 
occurs with both, is the 'first principle', and dvGucpaipEon; subsidiary. This is the reason, it seems to 
me, Aristotle stipulates dvxocveipecsK; as the definition of same ratio.
Aristotle does not, as Alexander thinks he does, distinguish same ratio from proportion— in 
fact in the Ethics Aristotle gives the definition of proportion as 'same ratio', just as Euclid did later 
(Euclid says ' "being in the same ratio" is defined ...' when giving the explanation of proportion). 
Yet Aristotle, as we have seen, sees a difference between dvxaveipEou; and avSwpoupemc,. 
Alexander's observation is therefore misleading; he treats the pair of terms 
avxaveipeoiq/avGucpaipeaic, as, in effect, mapping same ratio/proportion, which was far from 
Aristotle's thought.
Probably due to Alexander's assigning avTaveipecN; to same ratio, and ocvGutpaipemq to 
proportion, commentators have taken Alexander to be identifying the one method as the other128. 
This is not quite what is said; rather what he says indicates that the two methods are reducible to 
practical equivalence. To be so reducible there had to exist the two distinct principles; there was, in 
Alexander's reading of Aristotle's mind, some difference between the terms same ratio and 
proportion which were, nevertheless treatable opoico^. In mistakenly (in my view) projecting the 
two mathematical techniques onto a supposed difference between same ratio and proportion 
Alexander did not bring out with sufficient clarity Aristotle's considered preference for the term
principles, and the inferences closely tied to them (or, indeed to any scientific or analytic 
principles).
128 Artmann (1993 p.31 n.46) regards them as synonymous. M.Larsen (p.2 of 'On the 
Possibility of a Pre-Euclidean Theory of Proportions', in Centaurus 27, 1984 pp. 1-25) 
explicitly treats the two methods as equivalent; and Byrne (1997, pp. 112-17, 139) speaks of 
antaneiresin but in fact describes dv0wpaipeai.<;. Fowler (1987 p.32) says
Some [e.g., Heiberg and Heath] have argued that the two words have different meanings, 
but I shall treat them as synonymous, as did Alexander of Aphrodisias.
In fact Alexander did not treat them as synonymous, but just how much he grasped of 
Aristotle's reason in selecting ctvTaveipeon; I'm not sure. Fowler cites documents from the 
Xenon archive (as he does again in 1991, p. 107) which show their indifferent use in 
commercial accounts for the autumn of 251bc and the summer of 243. For many such 
purposes the terms, of course, would have been equivalent.
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dvxavEipeCTit;. By Alexander's day (2nd century ad) these earlier conceptions had long been 
superseded by the Euclidean theory, but Alexander's puzzlement tells us (when we look into the 
context of the Topics extract and the etymology of the word which Alexander thought Aristotle oddly 
selected) that there once had been two distinct pre-Euclidean conceptions of analogy (which 
Alexander wrongly saw as the distinction between proportion and same ratio). The two approaches 
reflect the two suppositions (perhaps even presuppositions) as to the nature of mathematics which I 
alluded to at § 1.2. The periodicity was conceived as either a process or a condition. As a process it 
was the active, de Morgan-like notion, associated with avGvxpaipeau; and Theaetetus. Thought of as 
a condition it was the passive, Heath-like concept, resting on the avTaveipEaic^ of successive 
bisections.
Although the Topics extract is frequently cited, the broader passage from which it is taken is 
rarely mentioned, consequently the rather casual (though sometimes insistent—see the last few 
notes) identification of the terms has obliterated the logical linesse which Aristotle brings. His 
sensitive choice of expression should be recognised, but unfortunately Fowler's dismissive:
The mathematical proposition that Aristotle is describing, in his typically vague fashion 
is all too representative. Aristotle is not directly concerned to make a mathematical proposition; his 
purpose is to illustrate the need to choose the exact mathematical term. In so doing his "typically 
vague fashion" is more precise than his critics' precision.
2. 6 An intermediate theory ?
The conception of proportion theory as either antaneiretic or anthyphairetic was largely 
replaced by the definition given in Euclid's Elements. Elements V has been attributed to Eudoxus 
since ancient times, but Knorr argues (1978a) that, based on deductions he makes from the work of 
Archimedes, Eudoxus had quite a different theory. Archimedes's antaneiretic usage, and the 
proximity to Eudoxus's method of exhaustions, in Knorr's view, support the existence of this 
alternative conception. Knorr "reconstructs" the theory from propositions 6 and 7 of Archimedes's 
On Plane Equilibria, Book I '29. This book proposes the Lever Law130, and these propositions
m  Archimedes also employs an antaneiretic lemma both in his preface to Quadrature o f the 
Parabola and On Spiral Lines; (as given by Knorr):—
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specifically deal with the principle of Balance. Proposition 6 treats commensurable measures and 7 
incommensurables. Unfortunately the book survives only in highly corrupted manuscripts in which 
these propositions are incomplete and, as they stand, invalid131. To make the propositions tenable, 
then, a good deal of reconstruction is necessary. To support his claim that 6 and 7 echo much earlier 
formulae devised by Eudoxus Knorr "reconstructs" the principles keeping to the Archimedean 
division into commensurable and incommensurable parts, but treating all classes of magnitude 
alike132. The account for incommensurable weights is more complicated than that for 
commensurables, and for these Knorr turns to a later scholium on Theodosius's (1st century b c ) 
Sphcerica, Book III'33. This reclaimed theory Knorr believes is the one referred to by Aristotle, not so 
much in Topics but in other passages, especially those from Posterior Analytics'34.
Of unequal areas the excess by which the greater exceeds the lesser is capable when added 
to itself of exceeding any pre-assigned finite area.
130 Mentioned by Pappus, and attributed to Archimedes by Heron. For the connexion with the 
Lever Law see § 3.7, note 241 and § 6.6.
131 Mach said that the proof of 6 was not valid; Dijksterhuis (Archimedes pp.305-306) said 
that though 7 might be improved, it couldn't be quite saved. Heiberg called 7 obscure and 
imperfect, and Berggren says that the proof is just "wrong" (see Knorr 'Archimedes and the 
Elements'. Proposal for a Revised Chronological Ordering of the Archimedean Corpus', 
Archive 19, 1978b pp.211-90).
132 For the full account of this alternative theory see Knorr 1978a, Appendix III, pp.230-35. 
For the commensurable cases:
Commensurable weights a, b, c, d, will be proportional when if the magnitudes a, b have a 
common measure E, and c, d  the measure F, there will be natural numbers n, m such that il 
nE = a, nF  = c, mE = b, mF = d; then a : b :: c : d.
133 Following a remark by Eutocius (6th century a d ) referring to:
the beginning of the tenth book of Euclid's Elements and the third book of Theodosius's 
Sphcerica
Heiberg (Archimedes, p.270) traced the latter to Book III propositions 9 and 10, which treat 
the arcs of great circles. The Elements reference is to X proposition 1. This Euclidean 
proposition is notably antaneiretic, unlike its succeeding proposition X,2 which is 
anthyphairetic. X,\ says (Heath):
Two unequal magnitudes being set out, if from the greater there be subtracted a magnitude 
greater than half, and from that which is left a magnitude greater than its half, and if this 
process is repeated continually there will be left some magnitude which will be less than 
the lesser magnitude set out 
whereas X,2 says:
If, when the less of two unequal magnitudes is continually subtracted in turn from the 
greater, that which is left never measures the one before it, the magnitudes will be 
incommensurable.
The later scholium on Theodosius’s III proposition 9 may be interpreted:
For natural numbers m, n, given three homogeneous magnitudes a, b, c, let c be arbitrary and 
a > b. Construct a fourth proportional d commensurable with c whereby a > d  > b.
Where necessary, bisect successively c until x  remains which is much less than a — b; then 
either (i), when b and m are commensurable, some multiple of m will exceed b exactly. Or
(ii), when b and m are not commensurable, some multiple of m will exceed b by less than 
itself. There is then some magnitude such that n -  l(m) < b, but n(m) > b. Let n(m) = d. As 
d  is commensurable with c (being obtained from a division of it) a magnitude has been
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Knorr does not mention what must be the most obvious interpretation of his evidence: that 
Eudoxus first worked-out this intermediate Special Theory in connexion with the bisection principle 
and his method of exhaustions (Aristotle demonstrates his familiarity with this method in Physics 
VY//135). Then he later arrived at the General Theory by fusing the concept of the equimultiples with 
the principle that magnitudes of the same kind might exceed or be exceeded by others, whether or 
not they are commensurable. Such a reading fits the evidence we have from antiquity: the 
references to Eudoxus by Archimedes and Apollonius, the reports derived from Eudemus, and the 
comments by the later Greek and Roman historians.
2 .1  A general anthyphairetic theory ?
In 1978 when Knorr proposed the intermediate model it was thought that the anthyphairetic
approach was incapable of generating a comprehensive theory of proportions. As such it could not
be what Aristotle was referring to in Posterior Analytics. Becker had thought that the technique
could produce the rules for numbers and (rectangular) areas mentioned in Topics, but not treat such
other continuous extensions as volumes, weights, periods of time, or angles. Then in 1984 Larsen
demonstrated that the eva.XAac theorem is provable using avGwpaipeai^—though only with the aid
of techniques not known before the 20th century136. In 1992 Anders Thorup published a paper
to show that the alternative theory of proportions may be built up on a very simple interpretation 
of "anthyphairesis"; without any reference to modern notational machinery.137
The stumbling-block to a comprehensive anthyphairetic account of proportions was always thought
to be the alternation rule; it is this rule which Thorup overcomes with his proposal138. If he is correct
constructed such that by however little a exceeds h there is a magnitude d  commensurable 
with c falling between them.
134 74al7ff. (Tredennick):
Again, if there were no triangle except the isosceles, the proof that it contains angles equal 
to the sum of the two right angles would be supposed to apply to it qua isosceles. Again, 
the law that proportionals alternate might be supposed to apply to numbers qua numbers, 
and similarly to lines, solids and periods of time; as indeed it used to be demonstrated of 
these subjects separately .... but now the law is proved universally; for the property did not 
belong to them qua lines or qua numbers, but qua possessing this special quality which 
they arc assumed to possess universally.
For the related passage 99a9 see § 2.8.
135 266b2-3 (Wicksteed & Cornford):
for by successive additions I can make the power exceed any given limit, and by 
corresponding subtractions can make the time fall short of any.
136 Op.cit.
137 A Pre-Euclidean Theory of Proportions', in Archive 45, 1 pp. 1-16.
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then a general anthyphairetic proportion theory was within the orbit of mid-fourth century 
mathematicians.
Thorup is particularly careful to avoid claiming that his construction reflects what actually 
happened at the time; he restricts himself to the claim only that it was quite possible. Yet his work, 
and that of Larsen, appears to reduce the call for a distinctively antaneiretic intermediate theory. 
Knorr's reconstruction is, in any case, somewhat tenuous139; the thread being found in a commentary 
some time later than the 1st century BC on Theodosius’s use of a principle of Archimedes who, in any 
case, flourished a hundred years after the discovery of whichever method it was that generated a 
comprehensive theory. The variant theories both rely on two main features:
(i) that homogeneous magnitudes may exceed or be exceeded whether they are commensurable 
or not,
(ii) equimultiples.
(i) is an obvious characteristic, but it needed to kept in mind in connexion with (ii), which carries the 
main burden for both the suggested alternatives (in addition to the Euclidean general theory). It is 
equimultiples that make the alternative theories tenable. As all agree that equimultiples were used 
by the mid-fourth century, it would seem reasonable to project their use back a few years to allow for 
the general anthyphairetic theory. But doing this might be putting the cart before the horse (as 
Thorup himself clearly recognises): relying on the very insight of the equimultiples in the Euclidean 
theory which make the alternative models possible. It is much less extravagant to keep to the 
traditional view that Eudoxus devised the (Euclidean) general theory to resolve the difficulties to 
comprehensive and exact calculation posed by the irrationals. Keeping to this stand Eudoxus's
138 Thorup's suggestion may be represented:
For homogeneous magnitudes a, b, c, d, and natural numbers in, n, then:
(A) when, respectively, a, b, and c, d, follow different sequences of reciprocal subtraction 
they are said to differ in order. Equimultiples of a and c, and of b and d  respectively, 
will differ in order.
(B) When the order of reciprocal subtraction (avGwpaipeau;) of a and c differs from that of b 
and d, the avOwpaipeon; of (a, b) differs from that of (c, d).
Using A and B to demonstrate that (a : c :: b : d) assume (a : c ^  b : d), then:
(i) from A: n(a, b) and m(c, d),then (na, me) differs in order from (nb, md).
(ii) Then from B: n(a : b) t  m(c : d).
But as by hypothesis (a : b) = (c : d), (a : b) & (c : d) = Jl (i.e., absurd).
Hence (a : b = c : d) => (a : c = b : d).
139 Knorr's proposal doesn't seem to have been widely taken up: Larsen (1984), Thorup
(1992), and A.Jones (Greek Mathematics to AD 300, in Companion I  pp.46-56, 1994) do not
mention it.
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introduction of equimultiples can be seen as forming the bridge from the ’first order' thinking of ratio 
theory to the fully realised 'second order' conception of analogy.
2. 8 Aristotle's use of the models of proportion
The importance of these possible aetiologies for Aristotle's thinking is, if they do anything, to 
increase his range of options. In Topics 158b29 he gives the antaneiretic definition, as Knorr thinks 
he also does in Physics III 206b6ff.— and indeed the wording there is strictly antaneiretic140. Other 
passages from Physics could be based on any of the models for proportion, e.g., at IV  2 15b-16a 17 
where Aristotle makes a detailed application of proportion theory to velocity through differing media 
(water, air, earth). And in VII 249b31-250a28 where he relates the quantities of force and motion to 
distance and time ("A will move B over distance C in time D") he might possibly have relied on an 
anthyphairetic conception. Aristotle goes immediately on (250a29ff.) to apply the formula to living 
things; growth will be determined as "A alters B to degree C in time D". This again could have 
depended on any of the suggested models, as could the argument against the possibility of an infinite 
body (On the Heavens I 272a22-74al3). But the language of yet other passages in Physics, such as
VI 237b31 -33:
For if we take any fraction of the motion the whole motion will be some multiple of that fraction, 
and the time occupied by the whole motion will be the same multiple of the time occupied by the 
fraction of the motion. Consequently since the fractions are finite both in magnitude and in 
number the time also will be finite; for it will be a multiple of the time occupied by the fractional 
motion and it will be equal to that period of time multiplied by the number of fractional 
motions141
anticipate the terminology of the Elements. Aristotle here speaks of the equimultiples of finite 
magnitudes which, although possibly borrowed from the very complicated alternative constructions, 
seem far more likely to have been based on the much simpler, incisive and comprehensive, theory we 
know from Euclid. And if Physics VI assumes the Euclidean model there is no good reason at all for 
Aristotle to have supposed the more awkward and elaborate preliminary theories in books III, IV  and
140 Knorr had earlier (1975, p.285) thought that there Aristotle drew on both the 
anthyphairetic and the Eudoxian theories. Wicksteed's and Cornford's (Loeb) translation, 
altered slightly (where they give proportion I have put ratio: the Greek is x& ot imp Xojm , 
and later xov Xoyov) is:
For if one should take a definite piece away from a limited magnitude and then go on to 
take away the same ratio of what is left (not the same fractions of the original whole) and 
so on and on, one will never work through to the end of the original magnitude.
141 237b31-33 (Wickstccd & Cornford).
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VII of the same work. The recommendation in Topics to study equivalences between the differentiae
of both close and remote genera142 could also perhaps have been taken from the earlier models, but it
reads much more naturally as benefiting from the Eudoxian theory. The treatment of the winds in
Meteorology III 362a34-64b22 and the more elaborate use of proportion theory for rainbows at 375b-
76b22143 depend on the principle of mathematical modelling144, and though they also could have been
taken from the other theories the complexities of the formulae indicate that this was unlikely. It is
far more plausible to suppose that the principle of the mathematical model rested on the general
theory. A further extract from Posterior Analytics, 85a38 (Barnes):
for as they go on they prove as in the case of proportion, e.g. that whatever is of such a type — 
neither number nor solid nor plane but something apart from these — will be proportional,
and one from Metaphysics M  1077a9-12 (Ross):
Again, there are certain mathematical theorems of a universal character, extending beyond these 
substances .... a substance which is neither number nor point nor spatial magnitude nor time145
also read most naturally as drawing on the general theory of proportions, being indications of
something like 'real number' (which he might or might not regard as fictitious). Indeed Aristotle's
remarks show that the speculation that there might be mathematical entities of such an abstract
nature as to parallel what would later be thought of as real numbers arises from concepts introduced
by the general theory's revelation of what a mathematical entity might be146. And of one of the most
vivid uses of the general theory (which occurs in Posterior Analytics):—
142 108a6-14 (Pickard-Cambridge):
Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the 
formulae being ’A : B = C : D’ (e.g. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is 
sensation related to the object of sensation), and ’As A is in B, so is C in D' (e.g. as sight is 
in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as a calm is in the sea, so is windlessness in the 
air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart; for in the 
case of the rest, we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness.
143 This corresponds to a lost theorem of Apollonius. Simson worked out the theorem from 
ElementsVI.3; it is given by Heath 1949 pp. 181-83.
144 The principle of mathematical modelling, in turn, follows directly from the later theory. 
The notion of a model is found in Elements VI where Euclid applies the general principles 
defined in Book V to continuous magnitudes. Book VI demonstrates the conditions to be met 
for two geometric figures to be 'similar', and in so doing establishes what it is for one figure to 
be a model of another. The equivalence is generated (i.e., the model is facilitated) through the 
ordered sequence of the proportionals. For two triangles abc and def, a : h :: d  : e :: h : c :: e 
: f :: c : a :: f : d. This can be performed using anthyphairetic methods, but in an improbably 
round-about way.
145 Also 1077b 17-19, see § 1.3, note 27.
146 Knorr had earlier (1975 p.302) thought Aristotle was referring to the Eudoxian theory. 
Klein (op.cit. p. 162) says Aristotle is here "using the model of Eudoxus"; Heath also said 
(1949 pp.43-44) that it seems clear that Aristotle was already familiar with the general theory
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Why do proportionals alternate? The cause is different for lines and for numbers, and yet the 
same; different if the lines are considered as lines, and the same if they are considered as 
exhibiting a given increment. So with all proportionals147
it imposes quite a strain to read this as other than drawing from the proportion theory more or less as
it appears in Euclid.
Aspects of the use of analogy in the biological works further show a familiarity with the 
general theory148. In his elaboration of the structure of the life sciences Aristotle pioneers the concept 
of one species being used as a model for another149. His use of the principle is taken directly from 
that of mathematical modelling reproduced in Elements V7150, thus demonstrating his familiarity with 
that notion.
Together with his book on justice, with which we are primarily concerned, the reliance on the 
principle of models throughout the biological works and in the Meteorology, his remarks in Physics 
VI (and therefore also in III, IV, and VII), those on mathematics in Metaphysics and Posterior 
Analytics, all show a dependence on the general theory of proportions. The research and speculation 
by historians of mathematics—whether there was a general anthyphairetic theory, or a limited 
anthyphairetic theory combined with a complex antaneiretic model, or the full Euclidean theory—all 
demonstrate that some comprehensive proportion theory was known to Aristotle. The evidence we 
have can fit any of the models of proportion theory that have been suggested; the only case it will 
not fit is the absence of some general theory (by general is meant a formula for every class of 
magnitude whether commensurable or not). And we should note that the presence of either or both 
of the alternative models is no evidence for the absence of the Eudoxian model.
of Eudoxus, and that he is alluding to it here. Van der Waerden makes a similar point (1954 
p. 178), as does J.Lear (p. 166 of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics', in Philosophical 
Review 91, pp.161-91). Lear's position is the reverse of Knorr's; where Knorr thinks the 
treatment of proportions in Aristotle's time was less general than in Euclid, Lear thinks it was 
more. Speaking of the kva.'K'ka.c theorem (for this theorem, V prop. 16, see note 162) Lear 
says that
the proof with which Aristotle was familiar probably had a slightly more algebraic 
character than Euclid V-16.
147 99a8-ll (Tredennick). See also Byrne's useful remarks (1997, p. 142).
148 Throughout the biological corpus, but notably at PA I, chapter 1.4-5, II 653b32ff, and HA 
486a5-491b26, 588a25.
149 He does not appear to state the principle of a model in the biological writings, even though 
that is what is assumed for analogical comparisons. That a corresponding function holds 
between genera is what permits a filling-out of the relation between the pairs of analogates.
1511 The geometric continuous magnitudes there he boldly transfers to self-moving (i.e. living) 
things, which will be comparable either directly according to the greater or less, or indirectly 
through analogy.
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It has been necessary to examine these recent speculations as they might have revealed a 
history in which a general theory of proportions did not exist in Aristotle's time; what they have 
actually thrown-up is the possibility of a wider range of models for Aristotle to have drawn on. If it 
was the case that Eudoxus produced the intermediate Special Theory, then later the General Theory 
of Proportions, or if Eudoxus or other mathematicians proved the eva/J.ocq theorem 
anthyphairetically, we may read Aristotle as making use of these differing formulations of proportion 
as they served his own researches. Yet it turns out that not only is there no good reason to doubt 
Aristotle's knowledge of the Euclidean theory. By positing his knowledge of it a great deal in his 
work across the several fields indicated above, that would otherwise be obscure, becomes explicable. 
We must conclude that the comprehensive theory known to Aristotle was the Eudoxian as 
traditionally ascribcd.
2. 9 The general theory of proportions
In Elements Euclid gives the general theory in Book V. At 5.5, following the definition of 
ratio, he says:
'being in the same ratio' - a first is to a second and a third to a fourth - is predicated whenever, in 
regard to equimultiples of the second and fourth, according to any multiplication whatsoever, the 
former alike exceed the latter, or alike equal, or alike fall short, taken in the same order151
I.e., for any quantities a , b, c, d, there will be natural numbers m and n:
ma > nb => me > nd 
ma = nb => me = nd 
ma < nb => me < nd.
Book VII gives the older formulation, 7.20 (Heath):
Numbers are proportional where the first is the same multiple or the same part, or the same parts 
of the second that the third is of the fourth.
151 Knorr's translation (in Bowen 1991, p. 127), slightly altered.
( ’Ev -rep amcp ^oycp ji,EY£0T| Xeyexcu eivcu jtpcoxov 7tpo<; Seuxepov tcai xpixov jrpoq 
xexapxov oxav xa xou itpcoxou kou xpixou laaKiq n o X X a n X a c ia  xcov xot> Seuxepot) 
Kai TExapxco laaKiq noX X ankaa id tv  Ka0’ oitovovouv 7to^Aa7rXoccnaCT|iov eKaxepov 
EKax^ou fi 641a  'OJTEpxfl n d|ia iaa  f] f| &|ia eXAeijtti Xt|<p0evtcx KaxaXXri^a.)
De Morgan's gloss on 5.5 ('Proportion', The Penny Cyclopaedia XIX p.5 1) is:
For magnitudes, A and B of one kind, and C and D of the same or another kind, are 
proportional when all the multiples of A can be distributed among the multiples of B in 
the same intervals as the corresponding multiples of C among those of D,
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It is said that Euclid retained this version of the theory in line with his policy of keeping the work of 
his originals without undue editing. The Book VII formula is given for numbers and the Book V 
formula for magnitudes (i.e. for discrete and continuous quantities separately). 7.20 reflects the older, 
anthyphairetic solution; it is less general than the other in that since it treats numbers there is no 
issue of incommensurability. The two presentations are said by all commentators, no doubt corrcctly, 
to reflect the arithmetic/geometric distinction. Even so, the formulation for numbers strikingly 
accords with the three classical means developed from the Pythagorean analysis of strings, (i) The 
geometric mode of proportion "the same multiple" (the equal multiple), (ii) The harmonic mode "the 
same part" (the equal division), (iii) The arithmetic mode "the same parts" (the equal quantities).
The force of 5.5 is that quantities of any kind can be related such that, whether or not they 
share a common measure, the truth conditions under which they fall can be specified exactly. By 
means of Eudoxus's formula, whether or not a precise direct comparison is available, in all cases a 
precise and exhaustive indirect comparison is. Any kind of quantity is equal to, or greater or less, 
than some other quantity o f the same kind; this general fact of quantity qua quantity is used by 
Eudoxus to resolve the problem. The theory recursively applies the ancient polarity 'greater/less'; 
Eudoxus takes what it is to be a quantity (the very capacity to be '>', and so '='), and applies this 
feature to quantity itself. (Quantity, to which the principle of 'greater and less' is to apply, qua 
quantity itself is the principle of being capable of greater or less—all other attributes having been 
abstracted.) Just as a magnitude of any kind is comparable with another of the same genus, so now 
that comparison can always be compared to another such comparison (and a comparison itself being 
precisely the application of 'greater and less'). Unlike the antaneiretic or anthyphairetic methods 
(which count the steps in the corresponding states or processes of interaction), by exploring all the 
possibilities of the dyad 'greater and less’ the general theory supplies the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for there to bc a proportion.
Before Eudoxus mathematicians had sought a common measure to achieve a proportion 
between pairs of ratios152. They looked for it through the subtraction (anthyphairetically) or the 
division (antaneiretically) of the quantities. Through these processes they aimed to find the measure
152 Sec Byrne's recent (and particularly lucid) account of the Eudoxian proportion theory 
(1997, pp. 137-42).
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either qua a quantity, or qua a quantified number of steps153. Eudoxus turned their procedures 
upside-down; he ignored the apparent need for a common measure entirely, and allowed the 
quantities to measure one another by co-ordinating their multiplication. He thus removed (with what 
I am calling a 'second-order' concept not requiring the elusive common measure) the supposition that 
some measure (some x) had to be found to solve the problem. This principle Aristotle applies 
directly to the problem of exchange-value.
Book V goes on to specify the patterns in which analogical formulation could be varied. 
Euclid demonstrates that from a : b :: c : d  it follows that the analogates a, b, c, d  will be connected 
by alternation a : c :: b : d (V  definition 12); inversely b : a :: d  : c (V  def. 13); by combination or 
composition (V def. 14); by separation or division (V def.15); and by conversion (V def. 16)154. Book
VI applies the principles developed in Book V to continuous magnitudes, i.e., to geometric figures (it 
is here that the principles for mathematical modelling are given). VI def. 2 survived only in a form 
thought to be unintelligible (Heath 1926 II, p. 189)155, Simson substituted a rather loose definition156 
which is met by two formulae, neither of them valid as universal proportions157. Though usually 
cited as the source of the definition of 'reciprocal proportion’ (a : b :: c : d  => a : b :: d : c)158 by 
commentators on the Ethics, it is not directly generated by Simson's reconstruction. Stewart in fact 
quotes a rather better formulation159 of the definition (which applies to equiangular geometric figures 
not to quantities in general). VI propositions 14 and 15 apply the rule to parallelograms and 
triangles respectively. Although Book VI is concerned with geometric figures, it does produce a rule
153 In what Fowler (op.cit.) calls adverbial and repetition numbers respectively; see § 1.3.
154 V def. 14 (a+b) ;  b :: (c+d) :  d; del. 15 (a-b) : b :: (c-d) : d; def. 16 a : {a-b) :: c : (c-d).
155 (Heath p. 189):
Figures are reciprocally related when there are in each of the two figures antecedent and 
consequent ratios.
156 Simson (1756):
Two magnitudes are said to be reciprocally proportional to two others when one of the first 
is to one of the other magnitudes as the remaining one of the last two is to the remaining 
one of the first.
157 This definition yields both:
a : b :: c : d => a : c : d : b and a : b :: c : d => a : d :: c : b.
158 Jackson, for example, repeatedly in pp.87-99; Stewart pp.451-53, 464-65; Burnet 1900, 
p.223, Gauthier-Jolif, 1959 II p.376.
159 Stewart p.442 (he does not mention his source):
Two sides of one figure are said to be reciprocally proportional to two sides of another, 
when one of the sides of the first is to one of sides of the second, as the remaining side of 
the second is to the remaining side of the first.
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in association with proportions that is of universal application: VI proposition 16160 is generalisable 
as the biconditional: a : b :: c : d  <=> a x  d = b x  c. This mutual dependence of proportionality and 
the product of the reciprocating terms is a much more likely starting point for "reciprocity on the 
basis of proportion" which interests Aristotle (discussed in chapter 6 below) than the dubious 
'reciprocal proportion' that is commonly cited.
There are four features of these elaborations of the formulae which need to bc noted here:
(i) that the 'reciprocal proportion' (a : b :: d : c) is not the inverse proportion (b : a :: d : c)161; just 
what the reciprocal proportion is will bc a factor in understanding the theory of exchange-value (see 
chapter 6).
(ii) Euclid does not mention the reciprocal proportion, only that under certain conditions, i.e., if the 
quantities belong to equiangular figures, they will have reciprocally proportional parts.
(iii) The formula drawn from VI prop. 16 will provide the criteria to be met for ajust exchange.
(iv) Although for ratio the terms must be homogeneous there is no parallel requirement for all cases 
of analogy. Homogeneity is a requirement for just those formulae which use the principle of 
alternation. The adverb evaXXa% was used adjectivally as with "alternate magnitudes" and 
"alternate angles" to indicate any rule of proportion in which the terms in one ratio may cross-over to 
the other (and V, proposition 16, the alternando rule, stipulates homogeneity)162. To alternate the 
terms in the ratios a : b and c : d  so that a : c and b : d  all the terms must be capable of being in ratio 
with all the others. (I.e., they must all belong to the same genus.) The rules which operate without 
the use of the evaXXal; principle, on the other hand, may apply to analogates from other categories.
V propositions 17 and 18, for example, hold across genera163 (i.e., there is no requirement for c and d 
to belong to the same genus as a and b). This feature of homogeneity for only some analogies is fully 
developed in Euclid's Elements, and was of significance for Aristotle's account of exchange-value.
16(1 See § 6.3 figure 7 and note 382.
161 V.Karasmanis (p.376 of 'The Mathematical Passage in "Nicomachean Ethics" 1131 b5-15’, 
in Ancient Philosophy, 1993, pp.373-378) speaks of the 'reciprocal' proportion (a : b :: d : c) 
as the inverse; see §§ 4.10, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.6.
162 V prop. 16 (Todhunter):
If four magnitudes of the same kind be proportionals, they shall also be proportionals 
when taken alternately.
163 From definitions 15 and 14 respectively (see note 154).
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Chapter 3
CLASSIFICATION
3.1  Dichotomous division
Homogeneity figures in Aristotle's use of proportion theory, albeit in a way that is not well 
understood. But before looking at that, or even at the connexion between analogy and generic 
sequence, we should bring to mind Aristotle's interest in classification. Or, as that interest might be 
taken to characterise a great part of the whole corpus, two aspects of classification related to analogy. 
Of these two aspects one is positive and the other negative, the negative being his response to 
dichotomous division. That method of investigation followed quite naturally from the polarities 
outlined in §1.4 and had had something of a stranglehold on philosophy since the time of 
Pythagoras. Plato began to be dissatisfied with dichotomous division; he recommended that if 
bisection failed to accord with the "joints in nature" then division should be made into as many parts 
as would accord164. Despite the apparent strengths of dichotomy (seen, for example, in the zeugmatic 
passage defining an angler in the Sophist165—the angler is defined through ten dichotomous stages 
starting from "skill", a high genus166) Plato became increasingly uncomfortable with the method 
(which is demonstrated throughout the Statesman).
What was an increasing dissatisfaction for Plato becomes a settled hostility in Aristotle. He 
has several objections to the method, but the first is logical167. To rely on dichotomous division, as 
had been attempted, to draw inferences or arrive at a definition (or refute an argument or ascertain 
matters of fact)168 is question-begging. If it should be asked, for example:—
164 The aim was to order the Forms as they really occur in nature (Philebus 16d, Statesman 
287c); Phaedrus 265e (Wright):
by dividing at the joints, as nature directs, and not attempting to break any limb in half 
after the fashion of a bungling carver.
165 The sophist himself being metaphorically an angler; the purpose of division is to 'hunt 
down' exactly what a subject is.
166 Skill (xexvr)) is divided into that of making or of acquiring; acquisition then by consent or 
capture, capture into open or secret. Secret, i.e., hunting of inanimate or animate things; 
animals are then divided into terrestrial or not: the non-terrestrial into bird or fish. Fishing 
takes place either with nets or by a form of striking; striking by night or day. In daylight 
either from above or below. From below by a barbed hook at an angle into the mouth; hence 
"angling".
167 Pr. An. I 46a31ff; Post. An. / /  91bl2ff.
168 Pr. An. I 46b26.
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"Is man animate or lifeless?" The definer assumes that man is an animal; he has not proved it. 169 
All substances are here assumed to be animate or inanimate. Man is reasonably taken to be a 
substance; it does not follow that man is animate but merely either animate or inanimate. Similarly 
with any predication, e.g., to establish if man is footed (or wingless, blooded, rational, or mortal) 
instead of narrowing down a major premiss, what would be the middle term of a syllogism linking 
the major to the minor premiss is widened into a universal disjunction: all animals are either footed 
or footless, winged or wingless, or whatever the predicate. The point at issue— being footed or 
wingless or whatever—is always merely assumed, never derived.
Division does have a use but plays "only a small part"171’, that small part is to help set out the 
order of things to be investigated. Having decided (in the Analytics) that dichotomous division is 
logically incapable of defining a subject or determining a matter of fact, Aristotle has no difficulty in 
showing its ineffectiveness for the classification of animals. Continuous bisection (in effect 
avTavEipecru; as applied to zoology) does not follow the joints in nature at all. Dividing animals, for 
example, into terrestrial and any one other class (aquatic, say), leaves out of account another group 
of equal standing (birds). Yet dichotomous division goes much further than mere bisection, it selects 
some highlighted attribute which it then bisects either through privation or into opposites. The 
opposition will often be no more than privation, or come very close to that principle, e.g., in 
oppositions such as white/blackxl{ and whole/split, the black may be the absence of light, and split (as 
with cloven-hoof) the absence of wholeness. Other opposites, such as left/right, straight/curved, 
heavy/light, or hard/soft may indicate something more than the absence of a property, but little can 
be done with them as headings for further division (few subordinate groupings will be only on the 
right, or only curved, or light, or soft172). Aristotle goes on to reject privation: the lack of a property 
does not create a positive life-form173. The mere absence of an attribute does not necessarily count as
169 Post. An. 91 b 18.
170 See Ross's comments in his edition of The Prior and Posterior Analytics o f Aristotle, 
p.398; his italics.
171 PA 1 643a22.
172 Hard/soft, however, was to some extent a usable opposition: aquatic creatures were 
divisible into the hard and the soft. The 'soft' being the cephalopods, distinguished from other 
molluscs. The hard were further divided into those hard on the outside and soft within 
(crustaceans) and those soft outside covering a hard structure (vertebrates).
173 PA 1 642b23 (Ogle):
There can be no specific forms of a negation.
There are discussions in the Categories l ib  onwards, Topics 143b33 and Metaphysics A on 
the senses in which it is appropriate to speak of privation.
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privation, privation is the lack of some attribute natural to a subject area. Being feathered, for 
example, is a property of certain bipeds and of certain aquatic animals, so it might be said to be 
natural to such life forms, but the featherlessness of monkeys and jelly-fish is not a useful truth to 
know about them: there is nothing about featherlessness to contribute to the understanding of their 
essences or definitions, or classification. (Very broadly, species arc not defined or arrived at through 
the absence of some property.)
Dichotomous division also, rather than providing a mechanism which uniquely isolates or
classifies essential features, results in the same creatures falling into several classes. Balme thinks
this is what Aristotle regards as the outstanding defect of the method174. The Academics had not
presented just any differentiae to be dichotomously processed, but tried to find which of the
important requirements should be primary. They hoped that some essential attribute— such as
movement—would be the key property from which to derive the others. The chosen differentia was
then sequentially divided to reach the individual species. Aristotle’s method is to concentrate on the
functions vital for an animal to be an animal, such as respiration, locomotion, growth, or
reproduction. He crucially perceives the most important requirements as functions, and from among
these vital functions he opposes the Academic attempts to, as it were, choose a first among equals175.
He demonstrates how it is impossible to derive the other defining attributes from any one
characteristic, however important. If locomotion, for example, is chosen as the prime function then
animals will be divided along the lines which implement locomotion: into the footless and the
footed; then into bipeds and the many-footed; the many-footed into quadrupeds and any others. We
then find that (GA II 732b 15-24; Platt):
These classes admit of much cross-division. Not all bipeds are viviparous (for birds are 
oviparous), nor are they all oviparous (for man is viviparous), nor are all quadrupeds oviparous 
(for horses, cattle, and countless others are viviparous), nor are all viviparous (for lizards, 
crocodiles, and many others lay eggs). Nor does the presence or absence of feet make the 
difference between them, for not only are some footless animals viviparous, as vipers and the 
cartilaginous fishes, while others are oviparous, as the other fishes and serpents, but also among 
those which have feet, many are oviparous and many viviparous, as the quadrupeds above 
mentioned.
174 D.M.Balme, e.g., in Aristotle's Use o f Division and Differentiae, in Gotthelf & Lennox, 
pp.69-89.
175 For a very different reading, however, see P.Pellegrin Logical Difference and Biological 
Difference: The Unity o f Aristotle's Thought (ibid., pp.313-38, and Aristotle's Classification 
o f  Animals, 1982 (trans. A Preus, 1986).
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And so on and on throughout the animal kingdom. For such reasons as these Aristotle rejects 
dichotomous division; the method does not respect natural divisions nor does it yield the classes of 
living things to be found in the world. He concludes176 that some more positive method of research is 
necessary, which would be both accurate and comprehensive.
3.2 Hierarchy
Aristotle's more positive approach to classification required an expansion of the concept of 
generic order. Plato introduced this principle of classifying into yevo^ and ei8og to the Academy, 
and it became a major theme of study (as fragments from Speusippus’s Homologies testify)177. As we 
see with small children there are two primitive impulses towards classification: to pull things apart 
and to put them together. These impulses may evolve into sophisticated procedures of analysis and 
synthesis— or as Plato puts them into awaycoyri (collection) and Sioapeaic; (division). Although he 
mentions a-ovaycoyri178 Plato gives much more attention to Suxtpeaig179, but the beauty of a fully 
developed generic classification is that it respects both these opposing tendencies: it aims to bring 
unity and diversity into a comprehensive whole. Whilst rejecting the Academic orthodoxy of 
defining an eiSog through the dichotomous division of the yevo$ Aristotle took over the programme 
of devising a generic system. His approach (I think it can be said) treats collection and division more 
even-handedly180; he focuses as much on the collective principle for ei5r| and yevri as their 
separability. Aristotle's starting point, as we have just seen, is the observation that living things are 
not characterised, nor can be defined, by any one pre-eminent function, but by several functions
176 Pr. An. I  46b36 (Jenkinson):
It is clear then that this method of investigation is not suitable for every inquiry, nor is it 
useful in those cases in which it is thought to bc most suitable 
and (PA I 644b 19, al 1, Peck):
dichotomy is either (a) impossible or (b) futile ... so it is impossible for those who follow 
the method of twofold division to arrive at any of the particular animals.
177 It is said (by Balme for example in De Partibus Animalium I, De Generatione Animalium I 
1972 pp.101-105) that neither Plato nor Aristotle were primarily interested in classification, 
but rather to account for phenomena. The first requirement would then be correct definition 
not placement in a rigid order. Classification however is not taxonomy, but a heuristic tool; 
accounting for phenomena will require their placement in relation to the investigator and to 
other phenomena.
178 In Philebus 18c, Phaedrus 249b , 265d , Sophist 226a , 267a-B but particularly 265d .
179 In Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman and Philebus.
180 Aristotle does not oppose division per se but rather dichotomy; according to Diogenes 
Laertius he wrote a book On Divisions (see Ross, Select Fragments, p. 105).
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collected together181. It is essential for any living creature to move, for example, and to grow and 
obtain nutrition; it is through the simultaneous division of the collection of such vital functions as 
these that the accurate and comprehensive account of living things is made possible182. (Aristotle 
applies his much more developed conception of generic order not only to the life-sciences but also to 
his other fields of interest, including the theory of justice.) To make his system more effective he 
inspires generic order with two important principles: teleology and the Eudoxian proportion theory.
Before considering the roles these ideas play we need to outline those features of the generic 
hierarchy most closely tied to analogy. A caveat must be entered here: Aristotle also uses the terms 
yevoq and £1805 non-hierarchically. Deciding how he is using the terms at any given point is 
controversial; I will join the controversy in the next section. For the hierarchical use of the term an 
account is given in Metaphysics A 1024a29ff. of what a yevoq is. It is
(i) a continuous series of things of the same form.
(ii) The source, or prime-mover, or unifying principle of (i).
(iii) That which underlies, or is common to (i).
(iv) The first, logically speaking, of a series of descriptors which is stated as part of the essence 
(and where the terms which follow are the differentiae).
Already, without going any further, it is plain that the subject of yevot; (like yevoq itself) will
generate an extensive issue. For its role in the theory of justice, and the connexion with analogy,
however, we may limit attention to certain minimal aspects of the use of the term. When speaking of
generic order we find that certain notions recur and interact, these include not only yevoi;, Sioccpopcc
and ei5oq, but universality and individuation, and the principle of the level they occupy within a
hierarchy.
The individual object— pre-eminently from the separate items of every-day experience: this 
pen, that chair, Fido— is what primarily is meant by substance. In a perhaps weaker sense that 
which is represented by the subject role of a sentence is also treated as a substance: it is to the extent 
to which something is individuated and predicable that it is the substance. Whatever takes up that 
position is to be distinguished from its predication or attributes as nouns are from adjectives. The 
individuated thing might be the individual object, or a differentia of such an object, or the form it
181 PA 1 644a4:
No single differentia, I repeat, either by itself or with its antecedents, can possibly express
the essence of an eidos.
182 PA 1 645b5-28.
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shares with other objects, or the class under which the forms and differentiae fall. Whatever the 
subject is, at whichever level, qua the subject it is not to be confused with its attributes.
The individual object shares (in most cases) a common form with certain other objects. The 
form is common, i.e., universal for that level of classification. It defines the essence183 the 
individuals have in common and what an individual item is taken to be (it is a pen, a chair, a 
Spaniel). The form shows both what an object is and what it is not: it is a structure which 
individuates the items, not from other items, but from other forms184 (the pen is a pen not a pencil, 
Fido is a Spaniel not a Labrador). This essential, individuating, defining form is the eiSoq.
What it is that is structured is the range of properties (or attributes or qualities) known as 
Suxcpopai (differentiae) shared by all the individuals of the same yevoq. The origin of the term 
Siacpopa was 'moving hither and thither'185; and Furth sources its logical root as 'being different 
from' (and this remains its most telling sense)186. The role of differentiae qua differentiae is 
adjectival, unlike yevr| and eiSri which will be the subjects the differentiae qualify. (This 
grammatical point will be of significance for deciding the forms of justice.) The range of features 
that will differ from other features is arranged into the differing structures (the ei5t|)187. The ei8r| are 
structures of something in two senses: they are structures composed of their differentiae (as Spaniels 
are composed of blood, bone, muscle, hair ...), and they are forms of some general kind (Spaniels are 
sorts of dog, pens are sorts of writing implement, chairs of furniture). What characterises a yevoi; 
(which covers all the differentiae that combine into the ei5r|) is that it is the widest appropriate class 
in any given inquiry to which an object will be assigned. The key term here is 'appropriate' as, in the 
process of definition, the assignment must be to the nearest available (relevant) yEvoq. In making 
this point at Topics 143al5 Aristotle gives the example of justice. Justice should not be defined 
merely as some state which produces equality, or distributes according to the appropriate mode of
183 See Balme pp.296-98 of Aristotle's Biology is not Essentialist in Gotthelf & Lennox, 
pp.291-312 or M.Furth (Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics, 1988).
184 Which echoes Plato, e.g., in Theaetetus 208C-D.
185 Liddell & Scott.
186 1988, p. 101; Furth cites Theaetetus 208c. In the attempt to define knowledge as "a correct 
belief coupled with an account" Socrates mentions:
being able to name some particular characteristic which marks off the thing in question 
from everything else.
187 The arrangement may be in any number of ways; in addition to the arrangements of the 
organs of animals into their characterising structures Metaphysics H  1042bl5 gives e.g., 
blending, tying, gluing, nailing, and by position or location in time or space.
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equality, but is a higher yevoc, of the highest yevog virtue. Leaving out of the definition that justice 
is a virtue would omit what is most important about it.
The differentiae of a yevoc; are, as it were, a common pool from which the forms take the 
properties they need188. It should be noted that the full range of differentiae will not usually be 
present in each eiSog. One sort of bird may have a spur or crest189 or marking absent from others of 
the same yevo^. Ei8r| as ei8r| contain only the essential features which define an object; the 
differentiae used in the definition being those necessary for the thing to be the thing that it is190. Qua 
ei8r| they are concerned only with such essentials (essential differentiae being those which 
implement the vital functions)191; non-essential properties (i.e. accidents) falling within the yevoc 
may be essential differentiae for other eiSri of the yevoq. Aristotle uses a favourite example of the 
triangle to illustrate the nature of a form: in all triangles the angles add up to two right angles. 
Hence this fact is a property of triangles per se. Even so, it is a per se accident and not ol the 
essence of a triangle, in that we do not need to know it to know that a figure is a triangle192. (But 
adding up to two right angles could bc an essential attribute of some other pattern of the yevoi; plane 
figure to which triangles belong.)
It is evident that several levels of generality of forms and kinds might be invoked for any given 
sequence of classification. Series of generality will reach a highest jevoc,, which is the widest 
category to which an individual item, or individuated class, can usefully be said to belong. Highest 
'yevri would be e.g., substance, relation, living (thing), virtue: an individual dog Fido might be a 
Spaniel, which is a breed, a sub-eiSoq, separable from the other sub-ei5t| of the ei5o<; dog, which is
188 Tevo<; can also be thought of as equivalent to category or predicate (and it is mentioned in 
this sense in Metaphysics A I024bl3): it is the category to which the parallel forms belong, 
and the most that can be predicated of an individual object. (Arisotle's word for predicate is 
often 'category', e.g., in On Interpretation 21a9.)
189 HA 486b 10.
190 PA I 643a27.
191 Aristotle speaks of the "differentia of the differentia” (in Metaphysics Z  1038a8 and PA I 
643bff. for example) these are usually essential differentiae which qualify an already qualified 
yevoq. If the yevo<; is (say) animal, a subaltern yevoq might be that yevoq qualified by the 
highest level differentia which implements a vital function (e.g., locomotion). Footed would 
be such a high level differentia (since being footed enables certain modes of locomotion). The 
differentia of the differentia then will be an attribute which relates to feet (such as split or 
quadruped), not to some other organ, which would implement a different function (see §§ 5.5 
and 5.6 for the distinction of ei5o<; from Siacpopa in the classifications of justice).
192 Metaphysics A I925a30, E  1026b 12, PA 1 643a30. A zoological parallel is found e.g., in 
GA I. Sec also Gotthelf First Principles in Aristotle's Parts ot Animals, in GotthelJ & Lennox, 
pp. 167-98.
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individuated from the other eiSri of the yevo<5 terrestrial quadruped, which might in turn be isolated 
from the other yevr| of the higher mammalian yevoq, which will then be separated from the other 
higher yevri of the even greater ysvo^ animal, which could be individuated from the other greater 
yevot; (plant) of the highest yevoq living thing. An exactly corresponding generic sequence is 
employed for the layout of the subject of justice in the Ethics (see § 4.4).
3. 3 TENOZ and EIA02
Aristotle's use of the machinery of yevo^ and eiSoq is so extensive, especially in his books on 
the life-sciences, that until quite recently he was assumed to be proposing the taxonomy of living 
things193. Read as taxonomy his references to yevoq and ei8o^ were bewildering, with classes of 
animals cited without apparent consistency. For example in History of Animals 523bl4 he speaks of 
two species of cicada, than at 535b of one genus of cicada, and at 556a30 he says there are two 
genera of cicada. He also refers to a yevo^ of ox which has a bone in the heart, where there are no 
species (HA II 506a8). In Generation of Animals 719a7, 11, remarking that the uterus in 
ovoviviparous animals such as cartilaginous fishes (such as sharks) and vipers differs from both 
vivipara and ovipara "because they participate in both species", he then (751a28 and 754a20) refers 
to the genus of oviparous fishes'94. But through writers such as Balme and Pellegrin it has become 
clear that Aristotle's references are not taxonomic195. We should not read his use of yevoi; and niboq 
as the biological genus and species (this is why I have avoided these terms in the foregoing 
paragraphs). Aristotle applies the terms at any level of generality; they do not (or need not) fasten on 
to a taxonomic series in which Fido is a King Charles, a sub-subaltern class of Spaniel, which is a 
breed (an artificial selection) from the Familiaris species of the canine genus of the carnivorous 
family of the pfacentalian order of the mammalian class of the vertebrate phylum of the animal 
kingdom.
193 See Balme pp.80-81 of Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentiae (Gotthelf & Lennox 
pp.69-89), and J.Lennox (Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle's 
Biology, ibid. pp.339).
194 Translators had long been embarrassed by such apparent inconsistencies; D'Arcy 
Thompson omits a group reference here entirely, and Platt writes "both classes".
195 From Balme's TEN02 and EIAOZ in Aristotle's Biology', Classical Quarterly n.s. 12 
pp.81-93 of 1962 onwards, and Pellegrin 1982.
62
63
Since the work of Balme and then Pellegrin it is widely accepted that when speaking of yevoq 
and ev8o<; Aristotle is using the terms indifferently as designating one group or another, just as we 
would say "kind of hawk" or "sort of bird" without suggesting that hawks form the wider class 
containing birds. Yet when the terms occur together their use is strictly hierarchical; the yevoq- 
eiSo^ relation is invoked as a significant and rigid structure to inform any given inquiry. Although 
they may well be used at any level of generality (so that the yevoq spoken of might be winged, 
feathered, bird, predator, or animal) the ei8r| will always be sorts or forms within whatever serves as 
the yevoi;. The question whether there is semantic significance for the other separated uses of the 
terms other than as markers for groups is still controversial. Pellegrin believes (1987) that Aristotle 
speaks of yevo<; to indicate phenomena viewed as a class ready for division into sub-classes, and e 18t| 
as the outcomes of the division. The phenomena treated as yevri will be perceived as being distinct 
from other whole classes; the objects (which could be the very same phenomena) viewed as eiSri will 
be considered as parallel forms within some broad category196.
I think there is something right and something wrong about this reading. The first half of it is 
simply wrong; Pellegrin just ignores passages such as HA II 506a8 where Aristotle refers to the 
genus of ox that is not divisible into sub-groups, but is an ultimate species. Plainly there are no 
infima species and the class of ox is the outcome of some broader division. The second part of the 
interpretation fares better; Aristotle does seem to use yevoq when separating the subject from all 
other groups (perhaps relying on the old same/difference polarity). The difference of the subject 
from other classes comes to the fore, with any samenesses (equivalences) pushed to the background. 
Conversely, with the term eiSoq Aristotle might be focusing on the equivalences among the 
phenomena; their differences will then be relegated. The class of ox, even though it is not a group to 
be further divided into species, would, on this interpretation, be viewed qua distinct from other 
classes of animal.
Since Aristotle builds his theory of justice on the generic order (to be argued later), what we 
need to be clear about is (i) that when used in association the two terms yevoc, and eISo^ form a 
mutually rigid structure, (ii) There is great flexibility in the scope of application of the generic 
order; (iii) otherwise the terms designate any class, with (iv) the proviso that perhaps yevoc, will
196 See also Balme’s exposition in Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentia (op. cit.).
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emphasise separation from other whole groups, and ei8o^ parallel classes of animals within some 
overall kind.
3.4 Heterogeneity
Having taken a brief look at generic structure we need to examine the connexion between that
structure and analogy. It is undoubtedly the great strength of proportion theory that it enables
precise and exhaustive comparison to be made between elements remote from each other, and from
widely separated fields. It is tempting to suppose that in the biological works at least Aristotle treats
proportion as exclusively heterogeneous. And Pellegrin, who has argued convincingly for the non-
taxonomic reading of Aristotle's use of the generic structure, fixes analogical inference at the level
higher than the genus197 (e.g. 1982 pp.56, 72, 88-89, and 1987 pp.329-30). He writes:
Above the generic gap, analogy can establish relationships between heterogeneous beings, 
permitting propositions of the type: "that which is (a) in genos A is (b) in genos B ",198
even though this is no more than just one of the many permutations of the analogical formula. Such
a severe restriction inevitably reduces the power of analogical inference. Pellegrin then further
distorts the picture by interpreting his reading of the formula to mean:
what nail is for genos A is hoof for genos B .199
He takes this interpretation of an already unnecessarily restrictive formulation to be the paradigm for
Aristotle's understanding of analogy. Yet if we look at the passages from which Pellegrin's example
is taken they do not in fact treat the 2nd and 4th terms as yevt|, with the 1st and 3rd as 'parts'. Even
allowing for any degree of looseness in yevoq-eiSo^ relations, nail and hoof in Aristotle's examples
do not relate to yevrj, but to particular animals. However, putting that misreading to one side,
treating the analogical formula as representing no more than something (a differentia or 'part') being
contained in one yevoq in relation to something contained in another (which Pellegrin has
represented as a : A :: b : B), is not only not Aristotle's sole conception of analogical inference, it is
not even his usual. In § 2.8 above we found that Aristotle uses analogy throughout the corpus, but
197 For my discussion of Pellegrin in the following pages I am much indebted to R.M. White's 
forthcoming The Role of Analogy in Aristotle's Biology.
19(1 1982 p.72, with references to the discussion of 'form', privation', and ’matter’ in 
Metaphysics A 1070b 17.
199 Ibid' p.89.
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commonly, i.e., in Topics, Physics, Posterior Analytics, On the Heavens, Meteorology, and various 
sections of the Metaphysics, the uses cannot be made to fit the structure which Pellegrin construes 
from the biological works (and from some passages of the Politics200 and Metaphysics). Neither can 
it fit uses in the Ethics, Rhetoric201 or Poetics202. As Pellegrin holds (rightly I think) that there is no 
hard division to be made between the biological and the logico-metaphysical uses, there can be no 
question of isolating Aristotle's zoological reading of analogy from the rest.
At the very least, in extending the principle of analogy to non-strictly-mathematical fields, 
Aristotle is aware of some general principle (§§ 1.8, 2.5, 2.8. above) to the effect that analogy applies
(i) to 'any magnitudes whatsoever', (ii) distinguishes heterogeneous from homogeneous cases203, and
(iii) generates a range of permutations. As we saw at § 2.9 several variants of the analogical rule 
were recorded by Euclid; how many of them were familiar to Aristotle cannot be known, but he must 
have known some of them. And although the formula a : b :: c : d may well be legitimately 
interpreted as a : A :: b : B, that is not in fact the way Aristotle himself typically uses it. Nor does 
such an interpretation benefit from the moral he draws from the mathematics of proportion theory 
that all phenomena, be they yevri or eiSri of any level, or differentiae or 'parts’, just in case they are 
quantifiable are candidates to be represented by the terms in a proportion.
Pellegrin's doctrine that analogy must be heterogeneous204 also conflicts with Aristotle's 
explicit statements that some analogies take place within the genus. The evaXkal; principle (which 
stipulates homogeneous proportion) does not appear to have as ready a use in zoology as it has in
200 / 1252aff.; IV 1290b25ff.
201 1407allff. The genus covering the whole metaphor is that of gods and their 
paraphernalia. The sense of "cup of Ares" is achieved intuitively (there is a particular 
resonance in that the Dionysian cup was a wide, flatish bowl). If a - shield, b = Ares, c = 
cup, d = Dionysus, then: a : b :: c : d => a : d :: c : b (i.e., shield : Dionysus :: cup : Ares). 
This is not, as we saw, a true proportion, but applicable only in the cases of figures such as 
equal triangles as in the reconstructed definition VI.2, and propositions 14 and 15 (see § 2.9). 
The linguistic trick works because the elements are conceived as homogeneous— that is why 
they can be swapped over. The analogical basis of the metaphor cannot be a : A :: b : B, as 
that format stipulates two genera. (Finding the rule whereby d is assigned to a (and c to b) is 
the task of V chapter 5.)
202 1457bl6; Aristotle contrasts the analogical relation with the immediately preceding 
Y£vo<;-£i8o<; relations.
203 To be argued in the following two sections.
204 Which has been accepted by other writers; Lennox, for example, writes (p.358, op.cit.): 
Below the level of analogical likeness every eidos of a genos may serve as a genos for 
further division.
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other fields, but Aristotle relies on it in Posterior Analytics (see §§ 2.8 and 2.9 above), the Ethics2"5,
and the Rhetoric2I)6. Pellegrin himself cites two of the works (History of Animals and Metaphysics A)
in which Aristotle says that analogy occurs within the genus. The extract from Histoiy of Animals is
a little unclear, but Pellegrin agrees that the text states the relevant point that the analogical relation
holds between Ei8r| not yevri:
In some animals the parts are not of the same eidos and do not differ by excess and defect, but by 
analogy.2(17
O f the Metaphysics passage, A 1016b31, (as quoted by Pellegrin):
Things that are one in number are also one in eidos, while things that are one in eidos are not all 
one in number; things one in eidos are all one in genos, while things one in genos are not all one 
in eidos except by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genos,
Pellegrin indeed points out the common error of supposing the analogical "one" here to be extra­
generic, whereas the text reads "things one in genos are not all one in eidos, except by analogy" (i.e., 
that ei8r| not yevri are here analogically related). These passages all contradict his claim that 
analogical inference takes place only across, and not within, genera. Pellegrin's response is that 
there must be some "involuntary lapse", agreeing with Ross's view2'18 that it is by "mere inadvertence" 
that Aristotle places the analogical relation where he does. Pellegrin says that
the passage says that even a relationship at the level of the eide of the same genos can be said to 
be analogical. But this statement is terminologically un-Aristotelian, since the relation is 
between gene.2m
An insistence not only flatly contradicted by Aristotle but one which leads Pellegrin into an 
extremely distorted interpretation of the texts. In 1982 p.89 (referring to PA I 655b2) he says that 
nails, hoof, claws, horns, and beaks are:
considered as eide of the genos "organs of defense", even if Aristotle docs not say so explicitly, 
and that qua organs of defence:—
205 Book 5 ch. 5.
206 1407a 17 (Freese):
But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to cither 
of the two things of the same genus.
21)7 486b 17 as given by Pellegrin. The unclarity of the text is more evident in Ogle's wording: 
Once again we have to do with animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor yet 
identical save for the differences in the way of excess and delect: but they arc the same 
only in the way of analogy.
208 Pellegrin 1982 p.93; Ross Aristotle's Metaphysics, v. I p.305, 1924.
2m 1982 p.94 (repeated almost exactly in 1987 p.330).
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nail and hoof are no longer analogous.210 
This construal misses both the letter and the spirit of Aristotle's treatment of zoological comparison. 
Being analogous is exactly what Aristotle says they are. Beaks differ from other beaks by the more 
and the less, as do horns, claws, and nails from other horns, claws, and nails respectively. But claws 
do not differ from beaks by the more or the less. They are comparable analogically, and only insofar 
as they perform corresponding functions211.
3.5 Teleology
The 'parts' of animals are not, of course, determined as inanimate things might be (by dividing 
into half, third, 5/8, and so on), but are recognised as parts in terms of their functions. The parts of 
animals are in Aristotle's terminology the instruments212 which carry out the functions that exist "for 
the sake of the whole"213. The need each whole animal has to perform the several functions vital to 
its being an animal (and being the specific animal that it is) gives rise to (and explains) its differing 
parts. The parts all exist to serve functions such as respiration, nutrition, growth, defence, 
reproduction or locomotion214. In the classification of life-forms it is hardly possible to separate the 
role of teleology from the connexion between analogy and generic order215: it is just because a
210 1987 p.329.
211 Insisting that analogy can operate only at the level higher than the genus also has the 
complicating (but not insuperable) drawback of what is to count as the genus. It also runs 
strangely counter to Pellegrin's celebrated work in finally liberating Aristotle's classificatory 
machinery from a rigid taxonomy. Since genera are not fixed, what might count as extra­
generic is not fixed either; this can be overcome by determining that whatever the scope of the 
genus, analogical comparison takes place at a higher level. Pellegrin makes just this point in 
1987 pp.328-29, but this banishes analogy to the fringes of the classificatory scheme and does 
not gel with Aristotle's extensive reliance on it.
212 More exactly the parts are divided (HA /, 486alff.) into the uniform tissues (such as blood, 
flesh, bone, hair) and the non-uniform organs (such as hand, foot, lung). Only the latter are 
spoken of as "instruments" (PA 647b22ff.— opyav, the Greek for instrument). Certain parts, 
such as the heart and veins, have the character of either tissues or organs (PA II 647a31, b 18).
213 When speaking of analogy Pellegrin does not particularly distinguish the organs from the 
functions they implement. In 1982, p.7 1 he speaks of the vital functions as "characteristic 
properties (nutrition, sensation, movement)" yet he has just spoken of the organs which carry 
out these functions also as "characterized by a property ... having wings". Referring in the 
same passage to both the principle of locomotion and the instrument which performs it as 
"properties" would not be so misleading were it not for the failure to differentiate the role of 
lunction from the other elements present in an analogical comparison.
214 Politics IV 1290b25.
215 No grander claim for the meaning of teleology is being made. Notions ol purpose and 
lunction assigned to non-conscious entities, and to Darwinian evolution, arc hotly debated. 
The point being made here is that Aristotle accounts for the parts of animals in terms of the 
ends they serve.
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comparison is aimed towards some end that analogy is useful. There is an especially illuminating
passage at PA 681 b 12-30 (Peck):
But there is yet another part which every animal must have ... these creatures must have some 
part which is analogous to the parts which in blooded animals are connected with the control of 
sensation. In the Cephalopods this consists of a fluid contained in a membrane ... An organ just 
like this, also called the mystis, is present in the Crustacea ... the mystis occupies a place which 
corresponds exactly with the heart in blooded creatures: which shows that it is the counterpart of 
it.
The organ in fact corresponds to the liver, not the heart. The error in observation is an error exactly 
in virtue of there having to be analogues of the heart and liver in creatures of other genera. That we 
recognise it to be a mistake confirms Aristotle's model for the analogical correspondence of 
equivalent functions.
Remote elements can be 'analogically' aligned in any old way: the beak of the Occelated 
turkey might be narrower than the reed bunting's by a measure exactly equal to the degree by which 
the blood of the antelope coagulates less firmly than that of sheep. But the equality of two such 
measures is of no interest, even to men in anoraks. What decides the futility of such a comparison is 
not the remoteness of the analogates but the lack of a common purpose. There must be a point to the 
exercise; for Aristotle the point is always in the way animals in each genus carry out the same 
function. Locomotion, for example, is achieved in one genus by flying, in another by swimming, and 
by undulating, walking or creeping in yet others216. In terms of analogy these several actions are 
regarded as the same process, and without the functional correspondence comparison of the organs 
which implement locomotion would be a mistake (as with the mystis and the heart), or at best (as 
with the beaks and the blood) otiose. The implementing organs may all differ in form, and not only 
in genus— depending where the genus is drawn (which depends in turn on the particular question 
being asked217)— yet are to be compared indirectly, i.e., not directly according to the greater or less of 
their differentiae, but by analogy.
Pellegrin believes Aristotle uses analogy to:—  
relate one group of animals to another, and ultimately ... to ... Man .218
216 PA I 639b3.
217 In Metaphysics A 1016a20 for example: wine, oil, and water, might be treated either as 
distinct genera or as species of one genus, liquid.
218 Ibid. Pellegrin cites G.E.R.Lloyd (Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life 
Sciences in Ancient Greece, section 3: 'Man as Model1, 1983) as supporting a similar view.
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Such a programme need not conflict with its teleological role. It employs the principle of the model 
but still requires the corresponding organs in the other animals to be understood as the 
corresponding parts because they implement the same functions (of movement or reproduction or 
whatever). But he says that Aristotle's use of analogy:
is not limited to the morphological or functional domain219 
yet beaks and claws are comparable analogically only insofar as they are organs of defence, but 
insofar as the organs also perform other, different, tasks (feeding on the one hand, and locomotion on 
the other) they are not comparable at all, either by analogy or by the greater or less. Since no non­
functional explanation of analogy is given, and functional priority denied, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that Pellegrin conceives analogy to be what (virtually) all other writers of the post-mediaeval 
world take it to be: as an ordering of resemblances. In case it should be denied that he relies on the 
modern conception Pellegrin scotches any such disclaimer: he says that analogy is not limited to the 
morphological or the functional or the psychological. Hence he relies on some principle of ordered 
resemblance as prior to, and independent of, function. Yet for analogy to work towards the 
understanding of animals the organ in one creature must perform the task which corresponds to the 
equivalent process in another, not that the organs should merely look alike220. So the use of analogy 
relies in practice on the priority of function— albeit in Pcllegrin's case through the back door. (II 
function is set aside, how it is that good analogies are to be distinguished from bad is left radically 
unexplained.) But through the front door Pellegrin only admits function as being no more than on a 
par with morphology and psychology. His lack of recognition of the primary role of function falls in 
with the modern notions that analogy is the creation or explication of resemblance independently of 
function.
2,9 1987 p.330.
220 It often happens that similarities flow from the analogical correspondence; e.g., there will 
often be certain regularities in the position of organs (a fact which misled Aristotle about the 
mystis). The resemblances are the results, or symptoms, of the analogical relation, not the 
cause. That one element may resemble another is for Aristotle strictly irrelevant if they do 
not relate functionally. The post-mediasval conception of analogy as a resemblance relation 
infects most modern approaches to its use (§ 1.9 above) but it has no place in the structural 
and relational understanding of classical analogy.
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3.6 Resemblance
I can only suppose Pellegrin supposes, but Olshewsky declares:221
The thesis of this paper is that [Aristotle] treated analogia as a device for the explication of 
resemblances.
As we saw in chapter 1, despite the warnings of Kant and Berkeley, the idea that that is what
analogy is has become completely established. Even though (I repeat) the classical conception was
both more powerful and more exact, there can be no complaint against the current notion per se: it
is what it is. The error here has been to suppose that the one notion is the other. The presupposition
that analogical inference seeks "an imperfect similarity of two things" (§ 1.9), which Kant exposed
as just what classical analogy does not do, has been damaging to the attempts to explain Aristotle's
use of analogy. When Olshewsky (p.6 ) says
[Aristotle] seeks an analogical identity across categories in order to explain resemblances,
referring to the passage at the end of Metaphysics (iV109b317ff., Ross):
For in each category of being an analogous term is found—  as the straight line is in length, so is 
the plane in surface, perhaps the odd in number, and the white in colour,
his explanation is at total variance with the written passage. There is no resemblance between the
odd (rather than the even) and a level surface. White does not resemble what is straight any more
than jonquil and viridian are similar to what is bent, or puce curved. Aristotle's point is
diametrically opposite: that there may be important characteristics held to correspond through the
analogical formula despite the total lack of any resemblance whatsoever. The salient feature of
Aristotle's use of analogy in the life-sciences is precisely its ability to locate this equivalence of
function, whether any resemblance can be found or not222.
Regarding the generic status of analogy Pellegrin's approach is the reverse of Olshewsky's; 
Olshewsky sees analogy for Aristotle as operable strictly within a genus:—
221 T.M.Olshewsky, p.l of'Aristotle's use of Analogia', in Apeiron vol.2, pp.1-10 (1968).
222 When we say that one thing resembles another it is in virtue of this or that respect(s). 
When one thing does not resemble another it is always possible to contrive some respect in 
accordance with which a similarity can be found. Many (usually feeble) jokes are of just this 
sort ("Why is the moon like a bottle of Guinness? Because ...."). Where everything is allowed 
to be similar to everything else the principle of resemblance loses its use. In an earlier section 
of the Metaphysics (A 1070bl7) Aristotle analyses phenomena in terms of form, privation, 
and matter, as these principles will hold across the categories in spite of the absence of 
shared, not because of the possibility of occult, properties.
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in order for analogia to reveal knowledge, the terms must be commensurate in this sense because 
alternation is a property of proportionality ... Thus knowledge, properly speaking, cannot be 
transferred from one genus to another, not even if they are as closely allied as arithmetic and
geometry.223
Olshewsky thinks that "because alternation is a property of proportionality" it is a property of all 
proportionality. His non-sequitur leaves out of account the immense range of applications (which 
decided Pellegrin's interpretation) that not only happen to cross genera, but do so with the clear 
purpose of crossing them. Pellegrin insists that Aristotle never uses analogy within a genus; 
Olshewsky says he only uses analogy within the genus, but Mueller thinks Aristotle doesn't know the 
difference224. He claims that Eudoxus, and following him Aristotle, was indifferent to the issue of 
homogeneity. He assigns the first consciousness of this issue to Euclid (or at the earliest to some 
unknown mathematician who flourished in the years between). Like Olshewsky Mueller cites the 
passage from Posterior Analytics225 to support his claim. There Aristotle says, with respect to the 
evo./Jmc theorem, that "now" the principle is proved universally which used to be demonstrated for 
each class of magnitude separately. Mueller holds that by abstracting the character which makes 
lines, solids, numbers, and time periods mathematical, viz. their quantity (or magnitude), from these 
several objects Aristotle "obliterates the distinction" between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
classes. He says (p.2)
For [Aristotle] the theory involves abstraction from all differences between magnitudes. Thus the 
objects of the theory are necessarily homogeneous.
The first sentence is misleading, and in any case the second doesn't follow. The homogeneity of "the
objects of the theory" flows from the nature of ratios (see §§ 1 .1 -1 .5) not from their nature as
magnitudes. Only homogeneous elements can be in ratio (half an hour does not have a ratio to a
pyramid). The homogeneity of the alternando rule distinguishes alternable elements from
mathematical entities which cannot be interchanged (i.e., homogeneous from heterogeneous
quantities). Like Olshewsky Mueller believes that Aristotle takes the alternation formula to be
paradigm for all cases of analogy, but over and above that misapprehension, Mueller ignores one of
Aristotle's deepest metaphysical commitments: to be spoken of at all objects need a form (eiSog).
Neither matter nor differentiae can bc left to float free within a genus without being enformed, i.e.,
223 1968 p.9. Olshewsky cites Heath 1949 pp.43f., 223 for Aristotle's use of the alternation 
principle.
224 'Homogeneity in Eudoxus's Theory of Proportions', in Archive 7, pp. 1-6 (1970).
22'’ 74al71f. given in § 2.6 n.134 above (related to 99a8-l 1 given in § 2.8).
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without specification. They are, as mentioned in § 3.2, qua differentiae, adjectives. The alternation 
theory, Mueller says, "involves abstraction", which of course it does, but the abstraction should not 
be such as to leave the elements formless— mere quantities with all distinctions removed. Mueller's 
reading obliterates not only the heterogeneous/homogeneous division, but all distinctions quantities 
possess. He misconceives the level of the homogeneity involved, and takes Aristotle's thought that 
there is a sense in which the elements of any science will be homogeneous, to be the level of the 
homogeneity at stake. All comparisons are homogeneous in that sense; even specifiably 
heterogeneous formulations. A theorem such as the kvaXXac does not obliterate the specific 
distinctions between the modes of quantity, any more than calling rabbits, crabs, dragonflies, and 
wildebeest "animals" removes their generic differences. In mathematics the genus (i.e., the highest 
genus) is quantity; yet (as mentioned in § 1.3) Aristotle resists giving that name, or any other, to all 
elements of the genus. He does this precisely because to do so raises the wrong expectations: it 
would flag the notion of quantities qua mathematical entities standing (or capable of being spoken 
of) apart from their several forms. There is something bizarre in Mueller accusing Aristotle of 
blurring these very distinctions, when it is Aristotle who points out the dangers— devoting much of 
the last two books of the Metaphysics to the issue. Aristotle does not maintain that the alternando 
rule governs all proportions; he simply selects a homogeneous class for his example. The objects in 
any given application of the alternando theory are homogeneous as distinct from other possible 
objects within the scope of mathematics. Aristotle would only be removing the specific differences 
between lines, numbers, solids, and periods of time, if he were to say that these several classes of 
quantity could interact in the kvaXXac theorem. Which he does not226.
226 Aristotle calls the classes of magnitude in the passage ei8r), which could easily have led to 
the thought that they make up a single genus. Mueller is perhaps assuming the yEvo<;-Ei.8oq 
terminology as applying a rigid taxonomy to mathematics parallel to the old interpretation of 
the biological works. It is worthwhile here to follow Pellegrin's suggestion (see § 3.3) that 
where Aristotle focuses on features held in common he uses eiSoq regardless of the level of 
generality. (But Aristotle is perfectly aware, as the passages 74al7 and 99a9 themselves 
show, that solids, for example, are not greater or less than periods of time.) The discussion 
from which the extract 74al7 is taken examines the roles of the principles of 'qua' and 'per 
se', and the level of universality of attributes. Particularly in such a discussion the probability 
is that Aristotle would have been alive to the sense and extent (the qua and per se) of the 
homogeneity of the terms. Over and above this specific probability, in view of his overall 
interest in the generic status of classes and objects, it is prima facie unlikely that Aristotle 
would neglect the homogeneous/heterogeneous distinction. (Mueller discusses Aristotle's 
concept of mathematical objects further in Aristotle's Doctrine of Abstraction, in Sorabji, 
1990 pp.463-80.)
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Imputations that Aristotle was unaware of, or indifferent to, the importance of homogeneity 
for certain analogies, or heterogeneity for others, are not well founded. He stipulates homogeneity 
where the mode of analogy is drawn from the kvaXkai, principle (as in the Rhetoric). In other cases 
analogy is used for the very reason that the objects belong to different genera. Aristotle's approach to 
the relation between generic status and analogy is not, as Pellegrin thinks, heterogeneous with lapses 
of consistency; nor is it, as Mueller thinks, indifferent to generic status (which would then, in effect, 
reduce the terms to homogeneity, where Olshewsky thinks they belong). These extreme 
interpretations all misconceive the connexion between genus and analogy. Neither heterogeneity nor 
homogeneity form part of the definition of it, nor are they even accidents per se of analogy. They 
each figure for certain extensions of the analogical formula, and not for others. The spellings-out of 
the rules for each were recorded by Euclid (given above in § 2.9), and we have no good reason to 
think that Aristotle did not know of these, and many to think that he did.
There is only one passage in the Aristotelian corpus I can recall which defies the explanation 
of the connexion between analogy and generic order I have been proposing. In History of Animals 
Aristotle says
In those blooded and footed animals which are viviparous, the bones do not differ much: they
differ only "by analogy" i.e., in hardness and softness, and in size.227
It is not an extract which Pellegrin mentions; nor is it one I can make sense of. The section in which 
it appears is concerned with comparisons of bones among the various species. Possibly Aristotle 
means that the classes of animals involved vary too much to allow a direct comparison of their bones. 
Perhaps by 'not differing very much, but only by analogy' he indicates minor, i.e., homogeneous 
analogies rather than major, heterogeneous ones. But even so, for the bones of fairly closely related 
animals (the footed, blooded, viviparous ones), to differ in hardness and size, is a matter of degree, 
not analogy, however minor. Good sense of the text is made by dropping the expression tcax’ 
dvaA-oyiav (on the grounds that it crept in through a later scribe who did not understand the issues). 
This is exactly what D'Arcy Thompson does in his translation228. But these are only tentative 
suggestions; I am loath to claim that the text is corrupt, or there was a slip of the pen: these, time
227 Peck, HA III 516b3ff. ('Oaa |iev oov tcdv  evou|icov kou ne^cov i^cboTOKa ecmv oi> 7toA.u 
Svacpepei toc o o ia  a X X a  icax’ avaXoyiav jiovov ctkXtipottiti k c u  (j,aXaKOTT|Ti Koa 
HeyeOei.)
228 The History of Animals (1910): "in the way of relative hardness, softness, or magnitude".
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and again, have been the cries of commentators whenever the text conflicts with their understanding. 
All I can say is I don't understand it.
There are two strands of thought to be combined to grasp the use Aristotle makes of analogy: 
(i) analogy discovers a common purpose; (ii) the Eudoxian model applies to all quantities.
(i) Although 'explicating resemblance' (where there may be little or no apparent similarity) forms 
the basis of virtually all modern conceptions of analogy, it is harmfully anachronistic to read that as 
the use Aristotle makes of it. For him there is an analogy only where an equivalent function can be 
assigned, whether there is any resemblance or not. Despite the lack of any resemblance, wholly 
disparate phenomena can fruitfully be regarded as in important ways equivalent provided that a 
common purpose is found. The job analogy is able to do is to account for phenomena exactly and 
comprehensively, however close or remote the elements, whether they share a common measure or 
not. (This facility Aristotle applies especially to the problem of exchange-value.)
(ii) The General Theory of Proportions applied (a) even if the analogates were incommensurable; 
whether they fell (b) into the same genus; or (c) into different genera. Elements from differing 
genera will usually be (relevantly229) incommensurable, but so might certain analogates within a 
genus (e.g., the side and diagonal). In the teeth of Aristotle’s plain assertions to the contrary 
Pellegrin is misled by the great value of analogy for (c) into supposing it applies only to (c). What 
provokes analogy however is the absence of a direct measure, whether inside or outside the genus. It 
makes an indirect exact measure by comparing the comparisons230. The reason it is not called on for 
those commensurable quantities within a genus is simply that there it isn't necessary: the direct 
application of greater and less suffices.
To recap, to account for the life-sciences Aristotle fuses three distinct principles: teleology, 
generic structure, and proportionality. The (perhaps I should say a) teleological principle joins 
analogy to the generic order. Perceiving the biological works as non-taxonomic has lifted much of
22!) Differentiae will often be irrelevantly commensurable, of course, e.g., the weight of a 
turkey's egg and a sheep's bladder can be directly compared (and see § 6.5).
230 Notice that the same referents might be compared either directly or indirectly; there could 
be an analogy: triangle : hexagon :: rectangle : octagon, even though all the analogates are 
plane figures comparable as to the greater and less (see also Meteorology 347bl2 in which 
hail, rain, snow, dew and frost are related both analogically and by degree).
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the darkness from the zoological writings, though more light would be shed by a clear grasp of the 
role of analogy. Unlike yevo<; and ei5oq, which he employs casually along-side more structured 
uses, Aristotle employs otvaXoyia only technically, keeping very close to its mathematical 
provenance. He always puts to use the mathematical principles of proportion (both the classical 
forms of it and the Eudoxian general theory— these being the traditional discipline and what was 
then the most up-to-date mathematics), and the failure to appreciate the impact of these 
mathematical principles on him has long resulted in complaints of inconsistency and obscurity in his 
theory of justice. That theory still suffers from its dislocation from the proportion theory upon which 
it was modelled. I say "has long resulted" because knowledge of the relevant mathematics began to 
evaporate before the fall of Rome. Aristotle's treatment of justice is so intimately bound-up with the 
Eudoxian formulae, and so dependant on the power of the central definitions, that we should bring to 
mind the fortunes of those definitions.
3. 7 Disproportionate palimpsests
We have seen in §. 2.5 that by the heyday of the Roman empire there was already some lack of 
clarity as to the principles of proportion that had once been known. For the next millennium the 
understanding of Elements V was sadly confused. In the Levant the presentations of the definitions 
were quite accurate, but with one exception231 there was scarcely any understanding of the thought 
lying behind them. What foxed the Levantine mathematicians was the notion of 'equimultiple'. (The 
mediaeval difficulties with equimultiples are indicated below in connexion with Campanus's edition 
of the Elements.) Worry over the meaning of equimultiple formed the core of Ahmed ibn Yusufs 
(9th century) Letter232 He sought "the cause and essence" of ratio yet he did not clearly distinguish 
ratio from proportion; indeed Ahmed defined proportion where he was supposed to be defining ratio 
Cut sit in primo de partibus secundi quantum in tertio de partibus quarti"). And his troubles with 
equimultiples were echoed throughout the Middle Ages in both the East and the West.
231 The 11th century mathematician al-Jayyam demonstrated the effective equivalence of 
proportionality of Books V and VII. I.e., although VII.20 does not provide enough to cover 
incommensurables, it does follow that there cannot be a proportion when (taken in order) nA 
> B, and nC < D. (See Plooij, his translation pp. 16-46.)
232 Translated in the 12th century by Gerard of Cremona as Epistola de Proportione et de 
Proportionalitate (Murdoch 1963 p.252).
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The errors in the West were much more complicated than the those in the East. The
difficulties started with the definition 5.4. This was wrongly translated, but the texts from which it
was taken were quite correct. The mistranslation started with /Ethelhard; Boethius's (via
Cassiodorus) version of 5.4, and both the Arabic traditions (via Gerard) were all accurate233
Ethelhard, however, both inserted a principle of continuity properly belonging to Book X, and
confounded proportions with ratios:
Quantitates que dicuntur continuant proportionalitatem habere, sunt quarum eque multiplicea 
aut equa sunt aut eque sibi sine interruptione addunt aut minuut.234
This spurious definition infected the understanding of Book V. It is true that there is a principle of
continuity in Euclid's definition 5.4, but only in that only finite quantities are capable of being
continuous with others. (I.e., it treats Archimedean not non-finite quantities— if the magnitudes
were infinitesimal or infinite they could not be directly compared through multiplication, or any
other process.) The requirement that for there to be a ratio magnitudes be continuous in this sense
(which amounts to their being of the same finite genus) was read by /Ethelhard as a proposal for
'continuant proportionalitatem'— continuous proportions as distinct from ^continuous ones235 . 5 .4
233 Elements V.4 in Boethius's version is:
proportionem vero ad se invicem magnitudines habere dicuntur, qua; possunt sese invicum 
multiplicatce transcendere.
Gerard of Cremona translated from the (Theonine) text of al-Nairizi stemming from al-Hajjaj: 
Quantitates, inter quas dicitur esse proportio, sunt quarum possibile, cum multiplicatur, 
alias addere.
Gerard's (pre-Theonine) translation from Ishaq/Thabit:
Quantitates quarum quedam ad alias proportionates esse dicuntur, sunt quarum quasdem 
cum multiplicantur super alias addere possibile est.
The Sicilian translation directly from the Greek was also perfectly accurate:
Proportionem ad se invicum habere quantitates dicuntur que possunt multiplicate se 
invicem superare.
234 Which I translate as
Quantities which are said to have a continuous proportion are those with an equal 
multiple, or else are equal, or else themselves, without interruption, increase or reduce.
A further version of 5.4 commonly read in the Middle Ages is very close to this, and belongs 
to the tradition that Clagett and Murdoch call "the Boethius-Adelard melange" (Crombie 
p.241):
Ilia continue proportionalitates esse dicuntur, quorum uno modo multiplicia aut equalia 
sibi sunt aut equalitur sese continue superant et a se continue superantur.
(Paris Bibliotheque Nationale 10257.)
235 Since 5.4 refers to ratios, with no mention of proportion, it suggests that, together with the 
uncertainty between mediates and proportionalitates (mentioned §§ 2 . 1 , 2 .2  above), the 
unfortunate custom of translating Xoyoq as proportio may be implicated in the mix-up. Book
V does contain the implication of the difference between continuous and discrete proportions 
in the definition 5.8: dvaXoyia 8e ev -tpicnv opou; eXaxiaTT) ecmv. The three terms being 
those in a continuous proportion (which Aristotle explains at NE 1131 a34ff., see § 1.8).
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was thus misconstrued as the rule for merely one class of proportions instead of being the (latter part 
of the) definition for all ratios.
Equally seriously, the notion (or rather a notion) of equimultiple was brought forward from the 
law for proportions (5.5) to the definition of ratio (5.4). In the process of being thus misplaced 
(equimultiples being a feature which distinguished proportions from ratios) the idea of an 
equimultiple was itself misunderstood in the West as in the East. As with the Levantines from 
Ahmed onwards Campanus took Euclid's term apa— from 5.5 (f| ap a  turepxfl i’l a p a  ia a  f] f) apa  
eXAeiTtfi)— to mean '(by) the same amount' (similes vel additione vel diminutione vel equalitate). 
This replaced Eudoxus's principle that the greater and less be greater and less correspondingly, or 
"in the same way" or "simultaneously"236 (which was more accurately in Latin "simul vel 
additione... ”) not that the greater and less were of the actual amount. The error was not primarily a 
fault of translation; although the most widely disseminated text and commentary of the Elements was 
Campanus's revision of /Ethelhard's second version (the Commentum), many of the copies of this 
edition contained the correct "«mM/(taneous)". And the other Latin translators, Boethius, Hermann 
of Carinthia, Gerard (from both his Arabic sources), and the Sicilian, in addition to the Arabic 
translators themselves, all gave the correct translation. Unlike 5.4 all the translations of 5.5 were 
quite accurate; the failure in both the East and the West was in understanding what it meant. What 
it meant was that the ratios could be manipulated to measure each other, not that there was any 
'amount' to be found which would resolve difficulties237. (In effect the mediaeval readings were 
variants on the old anthyphairetic approach238: not perceiving the character of the general theory has
236 For apex Liddell & Scott give: at once, at the same time, together with, at one and the 
same time, as soon as, and, without reference to time, together, both.
237 See §§ 2.9 and 6.9.
238 Not grasping the correct definitions in Book V did not signify a decline of interest in 
proportion and ratio, on the contrary, associated with the more than fifty editions and 
commentaries produced in the Arab world between the 9th and the 14th centuries, at least 
eight texts (those by al-Jauhari, Ahmed ibn Jusuf, Sanad ibn All, al-Mahani, al-Hasan, al- 
Farabi, al-Jayyani, al-Samarqandi) were separately devoted to the issues. Even conceived as 
an anthyphairetic work (this indeed was stated by al-Mahani, al-Nairizi, al-Jayyani, and Omar 
Khayyam— see Plooij pp.25, 50-51, and Omar Khayyam (11 th-12th century) Explanation of 
the Difficulties in Euclid’s Postulates) the definitions in Book V were regarded highly. This 
regard was expressed in the West by Roger Bacon (excluding 5.5) as (op.cit., p. 125):
prior to all, since they are appropriate to figures and numbers and all things mathematical, 
and through the medium of mathematics, to yet other things and sciences.
Bacon's failure to appreciate 5.5 is hardly surprising in view of the vacuity assigned to 
equimultiples, and the assumption that only discontinuous quantities were covered. He 
thought Euclid's language there was obscure, and proper to neither mathematics nor
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correspondingly undermined every account of Aristotle's treatment of exchange-value— see chapter 
6.)
Being assumed to be (i) an anthyphairetic theory set the stage for the complex reconstructing 
of the definitions V.3-5 in a manner which grossly undervalued them, (ii) The latter part of the 
definition of ratio became a rule for just one class of proportions, taking (iii) the notion of continuity 
to be a characteristic of that class, where (iv) in reality it underscored needs to be met for all ratios;
(v) vitiating the concept of the equimultiple to express no more than 'the same amount' rather than at 
the same time or in the same way, and (vi) projecting this debased concept onto the preceding 
definition, in effect (vii) replacing definition 5.5 by the arithmetic 7.20, when (viii) 5.5 had been 
devised explicitly to replace the anthyphairetic theory. These multiple factors rather than merely (ix) 
mistranslation, were responsible for the evaporation of the meaning of the theory of proportions239. A
philosophy (pp.86 , 94). In the West the latter part of the Middle Ages saw a flourishing of 
work on proportion theory; it was extensively discussed by writers such as Bradwardine, 
Oresme and Albert of Saxony, and was explored notably in connexion with astronomy and 
mechanics (Oresme De Proportionibus Proportionum; Albert of Saxony Tractatus 
Proportionum). Archbishop Bradwardine, in his Tractatus de Proportionibus Velocitatum in 
Motibus, connected variations of force and resistance to the differentials of velocity. He 
developed a 'calculus1 of ratio seeking a mean between terms of given ratios and a 'ratio ot 
ratios'— although this (proportio proportionum) was Oresme's expression. (See Clagett The 
Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 1959, chapter 7.)
(So we see that Galileo's use of proportion to give a general theory of motion followed in the 
scholastic tradition, his breach with that tradition being his use of the true Eudoxian 
definitions to explain motion as continuous, not discrete.)
239 The loss was not recovered until the very end of the Middle Ages. In the 1460's 
Regiomontanus compared the Greek MSS with the Campanus editions (§ 2.2, note 103(v) 
above). He appreciated the genuine 5.5 definition (see Dedron & Itard 1973 I, p. 199) but died 
(in 1476) before he could publish. Zamberti (1505) did not clearly rectify the palimpsests 
(S.Drake 'Galileo Gleanings XXII: Velocity and Eudoxian Proportion Theory, in Physis 15, 
1973), which is very strange as he inveighed against Campanus as a "barbarous translator" 
who had filled the text "with extraordinary scarecrows, nightmares and phantasies". Heath 
(1926,1 p.98) points out that Zamberti did not realise that Campanus had to deal with the text 
as he received it.
The crucial role of the general theory of proportions in the development of science is 
vividly demonstrated by its impact on Galileo. Throughout the Middle Ages, as we have seen, 
the central definitions of Elements V were misunderstood as variants of Book VII, in which 
arithmetic quantities primarily figured. Apparently using Tartaglia's commentary (note 
103(v)) Galileo deployed the Eudoxian formula to re-define the physics of motion. In De 
Motu chapter 15 (1591-92) he relied on 5.5 to specify the truth conditions for relating 
disparate elements such as speed, weight, volume, and height; and straight and circular 
motion (this last in opposition to Aristotle— although Galileo follows Aristotle, e.g., from 
Physics VII chapter 5, in using proportion to connect motion and force with distance and 
time). Also in Mechanics (about 1602), in his proof of the Lever Law (which was a 
simplification and improvement on that of Archimedes: note that Archimedes had utilised a 
pre-Euclidean, anthyphairetic model of proportions— ref. § 2.6 notes 129-133), Galileo set 
aside the commensurable/incommensurable distinction by means of 5.5 (see Drake Galileo at 
Work: His Scientific Biography, 1978, pp. 15, 27, 57, 302).
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consequence of this loss was that the mediaeval commentators of the Ethics did not have the model of 
proportion theory upon which Aristotle relied available to them.
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Chapter 4
THE PATTERN OF THE THEORY
4. 1 Aquinas and analogy
I don't think there has ever been a satisfactory commentary on the account of justice in the
Ethics, but the best of the many that have been made was that by St Thomas Aquinas. In the
following chapters I shall promote his interpretation (except for one major issue— § 4.7) as accurate
and perceptive, and I especially support him against criticism of recent centuries. Not that St
Thomas's well-known doctrine of analogy240 touches on the commentary on justice. (Aquinas's, and
subsequent Thomist discussions of analogy are concerned with quite other issues of metaphysics241
and theology.) But it is plain from certain details in his remarks242 that he was aware o! the
mathematical principles of ratio and proportionality— at least as they were known to the translators
of Euclid by his time243. Aquinas distinguished indirect comparison via analogy from direct
comparison within a genus, and he knew that analogical similitude, as against resemblance, operates
wholly independently from the proximity or otherwise of the analogates. In De Veritate244 he says
talis enim similitudo similiter invenitur in multum vel parum distantibus: non enim est maior 
similitudo proportionalitatis inter duo et unum et sex et tria quam inter duo et unum et centum et 
quinqaginta;
240 Some modern Thomists (Davies 1992, p.70— see § 1.9 notes 73-75— following 
B.Montagnes (1963) La Doctrine de I'analogie de I'etre d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin) say that 
Aquinas did not have a doctrine of analogy, but that Cajetan is the source of the 'doctrine'. 
Whether what he thought amounted to a theory or not, St Thomas treated analogy as a mode 
of predication distinct from, and falling between, univocity and equivocity; from which stems 
much of the subsequent metaphysics of analogy.
241 Mentioned in § 1.9 and notes 73-77.
242 Not all those referred to by Phelan (see § 1.9, note 75) but rather in De Veritate (see 
following note) and corresponding passages on the Metaphysics V, lect. 8 § 879 (referring to 
1016bff.) and Summa III (Supplement) q. 92, art. 1, r. 6 .
243 The works St Thomas relied on most were those of Gerard of Cremona and the 
Commentum edition of /Ethelhard, but also the translation by Hermann of Carinthia. Aquinas 
refers to Euclid by name 20 times, with several references to ratio and proportion. Elements V.
3, for example, is cited in III Sent. d .l. q .l. a.i. ad. 3 in Gerard's translation:
Proportio est certitudo mensurationis quantitatum unius generis.
He was also familiar with Euclid through Cassiodorus's preservation of Boethius's Ars 
Geometrica (see Aquino I*ii, pp.65*-86*). Thomas's early studies took place at Naples, but 
there is no sign of his knowing the Sicilian translation made 80 years earlier.
244 Q. 2, art. 11 ad. 4 (Aquino 22 Ii-Iii, p.80, § 238-42). Aquinas also shows his familiarity 
with proportionality, not just ratio, at q. 2, art. 3, ad. 4.
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i.e., that there is no greater analogical closeness between very close and very distant terms (as he 
says, between 2 : 1 :: 6 : 3 and 2 : 1 : :  100 : 50). Aquinas was aware, unlike some modern 
Aristotelian commentators, that analogy functions independently of the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of the analogates, and that direct comparison must be homogeneous245.
My disagreement with St Thomas's account of universal justice is, as mentioned, best left (to § 
4.7) until after the layout of the theory has been presented. That layout is, in turn, best seen after the 
many threads I have left leading up to Aristotle's theory have been drawn together.
4 .2 Resume
Proportion begins with ratio, which is the manner of comparison between quantities, wherever
comparison is possible. Two distinct ideas as to the nature of mathematics informed how ratio was
to be conceived: (a) as primarily a relation between the objects of mathematics, or (b) primarily as
an interactive process (stressing the activity rather than the objects acted upon). In either case, since
heterogeneous forms of quantity cannot be greater or less than one another (50 yards is not more or
less than 17 ounces, or an acute angle) the objects had to be of the same kind. Ratio formalises the
greater-less relation; the notions of more and less form a polarity related to the ancient Trepcxc,-
dnevpov dichotomy which, in a number of guises, pervaded pre-Aristotelian thinking. It had been
supposed that ratio would achieve precision for the notions of greater and less, fulfilling the aims to
bring knowledge, i.e., reason and exactitude (nepac,), to what was otherwise inexact and boundless
(d7T£ipov). Even though it is usual to speak of ratio and proportion as if they are much the same
there is a vital distinction between them: ratio is a 'first-order' connexion between quantities.
Proportion, on the other hand, is a connexion between the acts of connexion; a 'second-order'
process. This logical difference is not observed very much in ordinary usage, nor even in technical
discussions. Where ratio encodes the difference between quantities, proportion records the sameness
of the relation despite the differences. It fastens-on to what is equal, whether or not the equality is
apparent. Analogy is the equality of the ratios. ’AvaXoyia (proportionality) had been developed as a
study by the Pythagoreans, from whom stemmed the three classical modes: arithmetic, geometric,
245 He says (ibid.) that although direct comparison between us and God is impossible, an 
indirect (but nevertheless literal not metaphorical) comparison is possible heterogeneously via 
analogy.
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and harmonic, locating respectively the equal in terms of quantity, multiplication, and division, 
between pairs of ratios.
The differences between geometry and arithmetic lead to the difference between continuous 
and separated proportions; Aristotle, however, generalises both of these into 4-term proportions (in 
effect treating then as separated, since the features of 3-term proportion are expressible in four 
terms). They all require a 'mean'. The doctrine of the mean is approachable in many ways, but the 
mean can usefully be thought of as the mid-point, centre, or point of comparison, for the whole of the 
proportion. I have defended the overlapping references to mean and proportion among the ancients, 
and Aristotle’s pristine use of arithmetical proportion. His conception of proportion is strictly in line 
with the mathematical principles of his time, and should not be confused with notions of analogy that 
have become familiar since the Middle Ages. These later conceptions work on the principle of 
resemblance, whereby similarities are located or explicated or created. Such ideas emerged from the 
classical notion by recognisable steps, but they distort our understanding when projected onto the 
ancient usage.
The discovery of the irrationals had a considerable impact on Greek thinkers, and we looked 
at the early anthyphairetic methods of tackling the problems raised. I hope to have clarified the 
reason for Aristotle's long-puzzling choice of the term dvxavEipeaiq when referring to this issue. I 
suggested that the alternative expressions dvBixpcapeai^ and dvxaveipeau; reflect the differing 
conceptions of mathematics. The proposals of Knorr, Larsen, and Thorup, raise the possibility of 
there having been an earlier general solution than that traditionally ascribed to Eudoxus. But it turns 
out that the traditional view remains the most likely, and in any case, had any alternative theories 
existed they would have benefited Aristotle by providing him with a greater choice for the many uses 
he makes of analogy. Either way, the impact of proportion theory in general on Aristotle's thinking 
and what we know as the Eudoxian theory in particular, was immense.
Aristotle draws proportionality into his entire method of classification; that method starts out 
in dissatisfaction with Plato's (or the Academy's) method of classifying by dichotomous division. 
This he exposes as unsuited to classification, especially in biology, cxcept as a minor aid. His own 
proposal is a generic structure made effective by principles ol analogy and teleology. We contrasted 
his often casual use of the terms yevo^ and ei8o<; (although these are sometimes, and always when
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used together, structured) with avaXoyia, which he always uses technically. Where the eiSoi; (or 
the je v o c , or the individual object) is the subject of an inquiry, as  the subject it is to be distinguished 
from attributes (usually differentiae) predicated of it; these will, typically, be adjectives. 'AvaXoyia 
was then a mathematical term which Aristotle begins to apply outside mathematics. In the life- 
sciences he uses the principle of function to integrate analogy with the generic order. The prime 
notion of function also determines how animals are divided into parts; their parts being organs to 
implement the (principally vital) functions. Comparison of animate parts or wholes is made, both 
within and across genera, according to their functions, not according to resemblance. (Similarity 
might be treated as either leading to, or resulting from, expectations as to an equivalence of function. 
I have not otherwise looked into other meanings of teleology, or its metaphysics.)
We found radically opposing claims for the place of analogy in the generic sequence. Ross 
and Pellegrin see only heterogeneous analogies, Olshewsky and Mueller only homogeneous. In fact 
both camps mistake the nature of classical analogy; analogy provides an exact indirect measure. 
Sometimes, as when the alternation principle applies, homogeneously, and sometimes 
heterogeneously. The outstanding value of proportion theory for Aristotle is that it enables the 
precise comparison of phenomena whether or not they are widely separated (N.B., not only when 
they are widely separated, or only when they are not).
The opposing (mis)perceptions of the generic standing of proportion in Aristotle's philosophy 
reflect a lack of awareness of the importance to him of the work of Eudoxus. Not appreciating this 
close association has vitiated accounts of the theories of justice and exchange, but has also done 
damage to the understanding of the biological works and his philosophy of mathematics. So 
important, and it seems novel, is the Eudoxian theory (in addition to certain key elements in 
proportion theory in general) to our understanding of Aristotle's thinking, that I have outlined some 
of the principle theorems, and traced the vicissitudes of the salient definitions. It will be 
immediately objected that proportion theory is well-known to have been known to Aristotle, and 
nearly always mentioned by commentators. So it is; it is mentioned, and sometimes elaborated, but 
not appreciated246. In the specific accounts of the importance of proportion for Aristotle (in Soudek's 
for example) the Eudoxian theory is not even mentioned, and in Lowry's, although the issue ol
246 An exception was Heath (1949), and recently Byrne (op. cit.).
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proportionality is explored in detail and Eudoxus's influence on Aristotle highlighted, Eudoxus's 
general theory is ignored247.
4. 3 Seven preliminaries
( i )  AiKociocrovri and S i k o u o v :
With what I hope is now an adequate picture of the factors supporting Aristotle's reliance on 
analogy, and especially of the actual principles he deploys, we are equipped to examine his 
presentation of the theory of justice. Aristotle's conception is derived from Plato; there are some 
divergences, but these reflect his delving into what the application of proportion theory entails, and 
certain limitations he imposes as a result, rather than a conflict of approach248. A terminological 
preliminary should be mentioned. AiKaiocrovri and (t o ) 8 ik c u o v  are often both translated as 
'justice'; the adjective “Sucaiov” was also used (in the neuter nominative singular “ t o  S i k c u o v ” ) as a
general noun to mean "the just_______the just thing, or the just act. Much of the time little may
hang on this grammatical detail, but at certain crucial points we find that it will be a considerable 
help in rectifying mistakes of interpretation (§§ 3.2 and chapter 5).
(ii) Righteousness:
The Platonic notion of SiKoaoaovri was perhaps in certain respects closer to the biblical 
principle of righteousness than to what is meant by ‘justice’ in modern English. (It also included the 
harmony of the connexions among the parts of the soul; Aristotle comments on this at the end of the 
book, where he treats it as metaphorical, and equivalent to the derivative sense of justice which 
applies in such cases as in (iii) following.) But whether 5ikcxioctuvt| expressed a broader concept 
than Sikcuov is not an issue that I shall explore: what we need to observe is that Aristotle 
distinguishes overall righteousness from the rightness of interactions with others of the noXiq. The 
traits of character of the righteous will be pretty much the same as those of the just. What are 
designated as righteous are the traits judged as inward dispositions; what is said to be just are these
247 Lowry traces the influences on Aristotle of proportion theory, and especially the 
Pythagorean sources via Archytas, but he surprisingly mentions only Eudoxus’s method of 
exhaustions in relation to the reciprocal or harmonic proportion (see chapter 6).
248 But see note 252 for Burnet's view.
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same traits judged as outward relations to others249. He thus imposes a limitation on the Platonic 
conception; but it is thought that for Aristotle also S i k c u o o w t i  (justice) retains a broader sense than 
8 ik o u o v  (a just action or thing).
(iii) Plato:
The proportionality central to Aristotle's notion of justice is found in a number of Plato's
dialogues; in Gorgias 508b (Hamilton) for example:
you have not observed how great a part geometry plays in heaven and earth, and because you 
neglect the study of geometry you preach the doctrine of unfair shares
and Laws VI 757Bff. Plato says (Bury)
For there are two kinds of equality which, though identical in name, are often almost opposite in 
their practical results .... the equality determined by measure, weight and number .... but the 
truest and best form of equality is not an easy thing for everyone to discern .... it produces all 
things good; for it dispenses more to the greater and less to the smaller, giving due measure to 
each according to nature .... it assigns in proportion what is fitting to each.
These passages might appear to prefigure only distributive justice, but they contain the germ of
Aristotle's more elaborate formulation of justice in general (explored below). At 744c:
so that by rule of symmetrical inequality they may receive offices and honours as equally as 
possible, and may have no quarrelling,
distributive justice is more exactly anticipated.
(iv) The limitations of equality:
Justice as a specific virtue, i.e., particular justice (see below), is intimately bound-up with 
equality; as justice is the appropriate, i.e., the right or fair equality, it can only apply when some 
form of equality is available. This association leads Aristotle to limit the scope of justice in ways we 
find unappealing nowadays. Only adult male citizens of the 71:0X15  are, he thinks, capable of some 
mode of quantifiable comparison (comparison as to the greater or less) with one another. The 
imperatives of equality require that no action, or state of affairs, can be just unless some mode of 
equality can be arrived at between those involved. Where no measure in common can be found there 
is no place for fairness— which can only apply to the genus of quantifiable justice (i.e., Particular 
justice). Fairness is a species of the genus equality, so where the genus cannot apply no species of 
that genus can be applicable. Strictly speaking, because the worth of foreigners, slaves, children, and
249 This distinction is sometimes confounded with the distinction of universal from particular 
justice (e.g., by Burnet 1900, pp.202-3) rather than as the contrast between (universal) justice 
and the other virtues.
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women, cannot be measured against that of citizens, comparison is impossible. Hence there can be 
no mode of equality, hence there can be no justice or injustice applied to them. Foreigners don't 
qualify because, although they may well be autonomous adult males, they are not members of the 
polis. Slaves may well be adult males within the polls, but they are not autonomous (such a notion 
contradicts the very condition of slavery), hence they are not properly 'members' of it. Children 
could be male, free, and of the polis, but are only potentially autonomous. Women will be adult and 
might be free and of the polis, but they are not even potentially male. All the excluded groups have 
debilities which prevents a quantifiable comparison as to the greater and less with citizens. Unlike 
non-citizens the worth of any citizen can be, in principle, measured against that of any other250, so 
that some ratio will express the comparison. Non-citizens do not occupy the same scale— they are 
incommensurable with citizens, so no ratio can express the worth of a non-citizen with a citizen. 
Women, children, and slaves, will belong to some adult male citizen (women to a father, brother, 
husband, uncle, or cousin), and just as justice governs interactions with others of the polis, it does 
not govern one's relations to one's own belongings. (There is an extended discussion on whether it is 
possible to be unjust to oneself (1136af0ff.) in which he concludes that it isn't.) It is their 
incommensurability that bars those excluded from justice; Aristotle’s restriction is (as with the 
structure of his whole theory) purely mathematical: there can be no mode of equality where the 
(worth of) the elements involved is not comparable. No multiplication will equate the value of a 
slave and master, or father and child, or us and God (1137a28), which is why justice is strictly 
inappropriate to such connexions.
But, Aristotle is clearly unsettled by the logic of his position; he concedes that in a secondary 
or metaphorical sense251 justice may apply even where no comparison of worth between the parties is 
possible. Taking Plato's notion of justice regulating the "differing parts of one's nature" (as Aristotle, 
NE 1138b7, puts it) the elements involved are treated as if they are capable of quantifiable 
comparison252. The strongest claimants for such ersatz justice are wives253. They are well placed
250 MM I 1194b9, 17, 20-21. (This and any other appeals to MM are intended only as general 
support for the argument— indicating Aristotle’s views as reported by a close follower.)
251 1 194b7 (Stock):
But the justice in these cases would only seem to share the name of particular justice
without sharing the nature.
252 Burnet (1900 p.246), however, sees Aristotle's remarks at the end of the book about the 
metaphorical extension of the word as "disposing" of Plato's notion of 8iKaiocn)VT|.
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because although as wives (and probably as women) their worth cannot be measured on the same 
scale as adult male citizens bound together through laws, qua partners who entered a contract 
according to laws and agreements susceptible to measurement, the worth of many of the issues that 
might arise between husband and wife will be "embodied in law". Insofar as the wife has entered a 
legal agreement and "who shares equally in ruling and being ruled" (1134bl5) (presumably the 
household) comparison is possible, but insofar as she is not an independent citizen comparison is 
not; her role is then ambiguous. The ambiguity seems enough for Aristotle to treat this form of 
domestic justice as the strongest of the extended senses of the principle. So long as anyone can be 
viewed as if their worth could be measured against a citizen, or against any other party, then within 
that viewing they can be treated as sharing a common measure. Principles of greater and less can 
then apply, and so some mode of equality, and so justice. Moreover, the principle of analogy is used 
not only to extend justice to non-citizens, but however faint the justice for them is, it reflects the 
same rules as full-bodied justice as j/they had the franchise.
(v) Parallel Injustice:
Justice and Injustice are presented as largely parallel genera of virtue and vice respectively, but 
they are not parallel in every respect; they are after all, most importantly, opposites. Whereas the 
other virtues hold the mean between the extremes of their opposing vices (as Nemesis is the mean 
between the vices of Envy and Malice), as higher-order conditions of vice and virtue, Justice is the 
mean between extremes of the same vice: Injustice (1133b30ff.)254.
Injustice is also a particular vice parallel to Particular justice (see below); as with the case of 
justice, Particular injustice will be the specific vice connected with (in)equality and all issues of 
greater and less. Aristotle begins his treatment of Particular justice with a discussion of Injustice 
covering certain aspects of the subject which, in the equivalent account of Justice, he passes over. 
The remarks about Injustice are particularly useful in giving details which help to clarify the 
corresponding structure for Justice. They are especially helpful in establishing the scope of the 
subject.
253 MM I 1194b23.
254 Stewart pp.471-75 has a useful extended note treating this passage; but many of the 
difficulties there flow from his not distinguishing sufficiently the Universal from the 
Particular conditions of justice that are discussed in the following pages.
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(vi) The mean for us:
The doctrine of the mean applied to ethics requires that the right stance is to be found between 
excesses and defects. Virtue will find a position between (say) extravagance and meanness; but, 
Aristotle says, what is to count as meanness or extravagance will depend on circumstances. What is 
generosity, even extravagance, in a pauper would be miserly from a millionaire. Similarly, what is 
courageous for one person to do might veer between the reckless and the cowardly for some others, 
depending on the situation, and who they are. Consequently there needs to be, in addition to a mean 
between the extremes, a further principle of the mean relative to the individual and the specific 
context.
(vii) Higher-order virtue:
Justice is placed as the last of the virtues of character (what we would call moral virtues). The 
earlier ones are principally dispositions for the individual's own good; these personal virtues, such as 
courage, wit, or magnanimity, take up an ideal position between greater and less255. The relevant 
excellence is found as the mean between an excess and a defect (the excesses of the virtues just cited 
would be recklessness, buffoonery, and extravagance; the defects cowardice, boorishness, and 
meanness). Such virtues are of the same order (lying on the same scale) as their vices. Justice, by 
contrast, turns outward, and applies only to the individual's inter-relations with others. It is more 
complex than the previous, specific, virtues; it is a mean but not, Aristotle says, in the same way. (It 
is the point of equality in a 4-term proportion (§ 1.8), not the mean of a 3-term proportion256.) It has 
the character of virtue itself, and acts upon all the specific virtues insofar as they relate outwards. It 
is placed after the others to sum-up the moral excellences; Aristotle quotes the proverb (1129b30):
In Justice is all virtue found in sum.257
255 In the section of EE (1220b40-21al2) which corresponds to NE II 1107a32 Aristotle lists 
fifteen virtues as means between their excesses and defects: courage is the mean between 
cowardice and recklessness, generosity between meanness and extravagance, and so on. In 
some cases there is no name for an extreme. Aristotle uses slightly different examples of 
virtues in different texts (MM, NE, EE, and Rhetoric 1366b 1-22).
256 It is not the outward stance of the virtue which renders it a 4-term proportion. Specific 
virtues might be purely self-directed or other-directed; thrift is a mean involving only the self, 
and nemesis is the mean between envy and malice (1108bl) which can hardly be applied to 
oneself. Perhaps also a purely inward virtue such as temperance is not a 3-term proportion 
holding the balance between two extremes, but rather a 4-term proportion inwardly 
supervising the particular e^ei^.
257 ev 8e SiKaioouvfi at>^At|p8r|V raxa’ dpexri 'vi.
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This recursive, second-order, virtue acts upon (governs) what is to count as a virtue for any of the 
specific dispositions. Unlike the earlier virtues, such as courage or wit, it is not reflected by the 
continuous 3-term (what I am calling 'first-order') format, but by the 4-term (second-order) separated 
proportion (113 lal5ff.— also MM I 1193b39-40). The universal character is contrasted with the 3- 
term sequences and is represented by (he higher-order 4-term proportion.
4. 4 The layout of the theory
The theory of justice is set out in Book V of the Ethics (and Book IV of the EE, it forming part 
of the Common Books). For the last 150 years or so all commentators (that I have found) complain 
that the layout of the subject is a mess. What is supposed to be wrong with it differs from writer to 
writer, but whatever each individual scholar's view has been, they all agree that as it stands the text 
is confused and unsatisfactory. Against all these and related objections I maintain that Aristotle is 
not confused; that the many obscurities that have distressed them rest with the interpreters 
themselves, and that Aristotle presents a well-organised and unified theory.
The clearest way to show the structure of the theory is to set out its headings diagramatically. 
This is the plan Aristotle declares (1130b30ff.) and which he sticks to throughout, working faithfully 
through the issues step-by-step:
Highest Genus Virtue
I
High Genus Universal Justice
Genus Particular Justice
Species Distributive Justice Commutative Justice
(chapter 3)
Subaltern Species Involuntary Exchange 
(chapter 4)
Voluntary Exchange 
(chapter 5)
Sub-subaltern Species open secret
(figure 1)
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4. 5 The highest genus
The Highest Genus here is apexri (virtue or excellence). The nature of virtue had been defined 
in Book II  (1105bl9ff.) as a quality; the substance qualified was yo%T) (soul)258. The soul is divided 
into specific affections rax0ri (feelings or emotions) on the one hand, and on the other, more general 
faculties. (Several specific emotions are listed at 1105b20259.) The general faculties are then split 
into the naturally occurring and the acquired. The naturally occurring capacity (5uvajo,i<;) is the 
rather fleeting and unstable liability we have to have a specific emotion. These natural inclinations 
are not (or ought not to be) blamed or praised; praise and blame attach rather to what we do with 
them. What we do is educate, cultivate, or train, these innate but unsteady faculties into settled 
dispositions. Such a trained condition was known as a tciq (variously translated as a state, 
condition, habit, tendency, or disposition). The term and the notion was taken from surgery and 
medical practice, and then from athletic training at the gymnasium, where it meant a firm posture or 
trained readiness260. Virtue is defined as just such an acquired settled disposition (and to be 
immediately distinguished from other kceic; such as xe%vr|, and mediately from 7ta0r| and Suvcx^ eu;, 
other qualities). The cultivated tendency to excellence produces either (i) what is worthwhile or 
good in itself, or (ii) what functions well. These aims will, in turn, be directed either (a) inward to 
benefit the individual (as we have seen these personal virtues are presented in the earlier books), or 
(b) outward. Justice is the characterisation of any and all of the specific virtues viewed as they relate 
to others261, but it is also a specific virtue (V chapter 2; 1130al4ff.) largely parallel to the other 
specific virtues, but hybrid, in that it operates according to the higher-order 4-term proportion, not 
the more limited 3-term. It might have been clearer if it had had some other name, but another name 
would be misleading in that justice as a specific virtue still has the higher character of justice, rather
258 In the text of the Ethics three divisions of the soul are given, but the principles reflect the 
more complex analysis in Categories 8b25ff.
259 Desire, anger, fear, daring, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity.
260 Liddell & Scott.
261 The lack of clarity about Aristotle's use of generic structure has led to many confusions in 
accounting for the relations between virtue and justice. E.J.Weinrib, for example (pp.l35ff. in 
Aristotle's Forms of Justice, in S.Panagiotou (ed.) Justice, Law and Method in Plato and 
Aristotle (1987, pp. 133-52), writes:
The movement of Aristotle's argument is from virtue to a form of justice congruent with 
virtue, then to a justice that admits but does not require virtue, and finally to a justice 
which completely denies virtue's relevance, 
which doesn't recognise the pattern that Aristotle lays out. All the classes of justice fall 
squarely within the yevo<; virtue.
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than the (in the appropriate sense) ordinary character of the preceding virtues. Justice in this 
specialised sense deals with all issues of greater and less purely as greater and less. It is this 
particular notion of justice that is our principal subject.
The connexions among the concepts ordering the relation of virtue to the soul it qualifies do 
not fit into the above diagram. There would be too much cross-division; even if the relevant concepts 
could be presented diagrammatically, the diagram would need to be so heavily cross-referenced as to 
subvert any hope of lucidity. (As with biology, a generic structure applies to a chosen range of 
issues, but does not attempt to cover the whole field.)
4. 6 A high genus
Justice is a High Genus; it is often said that universal justice262 is a distinct class falling within
the genus justice, with particular justice standing along-side as a parallel species (or sub-genus)263.
But that is a profound misconstrual of the text— which the corresponding account of Injustice makes
clear (1130a23ff., Rackham):
Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the universal sense, and 
there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general, or illegal.
Aristotle repeats (1 130a34):
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice, the former 
being a part of the latter.
262 T.Engberg-Pedersen calls it 'comprehensive' justice (see Aristotle's Theory of Moral 
Insight, 1983, pp.54IT.).
263 For example by T.H.Irwin who says (Aristotle's First Principles, 1988 pp.424ff.) that 
General and Special (Universal and Particular) justice are two distinct parallel virtues, not 
hierarchically connected with Special falling within General justice. To this misconception of 
the structure of the theory Irwin adds the usual modern assumption that the second species of 
Particular justice is the 'corrective'. From these errors Irwin constructs his own model of 
Aristotle's theory in terms of 'prospective' and 'retrospective' justice. General justice is 
prospective: it gives the rules for guidance. Special justice is mainly retrospective, although 
Distributive justice is also in part prospective: it guides initial distributions (Irwin does not 
allow the second species to be partially prospective, to guide initial exchanges; indeed he, like 
many others, thinks exchanges are governed by an undeclared third class (pp.625-26 nn.l 1 & 
12). Irwin then finds fault with Aristotle for not sticking to his (Irwin’s) criteria. F.Rosen 
('The Political Context of Arisotle's Categories of Justice', in Phronesis XX, pp.228-40, 1975) 
also treats Universal justice along lines similar to Irwin's, and leading to the "ambiguous" 
(p.237) condition of certain 'corrective' issues. C.J.Rowe ('The Eudemian and Nicomachean 
Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought', in Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society, suppl. 1-3, part 3, 3, 1971) similarly treated the forms of justice non- 
hierarchically; Professor Rowe, however, tells me (conversation, Spring 1997) that he is 
inclined to accept my objections.
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These two extracts lie in a section with an uncertain history; there was uncertainty because several 
MSS included expressions such as “kcu to jiaeov” in a couple of places. Jackson wrestled with the 
differing readings but eventually accepted Trendelenburg's endorsement of Muretus's correction of 
1130bl2264 to "ejtei 8e to aviaov Kai to jtapavo|j.ov....", which has been adopted by all subsequent 
translators. The intrusion of "more" (nXeov) confused further a passage which at first sight appears 
the reverse of our immediate intuitions: we usually think that there are many more things that are 
unfair than illegal. But what Aristotle appears to be arguing is that there is more to legality than 
issues relating to equality. Much of Law stipulates that we conform to some rule: murder, theft, and 
driving on the wrong side of the road, all transgress rules (we shouldn't only more or less keep to the 
left). Justice, universally (or generally) understood, is the whole of virtue vis-a-vis others, 
encompassing every sort or sense of right action. Law formalises right action into rules which 
supervene both on justice as a special virtue, dealing with all issues of more and less, and on all the 
other virtues insofar as they impinge on others. This allows justice (contrary to frequent 
interpretations of Aristotle's texts) to apply to non-citizens. Law will require right action in relation 
to others; the limitation that the absence of a common measure disallows the possibility of any mode 
of equality— and so the possibility of Particular justice— only disqualifies judgements with respect to 
issues of comparison between the parties. Many actions (promise-keeping, for example) have little to 
do with comparisons or equality, and fall under Universal justice. In addition, Aristotle allows the 
rules of Particular justice to be borrowed, so that justice-by-courtesy (§ 4.3 (iv)) is available for those 
who do not qualify for the strictly comparative rules.
A point needs to be made about legal justice. I have not itemised it in the diagram because it 
is not a separate class (genus or species) of justice, but is rather universal justice considered vis-a-vis 
Law (this is repeated in MM I  1193b 1-11). On the (sublime) understanding that the laws are just, 
they codify the rules of virtue in general, for dealings in general. There is a key extract at 1130b23 
(Thomson):
For, broadly speaking, what we do as a result of practising virtue in general are those very
actions265 which conform to law;
264 Jackson, pp.73-74; see also Stewart, pp.406-9.
265 Michael of Ephesus said this refers to the various trades, businesses, and crafts, rather 
than to moral conduct; see Stewart, p.410.
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which follows the above passage connecting 'the unequal' to 'the unlawful' as part to whole. 
Formalised justice-in-general is the 'whole' of Legal justice of which issues of greater and less are a 
’part'.
4. 7 Whole and part
The one quarrel I have with Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's theory is his reading of 
General (Universal or Legal) justice. The interpretation with which I disagree did not appear in the 
Commentary (which gave a faithful account of Aristotle's text) but, in drawing-in features of the 
Politics when writing the Summa, Aquinas constructed an erroneous interpretation of the principles 
of General and Particular justice which have remained as staple readings ever since. Starting 
gradually at Summa 11-11 q. 58, art. 5, there is a logical shift which is completed by the end of q. 61: 
Q.58 a.5, Responsio (referring to his commentary for Book V of the Ethics, chapter I): 
we have seen justice directs a man in his relations with others, 
and ad. 3:
Accordingly general or legal justice, as directing to the common good, may be called a general 
virtue.
Ad.6 :
Sed Contra: sed virtus boni civis est iustitia generalis, per quam aliquis ordinatur ad bonum 
commune
(This virtue is general justice, which orders our acts for the common good)
Responsio:
so general or legal justice, which regards the common good as its proper object...
By art.7 there is a movement in the scope of 'common good'. Responsio:
we have seen that legal justice, which directly charges a man with the common good .... so also is 
a particular justice, which orders his dealings with another individual person
legal justice is indeed sufficient to govern us in our dealings with others, immediately when they 
comprise the common good, yet mediately in the case of the good of one individual person. 
Hence the need of a particular justice immediately engaged with this
the common good of the community and the particular good of the individual differ,
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Aquinas here draws on Politics I 1252a7. At q.59, art.l, ad.l:
legal justice is relative to the common good in human terms.
Then at q.61, referring to the above passages, he says: Reponsio:
iustitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquant privatum personam, qua: comparatur ad communitatem 
sicut pars ad totum
(particular justice is directed towards the private person, who may be compared to the community 
as a part to a whole).
He then specifies the tripartite division of the field of justice:
part —> whole (General, Universal, or Legal, justice); 
whole —> part (Distributive justice); 
part —> part (Commutative justice).
Then ad.4:
et ideo ad iustitiam legalem pertinet ordinare ea quce sunt privatarum personarum in bonum 
commune
(Accordingly [general or] legal justice aims to conduct the dealings of private persons to the good 
of the community).266
Thus St Thomas reduces the extension of his opening (and Aristotle's original) sense in which:
(a) General justice is justice common to all our dealings, 
to the much more limited:
(b) General justice is justice for all our common dealings.
Aquinas does not appear to notice the (in modern terminology) reduced scope of the universal 
quantifier; rules for (a) will include rules for (b), but they are far from co-extensive. The established 
Thomist interpretation of universal justice was (b), and is retained to this day by the many writers in 
fields of law, politics, and jurisprudence, influenced (knowingly or not) by Aquinas267.
Placing universal and particular as mutually exclusive classes has led to many difficulties for 
jurisprudence; the principles appear to leave lacunae and demarcation conflicts that have proved 
impossible to resolve268. Were it not for his non-sequitur when presenting General justice St Thomas
266 Summa XXXVII 2i-2ii; translations Gilby, slightly amended.
267 Including John Finnis, for example in chapter 8 (Distribution, Exchange, and Restitution) 
of his forthcoming work on Aquinas, and in Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980, pp. 164- 
65).
268 Ibid. pp. 178-79. Finnis discusses the complexities further in 1997; if I do not 
misrepresent him Professor Finnis says that Aquinas was undecided as to the species of 
justice, and to the seriousness with which they should be held. In his early In. Sent. St 
Thomas treated the species of Particular justice as two among others, including vindicatio, 
observantia, and innocentia (III, Sent, d.33 q.3a. 4 sol. lc and sol. 2c). I don't quite know 
what Aristotle would make of observantia (promise-keeping and obedience to law) and
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need not have been fearful lor the elusiveness, or the seeming overlap or conflict, of roles in the 
classifications of justice. But inevitably treating General justice as merely (b)—justice for dealings 
with the general community, rather than (a)—-justice general-to-all-dealings, whether general or 
specific, results in confusions269. For Aristotle General justice is not limited to (b), but embraces (a), 
pervading all moral dealings. Within this General justice every feature of right action that has to do 
with equality or greater and less is governed by the sub-genus of Particular justice, and more directly 
through its appropriate sub-divisions.
It was this illegitimate restriction from what is common to all interactions to (merely) our 
common interactions that set the stage for the tripartite political divisions of law. Universal justice 
was seen as a part—>whole connexion relating individuals or lesser groups to the state. Particular 
justice was then correspondingly perceived to govern either (i) part—>part connexions relating any 
individual or internal group to any other part of the community, or as (ii) a whole—>part relation 
governing the individuals or groups by the central whole authority. Such ideas were developed 
rather more by Thomists such as Cajetan and de Soto, and by others such as Bodin270, than by 
Aquinas himself, but they were more than adumbrated in the Summa.
There has also been a further, oblique and unexpected, consequence of the principle of a 
tripartite construction of the genus. Variations of the three part division of justice became so well- 
established by end of the Middle Ages that the thought that Aristotle divides forms of justice into 
three species would appear natural enough to a writer in the 17th century, when just such a new and 
hugely influential tripartition was proposed (discussed below).
innocentia (not harming or depriving others), but I'm inclined to think he would treat them as 
distinct virtues, along-side e.g., even-temper, courage, or friendliness. He certainly designates 
vindicatlo as a specific virtue— vep,eai<; (1108bl), not as a species of justice. Finnis says that 
eventually, via the Commentary (but presumably also via the Tabula Ethicorum) St Thomas 
came to the position of the Summa (given above). That position reflects Aristotle's account of 
the species of Particular justice.
269 Finnis aims to resolve the conflicts by treating the classes ol justice as no more than vague 
markers, which is hardly a resolution; but it is a response to what need not be a problem.
2711 J.Bodin Six Books on the Republic (1576).
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4.8 Particular justice
Having objected to Aquinas's treatment of General (Universal) justice, I support his 
interpretation of Particular justice. Particular falls within universal (General or Legal) justice 
(rather than being a class parallel to it), and is a genus of legal justice in that it treats the rules of 
General justice encoded in law. It deals with equality271; wherever issues of greater or less are at 
stake it is the job of Particular justice to adjust the amounts, until the fair balance is found. There is 
an intimate association between Particular justice and Equity (EJiieiKeg): Equity is concerned with 
the appropriate equality for those circumstances where rules have not been provided (1137bl2ff.)272.
The province of Particular justice is wider than that of suum cuique tribuens, as innumerable 
myths, legends, fairy stories, and tales, from the Oresteia to the Merchant of Venice, testify. 
Although rendering what is due is taken by many to form the whole of justice273 it often happens that 
what is due cannot be rendered: the pristine value has often been destroyed, and sunt lacrimce rerum. 
O f this almost all philosophers of justice seem oblivious, and proceed as if the status quo ante is, 
generally speaking, restorable; and is the rule rather than the exception. Aristotle's theory has at 
least the virtue that his model allows for new balance to be found. The factors in a judgement, either
271 MM I 1193b 19 (Stock):
The just, then, in relation to one's neighbour is, speaking generally, the equal. For the
unjust is the unequal.
272 Some rules of law have arisen through Equity; in England law for insolvency developed 
through it, i.e., through Mercantile law, though partly and indirectly via Canon from Roman
273 The outstanding modern supporter of justice as no more than the rendering of what is due 
is probably R.Nozick. In Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) he argues for a purely 
'entitlement' theory and against 'end-state' theories (such as Aristotle's, though without 
mentioning Aristotle) which look to some desired outcome to render an action just. Nozick, 
however, acknowledges what are in effect Aristotelian principles for a certain difficult sort of 
case (p. 153n), to which should be added a related but distinct sort not noticed by Nozick. 
Where the claim to entitlement is unresolvable in terms of entitlement (i.e., where what is to 
count as entitlement is the issue), for example in cases relating to dispossession as with 
aborigines in Australia and native Americans, or certain evils consequent upon slavery, some 
other principle has to be invoked. To such sorts of case should be added insolvency; this issue 
has (virtually) never been treated by philosophers (excepting to some extent Finnis 1980, 
pp. 185-93), and Law in this field derives not from statute but Equity. In Insolvency the 
difficulty is not 'Who is entitled?' because all creditors, by definition, are entitled. In neither 
of these areas can the concept of justice as rendering what is due be adequate. Entitlement 
itself must rest on the very principles of Distributive justice Nozick rejects. On p. 153 Nozick 
recognises that "the principle of distributive justice and equality" is required, but thinks it is 
needed for only "subsidiary" cases. Not so, cases where rendering what is due is impossible, 
either through insolvency or the impossibility of discovering entitlement, still require justice 
to be done. For a very large number of the cases with which legal systems have to deal, 
including the great majority of the difficult cases, entitlement is not the main issue.
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new or old, can be assessed as to the greater and less. What it is that is to be assessable to create the 
right and appropriate equality is exactly the same for every kind of case: oc^ia (worth, merit, desert, 
or value)274, which therefore forms the subject-matter of justice. Different kinds of problems will 
require proportionally different solutions; Particular justice will add or divide, multiply or subtract, 
the relevant factors to achieve the equal value. Justice is the right equality; i.e., the fair equality is in 
place where the value among the factors involved is made equal. This will require a 'second-order' 
principle which must take into account the equitableness of the relevant equalities.
For Aristotle the essences of Particular justice and of proportionality correspond: both can 
only apply when some principle of equality is acted upon. For such reasons as these he uses models 
for justice taken directly from proportion theory, and applies them consistently throughout. His 
remark that in political science, of which ethics is a part, we should not look for the precision we 
expect in mathematics (NE I 1094b 13) should not be taken as meaning that exact principles are 
really only vague. If  precision is much less easily attainable, all the more reason to use it as far as it 
will go. The 'mathematical' references should not be thought of as vague markers or regrettable 
idiosyncrasies, as they so often have been; they are not dispensable elaborations unsuited to the 
subject, but the bases from which to launch the whole project. By getting the analogical, i.e., 
mathematical, inferences clear the entire theory is clarified.
4. 9 Distributive justice
Aristotle often says with perfect clarity that Particular justice is divided into two sorts; this has 
not prevented many from claiming he really means three. About the first species there has never 
been any disagreement, at any rate about what it should be called, and its scopc as it is first 
presented. About the second, and a putative third, controversy has been enormous— we come to 
these after considering the first.
The first species of Particular justice, to which Aristotle devotes chapter 3, is unanimously 
called Distributive. It is the justice which deals with all issues involving the common stock, i.e., 
those matters that are the business of the community as the community. The well-ordered 
community holds resources for the common good. It exacts duties and assigns benefits to its
274 Liddell & Scott.
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members. The polis may retain wealth, places of shelter, stocks of materials, food, and medicines. 
Duties might be imposed to ensure the security of these common goods, and for the safety of the 
polis. Tasks and services will have to be performed, and rewards may be bestowed. People vary 
enormously in their contributions to the common good, and in their needs or standing; and to the 
extent to which they share the giving and receiving of the resources. The job of Distributive justice, 
among these fluctuations, is to regulate the distribution and redistribution of all things relating to the 
common stock. Following Plato Aristotle holds that the distribution of what arises as issues to be 
decided should match the a ^ ia i of the parties concerned. Sharing-out according to quantitative 
equality would be plainly inequitable (an active stevedore, for example, could need much more 
protein than a sedentary octogenarian— who might require far more medicine) and so would be the 
inappropriate (unfair) mode of equality to apply. Aristotle says that the right equality is found 
through the geometric rule. It is a ‘geometric’ disposal since it follows the geometric proportion; the 
equal axia is thereby preserved, and justice prevails. (The principle of geometric proportion is 
outlined in §§ 1.7-1.8 .) On the basis that all citizens are comparable in worth, some ratio will 
quantify that comparison. Corresponding multiples will then achieve the just distribution of 
whatever is in question. How the worth of the parties is decided in the first place Aristotle says will 
vary according to circumstances275.
It must be emphasised that Aristotle uses the geometric proportion only for Distributive issues, 
and that Distributive (geometric) justice does not apply to any area of exchange. In not 
understanding the proportionality at work— and therefore the structure of the theory— many writers 
have supposed that Aristotle applies geometric (distributive) rules to commercial associations. This 
mistake has resulted in extremely complicated distortions of the theory. There is a passage at the end 
of chapter 5 (1134aff.) which might seem to contradict what I argue for the authority and extension 
of Distributive justice. Aristotle there speaks of someone "distributing things between himself and 
another or between two others". First it should be noted that this passage occurs after the discussion
275 1 131a24ff.; democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and so on, are likely to assess value 
differently. It seems reasonable to extend this flexible principle to quantify the constraints of 
scarcity or even, perhaps, the exigencies of fashion. Treating qualitative differences 
quantitatively is not so artificial as it might seem; it is the standard practice throughout public 
life, industry, and commerce. (MP's income, e.g., is pegged to a certain grade of the Civil 
Service, and Judges are rated more highly than prison officers by exact quantitative degrees.)
See also § 6.9.
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of justice in exchanges has been completed; then that exchange or commercial interaction or 
agreements are not mentioned. The just individual will act as the polis acts; this accords with the 
above argument for the scope of Distributive justice. There is a feature of the Thomist tripartite 
account of justice that is useful in clarifying who has authority to administer Distributive justice. In 
the view of writers such as Cajetan, de Soto, and in this century B-H Merkel bach276, Distributive 
justice guides the whole—>part relation of the polis to its members277. It would therefore seem 
inappropriate for 'authorities' other than the polis to implement it. Although I think that identifying 
the whole—>part function as uniquely Distributive is not what Aristotle proposes278, Distributive 
justice, as a branch of Legal justice (see above § 4.6), is the responsibility of the polis, and not, it 
would appear, of any individual or other (and necessarily lesser) group. It seems to me that Aristotle 
would grant an analogical extension for an association that was sufficiently polis-like. Similarly, as 
just mentioned, where an individual distributes things (1134aff.) the geometric rule applies insofar as 
Particular justice is involved exactly because such distribution is not an exchange. To the extent that 
some association is a structured community (as might be certain business, charitable, sporting, or 
industrial ventures) it may take on, by courtesy, principles of Distributive justice. But the justice
276 Quoted by Finnis 1980 p. 185, n.26.
277 Finnis (1980 pp. 185-88) holds that Aquinas's own position differed from those of his 
followers. Aquinas's view, Finnis says, is that individuals
in charge of an item of 'common stock’ will have duties of distributive justice; hence any
property-holder will have such duties.
But this is only a question of what counts as the common stock. St Thomas's view of who 
might be lawfully entitled to make Distributive (or any other) judgements is given in Summa 
II-II q.61: a judge must act for, and be appointed by, public authority.
278 Whole—>part constructions are inadequate as models for Distributive justice in that they 
fail to show all the distributive issues. There is not only the flow from the central authority to 
its parts of goods to be regulated (geometrically) according to merit (of payments, honours, 
supplies etc.), there is also value taken from the members by the polis for the common good—  
such as taxes, jury service, or conscription. These are usually guided by ‘geometric’ rules. 
Aquinas saw such part—>whole flows as ruled by General (Legal) not Distributive justice. But 
General justice is not regulated by modes of equality of any sort (as argued above in § 4.7 
against the view that General justice only treats the polis's dealings-in-common), General 
justice would determine a rule that taxes or conscription are needed; it would not specify 
which degrees of greater and less should apply. That is the province of Distributive justice. 
Even claims that taxes should be flat-rate, not proportional, are distributive claims. Flat-rate 
taxes such as the Community Charge of the 1980's would appear to offend Aristotelian 
principles for 'geometrically just' reasons. Flat-rate charges on common goods, however, are 
not widely thought to be unjust, but they might be if imposed on necessaries. Conscription 
does not appear, initially, to be applied 'geometrically', but it conforms to Aristotle’s principle 
of the relevant hfya., in that it is generally limited to the youngish, able-bodied, adult, (and 
until recently) male section of the polis (conscription of children or the elderly if able-bodied 
younger adults are available would be a distributive absurdity).
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which governs commerce properly falls under the second species. Strictly, for an individual or group 
within the polis to distribute from their own resources would not be a matter of justice, however it 
was divided. In times of urgent need the polis will requisition the stocks needed and the resourceful 
individual will be its agent.
Mixing-up distributions from the common stock of the polis with ‘distributions’ in lesser 
Koivcoviai such as business partnerships has been misconstrued since at least the time of Albertus (or 
Heliodorus, whenever that was279). Endorsed by Stewart, Trendelenburg280 held that Distributive 
rules Kax’ a^iav  applied to the sharing of the common stock or exchanges of trade281. Grant (p. 108)
in all bargains the principle of geometric proportion comes in (which does not belong to 
corrective justice) ... With regard to this principle the text is not explicit, yet it appears to be (1) 
... applicable in all cases of awards made by the state, (2) ideally to be capable of a wider 
application as a regulative principle of distribution of property and all the distinctions of socicty,
which is the reverse of Aristotle’s theory. Yet it has been disastrously influential; the gross,
illegitimate, elevation in (2) of Koivcoviai other than the polis has made endless mischief for the
understanding, and even for the later translation, of the text. Jackson, who accurately translates the
(1131b26ff.) passage, nevertheless in his comments (p.76) says
it is obvious that his [Aristotle’s] remarks also apply to smaller Koivcoviai such as companies of 
merchants or manufacturers.
Stewart goes further (pp.432-33) he aligns an officer (i.e., a high official representing the polis)
distributing prizes with a board of directors apportioning dividends. He even raises the payment of
wages and dividends as
far the most important form of [distribution which] ... results from the operation of ‘economic 
laws’ regulating wages and profits.
Which, of course, they may well be, but they are not the Distributive principles Aristotle assigns to
the polis; they are transactional, and governed by the justice of exchanges (and not the geometric
279 He is traced to 1367 but neither his real name nor the millennium in which this legendary 
paraphrast lived is known. R.Sorabji comments (ed., Aristotle Transformed: the ancient 
commentators and their influence, p.23 n.106) that it might have been anytime between the 
3rd century ad  and 14th (see § 6.2).
280 F.A.Trendelenburg Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie, vol.3, p.412 (see Stewart p.415).
281 As will be shown below, associations other than (and necessarily inferior to) the polls arc, 
in the only relevant sense in the text, private (i.e., where the polis is not involved). Private 
interactions are governed through the second species— the justice of exchanges. Joachim 
(pp. 138-39, 143-44) also reads into the text distributions of the common property of a joint- 
stock company or club (but he does not appeal to the Politics as others do).
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form of proportion which these writers imagine). Trendelenburg, Grant, Jackson, and Stewart,
mingle the very distinction that Aristotle is at such pains to keep apart, with the result that a
subsequent translator (Ross) will actually translate the passage 1131 b29-31 as referring to
commercial activities. Ross (1925) inserts words such as "partners” and "business":
in which the distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership it will be according to 
the same ratio which the funds put into the business by the partners bear to one another.
Relying on this extraordinary anachronism Soudek quite naturally confuses issues of exchange with
those of distribution; he cites Burnet to support this privatisation of the state's function, but Burnet is
outstanding among the leading commentators in not being drawn-in to the confusion of the
geometric and arithmetic proportions— and the consequent overflowing of the Distributive principle.
Burnet refers only (p.218) to Aristotle's illustration of contributions (tcc e io E % 0 e v T a )  by the wealthy
to the polis in war-time282; he doesn't mention any supposed business partnerships283.
It was Grant who (p. 113) linked the passage 1131b26ff. to MM I and Politics III , chapter 9.
Stewart says of MM /
It is interesting to compare in this connexion the remarkable passage MM.i.33.1193b36-94a25, 
in which distributive justice is described as determining the returns of labour, and regulating the 
exchanges which in E.N.v are discussed in the chapter on to dvTiJi£7tov0o<;.
The connexion had been made by Jackson, and through Stewart’s influence284 especially it went on to
be made by many others, including Ross, Soudek, Gauthier-Jolif, Marc-Wogau, McNeill, Keyser,
Miller, Sparshott, and Judson285, making it the orthodox account of these texts. The custom has been
282 They were also required to pay for the frequent festive liturgies (xopriyiai). The Athenian 
legal system had an ingenious double-bluff to catch-out tax dodgers: they could be challenged 
to an exchange of properties at their self-assessed valuation (J.Davidson Courtesans & 
Fishcakes 1997, pp.238-46). See also § 6.7.
283 Anachronistic distortion is a central issue separating 'primitivist' from 'modernist' readings 
of chapter 5— see § 6.5.
284 His extension of the geometric, Distributive, principle is in some ways rather odd as 
Stewart himself says (p.423, in referring to the Politics) that Distributive justice is concerned 
with the perfection of human life, not an insurance or joint stock company.
285 (i) Soudek (pp.58, 61-62), using Ross's translation, which explicitly imports commercial 
associations into the text, believes that the geometric formula operates in chapter 5 of Ethics 
V, as well as in the Politics. Soudek then says (p.63) that:
As long as the problem is that of reducing skills to want satisfaction for the sake of 
establishing equality, distributive justice is at work.
He goes on to combine arithmetic and geometric proportions in a way that confuses the issues 
of exchange-value (chapter 6, below).
(ii) Gauthier-Jolif (1970 II, pp.360-61) believe that Aristotle surreptitiously introduces the 
geometric (distributive) principle to issues of commercial exchange at 1132a2ff. Weinrib (op. 
cit. pp. 135-36, note 9) objects (rightly, in my view) that Aristotle would not rely on the 
geometric rule at the very point at which he distinguishes that rule from the arithmetic.
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to add the NE, EE, and MM passages to chapter 9 of Politics III where, because they suppose that the 
Distributive function extends to trading associations, correspondingly suppose that the Politics 
chapter also extends to these lesser Koivcoviai. Which is as gross a distortion of the Politics 
chapter(s)286 as it is possible to make: it reverses the whole point. The thrust of the chapter is to 
show the polis as qualitatively distinct from, and far superior to, any other association that might 
aspire to its elevated status. To take its characteristic virtues, which have been presented to contrast 
with the epya of lesser organisations (trading companies, or even 'night-watchmen' states), as 
applying to just those lower structures, stands Aristotle's whole argument on its head. There is not, 
and could not be, any extension of the principle which marks-out the noXiqfrom other groupings to 
these inferior organisations, either in the texts, or in the spirit of Aristotle's theory. Any temptation 
to extend the Distributive principle analogically is forestalled not because Aristotle hasn't thought of 
it but because he makes detailed provision for all commercial and other associations in his treatment
(iii) K.Marc-Wogau (Philosophical Essays: History of Philosophy, Perception, Historical 
Explanation, Library of Theoria X: Aristotle's Theory of Corrective Justice and Reciprocity 
1967, pp. 21-40) falls foul of the vagueness in the language of proportions (examined in § 
2.1). He takes all proportion to be geometric, and that the arithmetic is only a "special case" 
of the geometric proportion. He then treats the geometric as being re-introduced to chapter 5 
to handle commercial exchanges (or rather, that Aristotle never leaves the geometric 
proportion at any stage).
(iv) D.McNeill (p.60 in 'Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and 
Reciprocity', in Public Affairs Quarterly vol.4 no. 1, 1990, pp.55-68) says that for Aristotle 
exchanges should be on a geometrically proportional basis in some ways like the distribution 
of booty. It differs in that in Distributive justice there is a 'conjunction' of citizens and their 
shares, where in exchanges there is a 'cross-conjunction' (see chapter 6).
(v) P.Keyser ('A Proposed Diagram in Aristotle EN V. 3 1131a24-b20 for Distributive Justice 
in Proportion', in Apeiron 25ii, 1992, pp.135-44) supposes (pp.138-39 and n.l 1, 143) that the 
assignment of the shares to the parties according to their worth (1131 bff.) refers to their 
wealth. Fortunately this doesn't damage his proposed model (see § 4 .10).
(vi) Sparshott (1994, pp. 169-70) jumbles the arithmetic and geometric principles so far as to 
remove the distinctions Aristotle is set on preserving. He complains that Aristotle:
slides into this account of distributive justice, which is firstly said to be merely one species 
of justice, the other being "rectificatory". It is not clear to the reader exactly when the 
discussion stopped being about justice (as fairness) in general and began to be about 
distributions in particular.
This travesties Aristotle. Aristotle starts out treating (Particular) justice as fairness— the 
appropriate equality, either as Distributive or as Transactional (to be argued below), and not 
as Sparshott, following countless others, thinks 'rectificatory'.
(vii) F.D.Miller (p.71, in Nature, Justice, and Right in Aristotle's Politics, 1995) also thinks 
that Aristotle extends Distributive justice to commercial ventures at the very place where he is 
actually explaining the unique superiority of the polis over any such lesser associations.
(viii) L.Judson (draft copy of 'Aristotle on Fair Exchange', in Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, Autumn, 1997) bases his analysis on Aristotle’s use of a geometric model of 
proportion for chapter 5.
286 In Book II, chapter 2 Aristotle also speaks of the qualitative priority of the polis over any 
other form of association.
102
103
ot exchanges. Aristotle does not mention geometric proportion in chapter 5 (see chapter 6 below), 
the reason he does not use the arithmetic proportion in the chapter, even though it governs all 
exchanges, is that he is by then no longer concerned to explain the justice for the act of exchange—  
he had just done that in chapter 4— but to assess the fair value of what is to be brought to an 
exchange. What has tricked so many into imagining him to be returning to the geometric 
(distributive) formula is the plain fact of his leaving the arithmetic.
4. 10 The diagram for distribution
Having laid out the order of Particular justice at the end of chapter 2 Aristotle goes on to 
explain justice in terms of proportions and means in chapter 3, speaking of separated and continuous 
proportions. In doing so he points to a diagram (1131b)287 to explain Distributive justice. It is for 
this passage that the MSS preserve the alternate methods of coding (mentioned in §§ 1.3, 1.8, and 
notes 63, 65). What diagram is Aristotle pointing to ? The traditional answer has been the square 
format as mentioned in § 1.6288 but Keyser (op. cit.) suggests a different pattern. The lines referred 
to are, he says: A-B, which is the line representing the link between the parties A and B, and T-A, a 
line between the extremes of what is to be shared between them. So far this is a fairly standard 
account, but the lines are not then drawn-up into a square, but cross so as to create the basis of a pair 
of similar triangles (such as those in Elements VI in which the rules for producing mathematical 
models are presented— see §§ 2.8, 2.9, and note 144):
287 A second diagram is said to be indicated at 1131 b6 (see Rackham p.270(c), or Thomson 
p. 146); if there are two, it is the second that is under discussion.
288 And by Burnet, for example, 1900, p.216.
103
104
Keyser's proposal shows the pattern of the argument more vividly than the diagrams it replaces. It 
also seems to me to explain Aristotle's immediately preceding allusion to the difference between 
continuous and disjointed proportions (although Keyser (p. 137) thinks that Aristotle's bringing in 
this distinction is "irrelevant to his discussion"). The point at which the two continuous proportions 
cross allows the figure to be viewed both as two distinct similar figures, and as two related 
continuities. This triangular model also leads to a more general conclusion than Keyser himself 
sees. In §§ 3.2 and 3.5 I mentioned Aristotle's replacing the method of dichotomous division—  
which privileged some given attribute of living things— with a cluster of vital attributes needed to 
define or classify animals. The beauty of a mathematical (in the present case a geometric) model is 
that it preserves clusters of attributes with no need to privilege any one. To the question 'What are 
the "wholes" referred to in the expression kcu to oXov 7tpo<; to oA,ov ("and the whole to the whole") 
at 1131 b7 and again at 1131 b 15 ?'289 Keyser (p.139) says they are the whole lines. From this he 
draws certain conclusions against the traditional reading of the proportions. Karasmanis290 also, 
though without the benefit of Keyser's diagram, claims that the traditional representation of the 
proportion is mistaken. Keyser and Karasmanis both say that all scholars support the traditional 
reading of the proportion291 (which they give slightly differing formulations292) whereby primacy is 
given to the relation between the parties (A and B). They replace that primary ratio with one 
between a citizen and a share (A : C)293. I am not especially drawn to their new formulae, as it seems 
to me that Aristotle gives priority to the relative standing of the citizens, but from the point of view 
of the lesson which I think Aristotle takes from his diagram, it doesn’t make any difference which 
inference is given priority. The mathematical model guarantees all (valid) sequences. The "whole to 
the whole" is not a reference limited to the whole lines, nor to one proportional sequence rather than
289 Rackham and Thomson ignore this phrase even though it is repeated.
290 V.Karasmanis ’The Mathematical Passage in "Nicomachean Ethics" 1131 b5-15’, in 
Ancient Philosophy, 1993, pp.373-378.
291 Cited writers are Ramsauer, Jackson, Bywater, Stewart, Burnet, Heath, Ross, Rackham, 
Joachim, Ostwald, Dirlmeier, Gauthier-Jolif, Hardie, NiKO/\.eo8ri<;, von Leyden.
292 Keyser presents the standard reading (p. 138) as: a : b - (a+c): (b+d).
Karasmanis is more elaborate:
(a : b — c : d) => (a : c — b : d) =$ (a+b) : (c+d) — a : b.
293 They prefer (Keyser): (a+b): (c+d) - a : c.
(Karasmanis): (a : b = c : d) => (a : c = b : d) = (a+b): (c+d).
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another294, but to the relation of one whole triangle to the other. Given that Aristotle points to the 
diagram, and that that diagram is likely to be of a pair of similar triangles, any sequence of valid 
inferences will follow equally "as the whole is to the whole", exactly because one figure is a model 
for the other, preserving a whole cluster of vital inferences. The advantage in using the geometric 
figures is that they display all the relationships of the elements represented (and not merely any one 
particular mathematical sequence).
Karasmanis usefully emphasises the term auCeuqic, as meaning coupling, yoking, or 
assignment, and not, as it is sometimes rendered, addition or sum295. The term indicates not the 
addition but the joining of the kind of objects (sometimes heterogeneous) that would go together296. 
The polis will not "add" jury-service or a reward of money to a citizen, but it might assign these to its 
members. The idea of assignment, rather than addition will be useful for understanding chapter 5.
In speaking of A and B standing in a ratio shown by the line connecting them being divided at 
some point, and of T and A being shared according to that ratio, what is being discusscd is value. In 
distributions the value of the shares is principally for the use of the recipient (and a duty would need 
to be actually performed). If whatever is of value is not used it might be retained for later use, or it 
might be exchanged for something else that is needed or preferred. Aristotle is credited by Marx, for 
example, with first distinguishing use- from exchange-value297; it seems quite possible that it was in 
reflecting on the differences between Distributive and the other form of Particular justice that led 
him to the contrast. In Aristotle's theory the relations between the polis and its parts or members are 
public relations. The polis may (and will have to) engage in trade with some of its members, but in 
such associations it acts (or ought to act) merely as a party to an exchange— as if  it were a private 
body. In the treatment of exchanges the polis acts as an arbitrator, it not being a party to the case; 
but in distributive issues the polis itself is directly involved. The Thomists (§ 4.7) construe 
Distributive justice as a one-way relation of the polis to its members; what they fail to capture is that
294 Karasmanis says (p.376(i), and note 8) that "the whole to the whole" denotes the ratio of 
the sum of numerators to the sum of denominators, and cites Elements V prop. 19, VII props.
7, 8, and 11.
295 By Welldon, Thomson, and Rackham, for example.
296 Gauthier-Jolif refer to the term designating objects with a particular affinity: male and 
female, night and day, sleep and waking. Liddell & Scott indicate yoking as the underlying 
thought, and give marriage as the prime example. Something like horse and cart might be 
nearer to the sense here.
297 At Politics I 1257a6ff.
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although it is one-way, it is one-way-at-a-time. Distributive justice governs both the flow from the 
polis to its members and the flow from its constituents to the central authority (§ 4.9, note 278). 
Interactions and exchanges are private not public affairs and, rather obviously, their justice is a two- 
way process (in relation to the polis they are part part relations), in which the polis acts as a judge 
between them298.
298 See also § 6.2.
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Chapter 5
CORRECTING CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
5. 1 The second species
Where everyone agrees that the first species of Particular justice is the Distributive, 
characterized by the geometric proportion, there is very little agreement about the remaining sort. 
There is complete agreement on only two aspects of this second class of justice, (i) that it is in some 
sense 'the corrective', and (ii) that the account of it in the text is unsatisfactory. I believe both these 
ideas to be wrong; the second species is no more or less corrective than the first, and Aristotle’s 
notion of the second is very well considered. There is also a feeling, not quite so unquestioned, but 
still very widespread, that this diorthotic species, even when combined with the Distributive, leaves 
out important areas of human affairs which Aristotle goes on to discuss under a further, though 
obscure and undeclared, heading. These (erroneous) notions stem from the failure to appreciate the 
structure of the theory. Aristotle does not propose a diorthotic eidos. The thought that he does has 
generated a bewildering range of names for the imagined species, but prima facie there is something 
fishy about a subject where there are so many attempts to capture its sense, and so little agreement 
even about what it should be called. It has been variously labelled Aequatrix, Collective, Corrective, 
Compensatory, Constitutive, Diorthotic, Directive, Emendatory, Epanorthotic, Equalising, Equating, 
Judicial, Parifying, Rectificatory, Regulative, Remedial, Reparative, Restitutive, Restorative, 
Retributive, Retrospective, and as justice in Redress. Sometimes some of these names are used 
indifferently but more often they have been carefully chosen in preference to the others299. Also some
299 Shuchman and Webster use remedial, as does Ross in 1923; Ackrill, Annas, Barker, 
Hardie, Haren, Joachim, Judson, Lloyd, Lowry, McKeon, McNeill, Prior, Rowe, Ryan, 
Sparshott, and Urmson prefer rectificatory; as does Ross by 1925. There Ross, following 
Burnet and Stewart, uses corrective but only for the single entry E7tavop0coTiKov, as does 
Moraux. Gomperz, like Burnet, generally prefers the scholastic directive; Kiernan gives 
collective. Ferrari and Barthelemy-Saint-Hilaire use reparative, Kirchmann has constitutive. 
Victorius and Eikema Hommes employ restitutive, emendatory and compensatory. Trojano 
and Donati speak of it as judicial as do Trendelenburg and Keyt, in addition to corrective. 
Bowie, Mercken, Petrone and Spicer prefer retributive. Aubenque, Bern and Engberg- 
Pedersen refer to "corrective or commutative". Others, including Appleton, Bodenhaimer, 
Browne, Bywater, Cairns, Castariadis, Chase, Dias, Edel, Epstein, Felden. Finley, Finnis, 
Fletcher, Flew, Freidmann, Friedrich, Gauthier, Grant, Grote, Hamburger, Hantz, Heath,
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of these names, in addition to others such as Catallactic, Commercial, Reciprocal, Retaliatory, and 
Commutative, have been assigned to the supposed third class which Aristotle is said not to have 
distinguished clearly from the second (see § 6.1). Hardie attributes to Ross3m the view that Aristotle 
treats the justice of exchanges in chapter 5 only as an afterthought. The claim had been made much 
earlier by Peters (in 1881), and by Ritchie and Richards in the 1890's301 that this class amounts to a 
third category of justice.
The idea of a ‘corrective’ species succeeds a much older tradition going back to St Thomas, 
who read Aristotle as exhaustively dividing the issues into the Distributive and the Commutative. 
‘Corrective’ and ‘commutative’ are as different as chalk and cheese, so it is remarkable that they 
should ever have been taken to designate the same subject. Since I maintain that Aquinas’s 
presentation was accurate I shall need to defend it in some detail where it conflicts with all the 
modern(ish) accounts. (That defence should also help to make plain the actual model of the sorts of 
justice which Aristotle proposes.)
The term iustitia commutativa (commutative justice) was introduced for the second species by 
St Thomas in his early work In Sententia302 (and perhaps originated from his taking notes from
Hooker, Husserl, Irwin (who also calls the species retrospective), Jackson, Janet, Jolif, 
Kelson, Keyser, Lapie (in addition to rectificatory), Lee, Lewes, van Leyden, Lucas, 
MacIntyre, Marshall (together with regulative, alongside Dareste and Rashdall) Meikle, 
Miller, Monro, Myers, Newman, Oates, Ostwald, Peters (who also uses rectificatory and 
redress), Posnar, Preston, Pufendorf (who refers to this also as commutative, though in a more 
restricted sense than Aquinas's), Rackham, Raphael (and Spengler: rectificatory or 
corrective), Ravaisson, Richards, Ritchie, Rosen, Sherman, Shorey, Smith, Solomon, Soudek, 
Springborg, Thomson, (who also gives emendatory), Tricot, del Vecchio (who, influenced by 
Vico's aequatrix, also uses (translated by Guthrie) equalizing, parifying, rectifying, and 
equating), Vinogradoff, Waluchow, Weinrib, Welldon, Williams (B), Williams (R), 
Winthrop, Zeller, and Zuccante (interchangeably with compensatory) prefer corrective, 
which, democratically, I adopt for the time being. Only Gronovius's expression iustitia 
contractoria, written in 1720, approximates to Aquinas's notion, treating the species as 
transactional: to do with exchanges.
300 Hardie (op. cit., pp. 194-95; Ross (1923 pp. 10, 212-14) calls the 'third' species the 
Retaliatory.
301 F.H.Peters The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle p. 148 (Peters may have got this idea from 
page 291 of Hildenbrand's Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie of 
1860). Ritchie p. 191, refers to the species as 'catallactic' or commercial justice, as does 
H.Richards in Classical Review vii, 1893, but he does not say it was an afterthought. Donati 
Fondatione della Scienza del Diritto (1929, p.22) follows Trojano I Primordi della Riflessime 
Morale ed Economica in Grecia (1897). Much more recent appearences of the doctrine occur 
in M.Haren Medieval Thought (2nd ed., 1992), Miller (p.300n.50 in Keyt & Miller 1991, 
pp.279-306), who thinks the place of "the reciprocal" is obscure but he nevertheless sees it as 
a distinct species; Meikle pp. 156-81.
302 In Sent, was written in the mid-1250’s; Aquinas refers to justice “iustitia distributiva, et 
commutativa’’ at II, ds.27, q.l ar.3, and repeatedly thereafter: ar.3, r.4; ar.4, r.2; III, ds.18,
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Albertus Magnus’s lectures on the Ethics). St Albert had come rather close with the expression 
iustitia communicativam , but generally he preferred the term iustitia directiva304. Aquinas referred 
to Commutative justice thereafter throughout his life, and particularly in his commentary on the 
Ethics, and in the Summa //-//, both written around 1270-72.
The notion of ‘corrective’ justice as an explicit nomination has been fully accepted since at
least the time of Jackson, but in fact it is much older; the principle that the second species is in some
sense the diorthotic was introduced in 1653 by Felden in his objections to Grotius's remarks305 on
Aquinas's account of Aristotle's theory. It was here I think that the rot first set in; he simultaneously
introduced the principles that the second species is the Corrective, and that Aristotle distinguishes
three, not two, species of justice:
sed statuit is tres species justitiae: (1) 8iave)j.r|TiKriv distributivam, (2) 8iop0coTiier]v correctivam, 
(3) t o  avTi7i£7tov0o<; retributivam.306
These ideas soon began to be discussed, by Boeder for example in 1663; they were accepted by
Pufendorf (1672) and have been in debate ever since307. In accordance with the predominant, the
virtually unquestioned assumption that the second species is the diorthotic308 (wholly apart from
issues of a 'third species'), by not treating the second species as specifically in some sense the
Corrective Aquinas is held to have misrepresented Aristotle— it has been a matter of debate whether
this 'misrepresentation' was deliberate.
q.l ar.2; ds.33, q. 1 ar.3; q.3 ar.4; IV ds. 14, q. 1 ar.l; q.2, ar.l; ds.46, q .l. Also it appears in 
the Summa and in the Tabula Ethicorum in addition to the Commentary.
303 Commenting on NE 1131 a 1 -9 (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia XIV-I Super Ethica 
Aschendorff 1968) he says "et ideo divisit communicativam iustum" (ref.391, p.330:95), and 
at 391, p.331:8 “et sit circa hoc potest esse communicativa iustitia.” At 392, p.331:14-15 
“quae in communicationibus directiva".
304 As at 389, p.329:8; 399, p.338:40, 66-67; 400, p.339:2, 23-24, 72 (ibid.).
305 Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pads, 1646) referred to the second species as the Expletrix.
306 J. a Felden Annotata in H.Grotium De Juri Belli ac Pads Amsterdam 1653, p .10.
31)7 J.H.Boecler In H.Grotii Jus Belli ac Pads Commentatio 1663; SPufendorf De Jure 
Naturae et Gentium 1672. Discussed or referred to by, among others, Thomasius, 1688; 
Buddeus, 1697; Voet, 1698; Glafey, 1723; H and S Cocceji, 1744; Zanotti, 1754; Michelet, 
1848; Trendelenburg, 1867; Ramsauer, 1878; Peters, 1881; Richards, 1893; Ritchie, 1894; 
Trojano, 1897; Burnet, 1900; Masci, 1911; Ross, 1923; del Vecchio, 1952; A.R.W.Harrison, 
1957; Hardie, 1968; Eikema Hommes, 1979; McNeill, 1990; Miller, 1995; Meikle, 1995; 
Hooker, 1995;Judson, 1997.
308 So rare is it not to speak of the second species as in some way the diorthotic that among 
commentators other than in the strictly Thomist tradition I am aware only of Ueberweg (1903) 
and D.S.Hutchinson (The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. J.Barnes, 1995) who clearly 
avoid it.
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Was Aquinas’s ‘misrepresentation’ just a mistake, or did he make a deliberate change?
Ritchie influentially held that Aquinas mistakenly thought he was presenting Aristotle's own views:
From all that he says in this part of the Summa and also from his Commentary on the Ethics it is 
quite clear that Aquinas considers that he is only following the opinion of 'the philosopher'309
Gauthier and Jolif, following Ritchie, hold that Aquinas was confused by the text, being misled by
faulty translation:
l'exegese thomiste repose essentiellement sur un contresens, occasione par l'ambiguite de la 
traduction latine qu'il utilisait.310
There are two ways in which St Thomas could have been confused: (i) if the text he relied on
misrepresented the original, and (ii) if he himself simply misread a good translation. In Natural Law
and Natural Rights John Finnis claims that St Thomas was not confused at all, that on the contrary
he deliberately, but secretively, altered the meaning he found:
So it was that Thomas Aquinas, purporting to interpret Aristotle faithfully, silently shifted the 
meaning of Aristotle’s second class of particular justice, and invented a new term for it: 
'commutative justice'.311
St Thomas looks damned either way: he stands accused as either a fool or a knave.
Against the claims that Aquinas was confused, Finnis argues that Thomas devoted far too
much attention to the relevant notions in writing the Summa to have been unaware of the meaning of
the terms he employed:
Gauthier and Jolif .... argue that the invention [of commutative justice] rests on a 
misunderstanding occasioned by the ambiguous Latin translation that Aquinas used. This seems 
unlikely in view of the extremely elaborate treatment of commutative justice that Aquinas 
undertook in S.T.II-II, qq.64-78, and in view of the conceptual gaps left by Aristotle's emphasis 
on correction.312
Finnis does not mention it but Aquinas had examined the issues in detail in his Commentary 
immediately prior to writing Part II of the Summa; the Commentary being to some extent written as 
research for the Summa II-IP13. In it the subdivisions of justice are thoroughly explored in lectures IV 
to IX; there are analytical tables distinguishing Distributive from Commutative, and there are
309 D.G.Ritchie 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of 'Particular Justice" Classical Review viii 1894, 
p. 187.
310 1970, pp.370-71.
311 1980, p .179.
312 Ibid. p. 196.
313 In the main each section of the Commentary corresponds to a section in the Summa. For 
example Commentary I, vi with Summa II-II qq.80-81, and VII, x with II-II q. 155. See 
Gauthier 'La date du Commentaire de saint Thomas sur l'Ethique a Nicomaque' in Recherches 
18, 1951, pp.66-105.
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sections tor the exposition of this second type of justice listed as Commutative’14. When we consider 
the detailed examination of the notions involved in the Commentary, coming after his frequent 
employment of the term in his earlier work, together with its repeated use in the Table of ethical 
terms he had had his secretaries draw up for his use in writing the Commentary and Summa II-IP'5, 
and add to this Finnis's point that the issue is treated extensively in the Summa, it becomes incredible 
that Aquinas might have simply misread the terms. Rather, for Thomas to have been misled it 
would have to be shown that the translations upon which he relied were seriously in error.
Finnis further argues that Aquinas had to work out a means of assimilating "conceptual gaps 
left by Aristotle's emphasis on correction" (p.196) which, of course, could not have taken place if 
Aquinas had not even been aware of the "emphasis on correction". Regarding this emphasis it will 
emerge that Finnis's remarks need to be seen from an entirely new angle.
But Finnis's own, conflicting, claim that Aquinas deliberately altered the terms to give a new 
meaning is just as improbable as the idea that he simply misread them. The Summa was not a work 
of Aristotelian exposition but of systematic theology, so, although it was written in close association 
with the Commentary, it would have been legitimate for Thomas to adapt Aristotle's notion to his 
own purpose. Thomas nevertheless does not in any way indicate that he is departing from or 
adapting Aristotle. The meaning employed in the Summa is exactly the same as (being derived from) 
that he had just elaborated in the Commentary, he presents the issues just as if they were Aristotle's 
ideas, as if Aristotle distinguishes Commutative not Corrective from Distributive justice. Whilst to 
have changed Aristotle's meaning in the Summa would have been legitimate, his not mentioning the
314 Lectio IV synopsis, I dividit 3; Lectio V, 2; Expositio pp.253, 259, 265.
315 The Tabula Ethicorum was compiled by his assistants from January 1269 onwards. (The 
glosses in the Tabula Ethicorum refer directly to A (below), and obliquely to B (at 358), but 
also contain other references to the second species as Commutative.)
Under IVSTIT1A (referring to 1130b30-31) they put:
Quod iusticia specialis diuiditur in distribucionem et comniutacionem
Quod iusticia distributiua constitit in distribucionibus et honorum et pecuniarum, 
commutatiua uero constitit in communicacionibus,
Continuing (ref. 1131 a3)
Quod iusticie commutatiue quedam est uolunitaria sicut...
For 1132a2
Quod in iusticia commutatiua attenditur ad nocumenti differeticiam solum 
Under IVSTUM, referring to the analogical extension of justice to the domestic context 
(1134b8-9):
Quod iustum dominatiuum et paternum non est idem iustum distributiuo et commutatiuo, 
set simile.
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alteration would not. That deception would have been bad enough, but to alter the sense in the 
Commentary would have been worse. Unlike the Summa it was a work whose entire purpose was the 
presentation ot Aristotle's theory. St Thomas would have had to suppress the Philosopher's thought 
and substitute his own notion in the very work wholly devoted to the careful presentation of that 
thought. Quite apart from the extreme psychological improbability of such a deception, Aristotle's 
words were openly displayed in his text: Thomas would have had every reason to suppose that he 
would have been found out. Consciously to have attempted such less than angelic doctoring would 
have required St Thomas to have been both a knave and a fool.
5. 2 Aquinas’s sources
As the alternatives that St Thomas either simply misread the text or consciously altered it are 
both untenable, the thesis that he misrepresented Aristotle depends on the scripts which could have 
influenced him being at fault. If they had been at fault then we can easily see how he would have 
been misled. In Thomas's time the Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics was still new, 
fragments from other works indicate that virtually the whole of the Ethics had been translated early 
in the thirteenth century, and references to it were being made by the 1230's. The translation being 
used at that time, which Gauthier refers to as the Translatio Antiquior, has been lost. In 1247 the 
bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste, completed his own translation (or perhaps completed his 
editing of the earlier translations) of the Ethics; it was taken directly from Greek, not, as is still often 
thought, from Arabic manuscripts. The original version of this Translatio Lincolniensis, known as 
the Textus Purus, was used by St Albert in his lectures— where Thomas would have been familiar 
with it316. From 1248 to 1252 Thomas Aquinas attended lectures on the Nicomachean Ethics given 
by Albertus Magnus in Cologne, where he took down notes317 to assist Albertus, who wrote a 
commentary318. Albertus was gathering in whatever sources that could be obtained319, and although
316 See H.P.F.Mercken 'The Greek Commentators on Aristotle's Ethics', in Aristotle 
Transformed R.Sorabji (ed.) 1990, p.442. It is thought that Books II and III, known as the 
Ethica Vetus had been translated late in the 12th century. Book I, with fragments of VII and 
VIII, known as the Ethica Nova, was translated early on in the 13th century by a different 
scribe, and Book I of this, at least, circulated (Gauthier-Jolif 1959 II, p.77*).
317 See Opera 47i, pp.235*-57*.
318 Super Ethica (Aschendorff, 1968). Albertus wrote a further commentary in the late 
1260's (see J.Dunbabin 'The Two Commentaries of Albertus Magnus on the Nicomachean 
Ethics', in Recherches 30, 1963 pp.232-50).
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these many documents are likely to have coloured his reading, St Albert's presentation of the extracts 
we are concerned with, nevertheless, is very close to the Purus of Grosseteste. Hence any defects in 
the Purus might have influenced Albert who might, in turn, have influenced Aquinas.
A revision of the Purus was completed by 1260. This new edition, known as the Textus 
Recognitus, included Grosseteste's translation of the Greek and Byzantine commentaries on the 
Ethics with his own extensive notes in the margins320. It is a corrupt variant of this text which St 
Thomas eventually obtained. His version of the text was cobbled together from the Recognitus and 
from elements which Gauthier attributes to the Translatio antiquior, together with poor copies of the 
earlier Purus. Had the relevant sections in this debased copy suffered, that particularly could have 
influenced Thomas's understanding. The common belief that Aquinas commissioned William of 
Brabant (Moerbeke) to translate the works of Aristotle (or that Urban IV launched such a 
collaboration) has been shown by Gauthier to be mistaken321. Aquinas’s own text, in the sections we 
are concerned with, differed from Grosseteste's Purus and Recognitus in word order and in 
punctuation, but not in the terms chosen: these are virtually identical (see below). As it is rather 
improbable that an independent translator (such as Moerbeke) would choose identical Latin terms, 
and as the quality of the text of the Ethics that Thomas was able to acquire was so bad, it is clear that 
Moerbeke was not responsible for it.
The texts then, which might possibly have influenced St Thomas, that Ritchie and Gauthier- 
Jolif refer to as the Latin tradition, and which they blame for Aquinas's errors, are the patched-up 
script directly available to him and the Purus edition as it was represented in the commentaries of 
Albert. Standing behind these were the original Purus and Recognitus editions. The upshot is that 
all the translations that Aquinas could have been familiar with stem from Grosseteste, either directly
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319 Such as the works of Michael of Ephesus, Eustratius, Nemesius, John of Damascus, and 
Hermann the German, who had completed his translation from Arabic of Averroes’s Middle 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics on 3 June 1240.
320 There had been anonymous scholia on Books II to V dating from the 3rd century a d . A 
further commentary was written by Michael of Ephesus during the earlier part of the 11th 
century. At the beginning of the 13th the existing studies were compiled with the Ethics and 
published in Constantinople. It was these Byzantine works which Grosseteste translated and 
published with the Recognitus edition and added his own notes (notulae Lincolniensis). See 
also Opera 48(B), pp. 32,34.
321 This is not to say that Aquinas did not associate with Moerbeke; he made use of any 
Moerbeke translation he could get his hands on (see Gauthier-Jolif, 1970 pp. 125-31).
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or indirectly. Any poor handling of the relevant passages by him could then very well have been 
misleading.
5. 3 The Latin tradition
In order to compare all the texts of the Ethics that Aquinas could possibly have read I have
collected the relevant passages from the texts of the Purus and Recognitus, and also the copy of the
Purus used by Albert. Together with St Thomas’s own quotations in the Commentary322 these
exhaust the Latin tradition. Aristotle refers to the second type of Particular justice six times in Book
V of the Ethics, these (labelled A-F, and with the Oxford revised translation323) are:
1 1 3 0 b 3 4  ( A )  ev 8e t o  ev 1:0115 oovaXAayiaacn 8iop0coxiKov touto'U 8e (xepr) 8uo xcov yap 
auvaJiAaYnaTcov xa p.ev EKouaia Eaxi xa 8 ’ atcoucua
[...,] and another kind is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions. Of this 
there are two divisions; of transactions some are voluntary and others involuntary
1 1 3 1  b 2 5  ( B )  T o  8e X,oiitov ev xo SiopScoxiKov o yivsxai ev X015 crovaAAay^iaai Kai xoi<; 
EKouaioiq Koa X015 ocKooaion;
The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion with transactions 
both voluntary and involuntary.
1131 b33 (C) xo 8’ ev xoiq at>va^,A.ay|j,aai SiKcaov ecu )^ev iaov xi K ai xo aSixov aviaov aXX 
OX) Kaxa xrjv ava loy iav  ekeivt|v aXXa  Kaxa xt|v api0|ir|XiKT|v
But the justice in transactions is the sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of 
inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to 
arithmetical proportion.
1 1 3 2 a l 9  ( D )  cbaxe xo enavop0copxiKov S i i c a i o v  av e it|  x o  ( x e a o v  r^|jj,ia<; Kai K e p S o u q
[...,] therefore corrective justice will be the intermediate between loss and gain.
1 1 3 2 b  1 8  ( E )  ebaxe tcepSovx; x iv o c ;  Kai ^rmiag (xeaov x o  8iKaiov eaxi xcov jtapa x o  ekoixtiov xo 
icsov exeiv Kai rcpoxepov Kai ocxepov
Therefore the just is the intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, viz. 
those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the 
transaction.
1 1 3 2 b 2 4  ( F )  T o  8 ’ a v x i7 t e j to v 0 o < ;  o t )K  e c p a p ( j .o x t e i  o m  e t u  x o  S i a v e j x r ix iK o v  S i K a i o v  ov>x’ e jc i  x o  
8 lo p 0 C O X lK O V
322 There are 86 extant manuscripts of the Commentary, the most reliable being collated into 
two slightly varying presentations edited by Gauthier (Sententia), and by R.M.Spiazzi 
(Expositio).
323 Ross revised by J.Urmson (The Revised Oxford Translation of the Complete Works of 
Aristotle (ed.) J.Barnes, 1984).
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Now reciprocity fits neither distributive nor rectificatory justice.
The Latin tradition in the translation of these passages is given in the note below324. The extracts 
show that there was no significant'15 variation in the mediaeval translations of the six entries, as there
324 Listed A-F:
A (1130b34):
Grosseteste textus purus:
Una autem que in commutacionibus directiva. Huius autem partes due. Commutacionum 
enim hee quidem voluntarie sunt
(AL 1972 XXVI. 1-3(3) p.231; the following purus entries pp.233-36.)
Grosseteste textus recosnitus:
Una autem que in commutacionibus directiva; huiusmodi autem partes due; commutacionum 
enim hee quidem voluntariae sunt,
(AL 1973 XXVI. 1-3(4) p.457; the following recognitus entries pp.459-62.)
Albertus (purus):
(...;) una autem, quae in commutationibus directiva. Huius autem partes duae; 
commutationum enim hae quidem voluntariae sunt,
(Super ethica p.329; the following extracts from Albertus pp.338-40, 342.)
Aquinas sententia:
Una autem quae in commutationibus directiva. Huius autem partes duae; commutationum 
enim hae quidem voluntariae sunt,
(Sententia p.275; the following entries pp.282, 286, 289.)
Aquinas expositio:
Una autem, quae commutationibus directiva. Huius autem partes duae. Commutationum 
enim hae quidem voluntariae sunt,
(Expositio p.254 ref. 659-60; the following entries p.260 refs. 671, 674, 677, p.263 ref. 684 
and p.266 ref. 686-87.)
B (1131 b25):
Grosseteste purus:
Reliqua autem una, directivum quod fit in commutacionibus et in voluntariis et in 
involuntariis.
Grosseteste recosnitus:
Reliqua autem una directivum. Quod fit et involuntariis et in commutacionibus et in 
voluntariis;
Albertus:
Reliqua autem una directivum, quod fit in commutationibus, et in voluntariis et involuntariis 
Aquinas sententia:
Reliqua autem una directivum quod fit in commutationibus et voluntariis et involuntariis. 
Aquinas expositio:
Reliqua autem una directivum eius quod fit, et in voluntariis commutationibus et 
involuntariis.
C (1131 b33):
Grosseteste purus:
In commutacionibus autem iustum est quidem equale quid et iniustum inequale, set non 
secundum proporcionalitatem illam, set secundum arismeticam.
Grosseteste recosnitus:
In commutacionibus autem iustum est quidem equale quid et iniustum inequale, set non 
secundum
proporcionalitatem illam, set secundum arismeticam.
Albertus:
(...;) in commutationibus autem iustum est quidem aequale quid et iniustum inaequale, sed 
non secundum proportionalitatem illam, sed secundum arithmeticam.
Aquinas sententia:
In commutationibus autem iustum est quidem aequale quid et iniustum inaequale, sed non 
secundum proportionalitatem illam, sed secundum arismaticam.
Aquinas expositio:—
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well might have been despite having all passed through Grosseteste's hands. They also show that
In commutationibus autem iustum est quidem aequale, et iniustum inaequale; sed non 
secundum proportionalitatem, illam secundum arithmeticam.
D (1132a 18):
Grosseteste purus:
Quorum erat medium, equale; quod dicimus esse iustum. Quare directivum iustum utique 
erit, medium dampni et lucri.
Grosseteste recognitus:
Quorum erat medium equale, quod dicimus esse iustum. Quare directivum iustum utique erit 
medium dampni et lucri.
Albertus:
(...,) quorum erat medium aequale, quod dicimus esse iustum; quare directivum iustum utique 
erit medium damni et lucri.
Aquinas sententia:
(...,) quorum erat medium aequale, quod dicimus esse iustum. Quare directivum iustum 
utique erit medium damni et lucri.
Aquinas exvositio:
Quorum erat medium aequale, quod dicimus esse iustum. Quare directivum, utique erit 
medium damni, et lucri.
E (1132b 18):
Grosseteste purus:
Quare lucri cuiusdem et dampni medium iustum est eorum que circa voluntarium equale 
habere quod et prius et posterius.
Grosseteste recoenitus:
Quare lucri cuiusdem et dampni medium iustum est, quod preter voluntarium equale habere et 
prius et posterius.
Albertus:
Quare lucri cuiusdem et damni medium iustum est eorum quae circa voluntarium, aequale 
habere, quod et prius et posterius.
Aquinas sententia:
Quare lucri cuiusdam et damni medium iustum est, quod praeter voluntarium aequale habere 
et prius et posterius.
Aquinas expositio:
Quare lucri cuiusdam et damni medium iustum est eorum in praeter voluntarium aequale 
habere, et prius et posterius.
F (1132b24):
Grosseteste purus:
Contrapassum autem non congruit, neque in distributivum iustum, neque in directivum, 
quamvis volunt hoc dicere et Rhadamanthis iustum.
Grosseteste recoenitus:
Contrapassum autem non congruit, neque in distributivum iustum, neque in directivum, 
quamvis voluerit hoc dicere. Et Rhadamantis iustum.
Albertus:
Contrapassum autem non congruit neque in distributivum iustum neque in directivum, 
quamvis volunt hoc dicere et Rhadamanthis iustum:
Aquinas sententia:
Contrapassum autem non congruit neque in distributivum iustum. Neque in diretivum, 
quamvis volunt hoc dicere; et Radamanti iustum:
Aquinas expositio:
Contrapassum autem non congruit, neque in distributivum iustum. Neque in directivum: 
quamvis voluerit hoc dicere et Rhadamantis iustum.
325 Variations in quotation and paraphrasing show he did not have Albertus's text to hand 
when actually writing his own commentary (G.Wieland The Reception and Interpretation of 
Aristotle's Ethics' The Cambridge History o f Later Medieval Philosophy, 1982, p.662). For 
Albert's influence on Thomas, and influences via Albert see Gauthier 'Appendix: St.Thomas 
et l'Ethique a Nicomaque', Opera 48, 1971.
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Ritchie and Gauthier must be mistaken: there is no mistranslation. What we find is a failure to 
preserve Aristotle's use of an alternative expression at D— this is examined below— but it does not 
help their case. If Aquinas was misled then it could not have been through faulty translation of the 
text, and as we have seen neither through a simple misreading of it, and nor did he consciously alter 
it (which exhausts the possibilities o f his having been misled).
5. 4 A  simple m isreading ?
As he was not misled by mistranslation did Aquinas simply misunderstand the text? Ritchie 
and Gauthier-Jolif discuss only the entries A  and B. I argue below that Aquinas could not have 
misread D and F. With respect to directivum might Aquinas have been simply confused? Ritchie 
says:
Aquinas read the Ethics and the Politics in the version of William of Moerbek. Now in this old 
translation the words of ...(1130b30) [A  above] are rendered as follows: una autem quae in 
commutationibus directiva. In [B above] we find: Reliqua autem una directivum (sic) ejus f it  et 
in quod voluntariis commutationibus et involuntariis. In these passages Aquinas's attention was 
obviously drawn by the phrase in commutationibus and not by the vague word directiva which 
fails to give the force of 8iop0omKov. In the sentences ... from the Summa it will be observed 
that Aquinas uses directiva and dirigit of Distributive as well as of Corrective Justice: so he has 
clearly missed the significance of the term 8iop0cotikov.326
Gauthier-Jolif, correcting his reference to Moerbeke but otherwise in agreement with Ritchie, say:
Le dikaion to en tois sunallagmasi diorthotikon d’Aristote etait en effet ainsi rendu dans la 
traduction de Robert Grosseteste: una autem quae in commutationibus directiva...; reliqua autem 
una directivum quod f it  in commutationibus et in voluntariis et in involuntariis... Le mot 
important etait directivum, diorthotikon mais saint Thomas a souligne au contraire le mot 
commutationibus et, en face de la justice distributive, il ne connait dans son commentaire sur 
YEthique que la justice commutative, qui dirige les echange quant a la justice corrective 
proprement dite, elle n'est plus qu'un aspect secondaire de la commutative, et l'importance 
qu'Aristote attachait au diorthotikon passe inapergue.327
Neither Ritchie nor Gauthier-Jolif demonstrate that there is any ambiguity due to the Latin tradition,
nor what is significantly faulty in the mediaeval translations. Ritchie merely says that Aquinas's
attention was "obviously attracted" by the terms for transactions, not that those terms do not occur in
the Greek scripts. It could well have been the case that different translations would have rendered
differing senses, but as it happens they have not. The only claim that is argued for is that the
important word is directivum, while Thomas chose rather to highlight commutationibus, treating the
326 1894, p. 188.
327 1959 (1970), pp.370-71. (Ritchie and Gauthier-Jolif prefer slightly differing MSS).
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corrective function of this type of justice as secondary. Thereby, they argue, mistaking the
importance which Aristotle attaches to the corrective function of the second species; specifically to
SiopGcoTiKov. Their views indicate that Grosseteste ought to have translated the passages so as to
stress the term directivum rather than the expression in commutationibus. It is not apparent how
Grosseteste might have changed his translation of Aristotle's text to yield such an emphasis without
violating his sense of accuracy. Gauthier-Jolif are not quite so scrupulous: notice that they create a
term that is not present in the Greek:
Le SiKcaov to ev T015 a-ovaAAaY(J.aat 8iop9coTiKov d'Aristote etait en effet ainsi rendu dans la 
traduction de Robert Grosseteste una autem quae in commutationibus directiva.
But this was Grosseteste's translation of ev 8e to ev roiq auvaAACCY|j.aai SiopBcoTitcov. They
achieve the emphasis they believe to be intended by putting words in Aristotle's mouth (well, one
important word). The introduction of Sikcxiov here illegitimately props-up what Ritchie calls "the
vague word directiva which fails to give the force of SropTTiGcoTiKov"328. Ritchie spells out his failure
to grasp the central point understood by St Thomas:
It will be observed that Aquinas uses directiva and dirigit of Distributive as well as o f Corrective 
Justice: so he has clearly missed the significance o f the term 8iop0coTiKOV.
My claim is that it is Ritchie (along with very many others) not Aquinas who has missed the
significance of it.
5. 5 Am bigu ity  o f  parsing
In both the Greek and its Latin translations A  and B refer to both corrective and exchanges, C
and E only to exchanges, whereas D and F use only corrective (apparently leaving the field wide
open). The passages A  and B are complicated by two quite distinct ambiguities. I discuss the second
in connexion with B below. As for the first ambiguity, I believe that the mediaevals have been
wrongly accused of focusing on the wrong term. Aquinas discusses A  in his Commentary at 928:
secundo ibi...<una autem> Ponit secundam speciem particularis iustitiae. Et dicit, quod alia 
species particularis iustitiae est, quae constituit rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus, 
secundum quas transfertur ab uno in alterum; sicut prima species iustitiae attendebatur secundum 
quod transfertur aliquid a communi ad singolos.
328 Ritchie's claim is opposed by Burnet. W.F.R.Hardie (Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. 
1980, p.211) says that Burnet ignores Ritchie's argument, but this is not so, he explicitly 
rejects it (Burnet, 1900, p.217).
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C.I.Litzinger translates this as:
Next ... at 'another species' he gives a second kind of particular justice. He says that another 
species establishes a measure o f justice in transactions, by which a thing is transferred from one 
person to another - in the first species the transfer o f a thing from the community to the 
individual was concerned.329
Litzinger's English rendering omits a translation of rectitudinem— he simply leaves out the very term
which many claim definitively signifies the species. Thomas's expression was "quae constituit
rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus”; the key phrase may be parsed as either:
rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus, or as rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus.
I.e., the expression "corrective justice in exchanges" may be understood in either o f the two ways:
1 Corrective Justice in exchanges
2 corrective Justice-in-Exchanges.
The subject may either be disambiguated as Corrective Justice (applied to exchanges), or it may be 
Justice-in-Exchanges (qualified by the adjective 'corrective'— see §§ 3.2 and 4.2). Iustitia 
commutativa, the term employed by Aquinas, stems from commutatio— to alter or change— hence 
‘Commutative Justice’ . Drawing out the options in the ambiguity of the parsing shows exactly the 
way that the term emerged from the two passages (A ) quae in commutationibus directiva, ... and (B) 
directivum ... in ... commutationibus. Aquinas disambiguated the expressions as 2, whereas his 
accusers would disambiguate them as 1 .
Regarding the first objection to St Thomas— that the translations he used were poor— no 
evidence has even been offered. All Ritchie and Gauthier-Jolif have actually done is merely assert 
that Aquinas read the text wrongly. Was it then the case that Aquinas simply 'saw the meaning' as 2 
rather than as 1, mis-parsing the expression? Could an innocent error, i.e., one that was not a 
deliberate re-interpretation as Finnis claims, nevertheless not be due to mistranslation? For this to 
have been the case St Thomas would have had read the later two passages (D and F)— which refer to 
this form of justice without mentioning transactions— as if they referred exactly to transactions. 
Unlike Ritchie and Gauthier-Jolif St Thomas did not neglect the later passages; to have misread the 
text in them he would have had to read quare directivum and neque in directivum as meaning in
329 Commentary, 1964, p.400.
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commutationibus (as if the word 'direction' means transaction-130). That Thomas did not simply 
misread 'direction' as 'transaction' at D and F is shown by his application of directivum to both 
Distributive and Commutative justice in the Summa33'. It is absurd to suppose that St Thomas 
unconsciously mixed-up such totally unrelated meanings of the terms in several places and contexts 
both in his analysis of Aristotle's theory in the Commentary and in his application o f it in the 
Summa: whether he was right or wrong he had to have deliberated. Hence we may exclude the 
possibility of a simple misreading.
From these considerations it appears that St Thomas could not have been confused by poor 
translation and did not otherwise unconsciously shift the meaning from 1 to 2. Following this it may 
seem unavoidable to conclude that, however extreme the moral, psychological and practical 
absurdities involved, he consciously shifted it. An explanation close to that of Finnis's would be that 
St Thomas noticed the ambiguity in the first two entries and then looked to C and E, which 
unambiguously refer to justice in exchanges with no 'corrective' reference, to confirm the meaning of 
A  and B as 2 rather than as 1. (But he would then have had to accommodate his interpretation to the 
passages D and F.)
The reason for choosing Commutative rather than Directive to characterise the second type of 
justice, in Finnis's view, seems to be that Aquinas saw the immense potential of the notion of 
exchanges: that exchange takes precedence over correction (flatly contradicting Gauthier-Jolif). 
Regarding the depth and importance of Aquinas's insight into the notion o f exchanges I agree with 
Finnis; nevertheless I believe that St Thomas neither consciously nor unconsciously shifted the 
meaning of Aristotle's text. On the contrary, he gave a careful and faithful presentation. What is
330 At first glance it might appear that he had done exactly this when commenting on F at 
967. There Aquinas had treated neque in directivum as referring only to commutative justice 
(rather than to both species), even though it is headed simply directivum:
Secundo ibi [687] "neque in directivum". Improbat praedictam positionem quantu ad 
iustiam commutativam, 
in fact, like Albertus, he was merely following the customary method of locating the text.
331 //-// q.61 a. 1 :
Sed contra est quod Philosophus in V Ethic, point duas partes iustitiae, et dicit quod una 
est directiva in distributionibus, alia in commutationibus. 
and q.61 a.3:
In contrarium est quod dicitur in V Ethic, quod una species iustitiae est directiva in 
distributionibus, alia in commutationibus. 
also in the Responsio (I am grateful to Professor Finnis for pointing this out to me):
nam distributiva iusticia est directiva distributionum, commuutativa vero iusticia est 
directiva commutationum quam attendi possunt iter duas personas.
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required is an explanation of why it is that he emphasised exchanges rather than correction in those 
entries (A  and B) which contain both terms, followed by an account of the meaning of those passages 
(D and F) which do not even refer to exchanges. (C and E refer to exchanges only.) Part o f that 
explanation will show that the modern interpretation— that Aristotle drew his distinction between 
distribution and correction— creates major discrepancies which the mediaeval understanding wholly 
avoids. As we look at the passages the discrepancies emerge.
5. 6 (A )  1130b34
(..,) and another kind is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions. O f these there are two
divisions: of transactions some are voluntary and others involuntary
In the first two entries, where it is being introduced, Aristotle describes the species more fully than in 
the later references. We have seen that A  and B could be parsed so as to define the second species 
according to its extension or else according to its character. In the modern view part of the character 
becomes the defining noun (see §§ 3.2, 4.2, 5.5); now this could very well be arrived at via the 
sequence 'differentia of the differentia' where the last in the series of attributes is corrective, isolating 
the species from any other within the genus. But in Thomas's view this character is understood as an 
adjective not as the sortal noun; it is a differentia which is part of the sequence of attributes shared 
with the other species. The extension of the distributive species we know to be whatever may be 
quantified and shared (wealth, duties, honours, goods) of the common stock. What then is the 
specific character of distributive justice?
As species of a common genus the attributes of the two forms of justice will differ from one 
another (paradigmatically) in degree— 'as to the more or less', though possibly 'by excess or defect’. 
Any defect could not be a generically defining differentia, i.e., the species could not differ to the 
extent that one of them has a character where the other has not332. Nor could we even make sense of 
the notion that only one of them has an extension. For distributive justice not to possess a 'character' 
at all would, even if such an idea is coherent, eject it from the genus. I.e., i f  we said that, unlike the
332 The notion of species differing 'by excess and defect' is often treated interchangeably with 
difference in degree, but even if we allow that these two expressions might not be wholly 
equivalent, the differentiae to which they apply need to be generically non-defining attributes.
(A  table may have drawers, but drawers are not defining attributes of tables. Aristotle gives 
the examples of the presence or not of a spur or crest— these are not defining differentiae of 
birds, as are feathers and beaks.)
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second species, Distributive justice has a character that is simply “just” , this could not be 
accommodated alongside the other species falling under the genus Particular justice. (Particular 
justice contains subsidiary forms of justice; for them to be species o f the same genus, where one is 
attributed a character and an area o f application, then so will the other.)
Aristotle presents the species o f Particular justice as having attributes which differ as to the 
more or less complex. The more complex is the 'geometric' arrangement for just distribution 
(1131 a 1 Off.) involving a minimum of four terms: the two parties in a case and the division of what 
is at stake into two corresponding parts. It is 'geometric' in that it is the ratios between the sets of 
terms that are to be determined, not merely the quantities. The more simple arrangement is the 
'arithmetical' where, since the worth of the parties is irrelevant, only the value o f the items at stake is 
involved, i.e., only the quantity is to be determined. As outlined in § 2.1 Aristotle is not altogether 
clear in his terminology with respect to proportion, and the confusions that have bedevilled 
interpretation have, to that extent, not really been the fault of the commentators and translators. 
Aristotle relies on the context to clarify his exact sense. Sometimes, as here, he speaks quite loosely 
o f proportion to mean geometric proportion, to be contrasted with plain quantitative equality ( kcct 
dvaX.oyiav teat jj.t| kcct’ Ictottitcx, 1132b33). At other times (1106a35: Touxo 8e jieaov ectti Kara 
xr|v aju0n,T)TiKT|v ava/.oyiav) he draws on the careful application of geometric and arithmetic 
equalities as, both of them, modes o f proportion— as they are in proportion theory. This 
equivocation has been distinctly unhelpful (that simple, quantitative equality is both the plain 
everyday equal amount, understood by everyone to be what equality is, yet simultaneously a mode of 
proportion, is a feature of his theory of justice that could have done with a much more consistent 
terminology). The contrast Aristotle makes whilst presenting the difference between the distributive 
and transactional species is that between the complex model for geometric equality for distributions, 
and a simple model of quantitative equality for transactions. Properly speaking the arithmetic 
formula is every bit as complex as the geometric, but the complicating factors (the factors which treat 
the parties to a case), in effect, cancel-out by being reduced to a unity (A  : B = 1). The complex 
arithmetically-proportional formula is replaceable with a simple arithmetic formula of quantities, and 
the result is a marked contrast between the geometric and the arithmetic models for justice. Even as 
a form of proportion arithmetic equality remains the simplest of the modes— it maps the equal
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quantity across a pair of ratios333— but here Aristotle is using arithmetic equality to contrast with the 
complex geometric equality for distributions. The reader is expected (somewhat unreasonably 
perhaps) to be aware, as his original students undoubtedly were, that Aristotle is drawing on both 
aspects of arithmetic equality.
Apart from the simple/complexc distinction, as a species of a common genus the more complex 
form geometric justice in distribution corresponds in structure to the more simple arithmetical 
justice in exchanges. This correspondence is present in Aquinas’s reading of the theory; it is a 
minimal, logical, requirement that each will have a character and an area of application (an 
extension). The correspondence, however, depends upon the passage A  being parsed as 2. But 
reading it as 1— the way it is in modern discussions— the second species has markedly differing 
generic traits from the first; i.e. they are not species o f the same genus. Where the character is taken 
to be corrective, and this to be peculiar to the second species, a complex asymmetry is created; one 
which renders the interpretation incoherent. That the modern parsing 'Corrective Justice in 
exchanges' does not allow anything to correspond to what could count as the character and extension 
o f the first species becomes obvious if we take a quasi-schema:
Corrective Justice/or extension x,
it should map
Distributive Justice fo r  extension y.
It doesn't. Distribution belongs to the extension, not to the character of the species (and of course 
‘Distributive Justice in the distribution of yi, yi, ...y« is trivially circular, as would be a corresponding 
‘Corrective Justice in correction’ , or ‘Transactional Justice in exchanges’ ). The alternative is to 
parse the second species as St Thomas did: ‘ (corrective) Justice in Exchanges’ . Some corresponding 
character then is required for ‘ ( ..............) Justice in Distribution’ . Treated as a quasi-schema:
some z ( character of) Justice in Distribution 
is to correspond to:—
333 Marc-Wogau (op.cit.) comes close to the style of Aristotle’ s thinking in recognising 
proportions as the key to the text; but he misconceives the arithmetic proportion as a special 
case of the geometric, rather then as one of the three classical parallel modes of proportion.
He constructs the forms of justice accordingly— as Distributive justice containing Corrective 
as a subaltern class, which in turn contains justice for exchanges as a further sub-species. He 
would not have been misled had Aristotle’s terminology with proportion theory been clearer.
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some w (character of) Justice in Exchanges.
It is agreed that w = corrective, so here we need a 'value' for z. 'Proportional' is no use for z because 
both sorts o f justice are proportional. Entered in the schemas the two proportions are:
geometrically z ( ..................) Justice in Distribution.
arithmetically w ( corrective) Justice in Exchanges 
These do nothing to repair the logical mis-match in the orthodox interpretation, where without a 
'value' z marks no more than a lacuna in the first species to parallel the role of corrective in the 
second. There is nothing in the text which looks even faintly available to occupy the hiatus other 
than corrective itself—and nothing to prevent it. The traits z and w are generic; the corrective 
character of justice is general not specific. 'Geometrically corrective Justice in Distribution1 is 
perfectly in order, but conflicts with the modern presentations in which corrective is taken to 
distinguish the second species from the Distributive.
5 .7  (B ) (1131b25)
The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion with transactions both 
voluntary and involuntary.
In this entry the second ambiguity emerges, but it has been entirely overlooked because the contrast
that Aristotle draws has been taken to isolate the Corrective as a species (Ritchie even rehearses its
terms without realising their ambiguity). This passage
To 8e Xoircov ev to SiopGcoxiKOV o Y iveta i ev xoi<; ai)vaA,A,ayp.aCTi. Kai to 15 eKOUOioig 
K a i  T015 d K O -u a io ig
may be understood in two very different ways; Ross's translation is representative of the modern 
understanding:
3 The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion with transactions both 
voluntary and involuntary,
where only one species rectifies. I f  we remove the (interpolated) punctuation (there was of course
none to the original) we have the reading clearly understood by St Thomas:
4 The remaining one is the-rectificatory-which-arises-in-connexion-with-transactions both 
voluntary and involuntary,
where both species rectify but only one rectifies exchanges. The Latin tradition from Grosseteste
may be re-translated:—
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However, there remains one giving direction, it applies to exchanges both voluntary and 
involuntary;
in line with which St Thomas disambiguated the passage as 4. St Thomas saw the principle as 
giving direction in exchanges rather than giving it in distribution. The modern interpretations, on 
the other hand, have no choice but to view the passage as 3. It is indisputable that an explicit 
distinction is being drawn by Aristotle, but by rendering that distinction as between Corrective and 
Distributive (or as between Corrective and anything at all) the passage must be read as 3.
Yet interpreting the passage as 3 flows from a non-sequitur; it is one which commits a classic 
error o f scope with the negation operator. The mistake has been the inference that 
-> (A  asserts cp)
means
A  asserts -> cp.
I.e., because Aristotle does not say that the first species is corrective it has been taken to mean that it 
is not. But Aristotle nowhere says that Distributive justice is not corrective, only that the other sort 
is. This non-sequitur is the starting point for all the misinterpretations and most of the confusions 
that have grown up around Aristotle's theory o f Particular justice since the mid seventeenth century.
5 .8  (C ) (1131b31)
But the justice in transactions is the sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; 
not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion.
The third entry occurs in the same passage as B but no reference to the character of justice is made at
this point. That the character of this sort of justice is in some sense directive or corrective is not
disputed (the distinctions between directive and corrective, or any of the other near-synonyms given
in § 5.1 is examined in § 5.9 immediately below). The claim I am making is that Aristotle applies
some notion of direction to any form of justice and so it could not be the distinction that he makes for
just this form. For this reason the objections to Aquinas's reading of the contrast are misplaced. The
corrective character of this form of Particular justice is secondary, contrary to Gauthier-Jolifs
claim334, exactly because it is an attribute shared with the other species. The entry C most simply and
clearly expresses Aristotle's notion of the second type of justice: Justice in Exchanges— or as
334 1970, p.371.
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Aquinas expressed it, Commutative Justice. (For the Archytan origin of the expression and the 
principle of justice in exchanges see § 6 .3 , note 372.)
We have seen that both species share a broadly directive or corrective character, and that this 
character differs as to the more or less complex. Corresponding to the differing degrees of 
complexity are the differing areas of application. In both the Involuntary and the Voluntary sub­
species the simple vs. complex distinction will be a factor in separating the assessment o f the value of 
what is to be exchanged from the things exchanged (in chapter 6).
5 .9  (D ) (1132al9 )
(...,) therefore corrective justice will be the intermediate between loss and gain.
The fourth entry appears in the same paragraph as B and C; here Aristotle refers to the subject in a 
new way; instead of SiopOcniKov and crovocAAayiicxm Sikouov he now uses the term 
EiravopGcoTiKov. Grosseteste failed to pick up the new term; he used the same Latin translation 
directivum335 here as for the other entries. The mediaeval custom was to render the Greek as literally 
as possible, even where this created ugly or contrived Latin expressions336, which clearly shows that 
Grosseteste did not think the difference between 8iop0omKov and £7tavop0co-n.Kov significant.
’EnavopOcoxiKov is a term with a prefix consisting of two prepositions, etu to indicate that the 
action referred to is somehow secondary, and ava to indicate (in this context) that it represents a 
return to, or restoration of, an earlier or superior situation. Ross, taking note that a new term has 
been employed, uses 'corrective' here instead of the 'rectificatory' that he gives for the other entries. 
Burnet suggested that SiopOoymcov should be translated as 'directive', with 'corrective' reserved for 
EnavopOcoxiKov337. Diorthotic (directive) justice would then contain the epanorthotic (corrective) as 
a subaltern species. AiopSomKov stems from SiopO-co^a: to make straight, or set right; and 
ultimately from opOoq: straight. Directivum from dirigo: to set in order, or to give a particular 
direction, does not necessarily indicate that something having already gone wrong needs re-setting338. 
So the conflicting interpretations are whether 8iop0coxiKov is a term only for putting-something-
335 AL XXVI. 1-3(5) pp. 703, 707.
336 See J.Dunbabin Robert Grosseteste as Translator, Transmitter, and Commentator: the 
Nicomachean Ethics' in Traditio 28 1972, pp.460-72.
337 1900 pp.213, 220 .
338 Liddell & Scott; Lewis & Short.
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back-in-place or tor both placing and replacing. As far as I can tell the etymology of the root term 
opGoq (straight) will allow either sense: we take a straight path from the outset as well as requiring 
guidance to keep straight; we seek help straight away and not only when we've gone astray. If 
Aristotle was using the broader sense the geometric analogy will both guide initial distributions and 
re-direct re-distributions. The arithmetical analogy will be used in voluntary exchanges also both to 
guide initial transactions and to restore broken contracts. By contrast justice for involuntary 
exchanges can only give redress— the assault or fraud has first to take place. Aristotle uses the 
narrower term eiravopGomKov Sikociov in the one case where, logically, there is no room for the 
wider sense.
Bearing in mind the double preposition in the prefix, the expression has built-in a reference to 
some prior state, some circumstance which, although it need not have been a transaction, a 
transaction is a likely, natural, and representative circumstance to stand in for the prior state. Some 
sense of a prior inter-action is then a perfectly respectable import for this expression. The expression 
conveys "justice as a subsequent action which restores the situation to an earlier, superior, 
condition". Which also strongly suggests that the wider term SiopGcoTiicov, that he uses everywhere 
else, carries the wider sense— all their circumstances call for justice at the outset, not merely in 
redress339. For this reason it is better to use 'direction' for SiopGcoTitcov and 'corrective' for the more 
restricted range of epanorthotic issues; although 'corrective' can be used in English lor the broader 
sense, it is much more immediately understood to convey remedy rather than initial guidance.
It was a marked failing in Grosseteste not to pick up Aristotle's single use of the more 
restrictive term (he had available the stems corrigo and emendo which would have flagged the 
reactive function unique to this sub-species). His successors have often marked the new term 
(though Jackson, Peters, Welldon, Thomson and Irwin haven't) but they either do not notice that it 
has any significance (Chase, Grant, Ross, Joachim, del Vecchio) or have denied that it has any 
(Stewart, Rackham, Gauthier-Jolif, Harrison, Hardie)340. Stewart and del Vecchio, like Grosseteste 
himself, have missed the point of the distinct usage for this necessarily reactive sub-class of
339 Book IX, especially 1164bl3ff. again refers to the need for initial guidance in transactions.
34,1 Stewart, p.435; Rackham, p.275; Gauthier-Jolif 1959, p.358; A.R.W.Harrison ('Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, and the Law of Athens', in Journal o f Hellenic Studies 77,
1957 pp.42-47) says the difference is "too subtle"; Hardie (op. cit., p. 194).
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exchanges, even though they have not treated the justice for the whole o f the species as remedial. 
Many commentators have asserted that the whole o f the species is remedial341, so they find little need 
to see any significance in the more restrictive term for a sub-group. For these interpreters, insofar as 
they have noticed the difference o f expression342, the new term merely confirms the remedial 
character of the whole.
The passing-over of the special usage shows an insensitivity to the logic of Aristotle's 
proposals as much as to the linguistic care with which he expresses them. The justice for the 
involuntary sub-division of exchange is remedial simply because it must wait until there's been one; 
this limitation is a logical requirement o f one part o f the extension, not a differentia of the species as 
a whole. Aquinas, who did not have the novel term highlighting the reactive nature for this sub­
species preserved for him, had to rely on the coherence of Aristotle's position, and accordingly 
interpreted the reference as an ellipsis.
5 .10  (E ) (1132bl8 )
Therefore the just is the intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, viz. those which 
are involuntary*; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction
Here Aristotle repeats the point that he is borrowing the terms 'gain' and 'loss' from voluntary
exchange; he is using them to express the relations greater than and less than in a way that vividly
connects the two branches of Exchange. A  number o f translators have responded to the nuance in
Aristotle's choice of napa to ekovjoiov ("other than the voluntary") rather than atcouaiov
("involuntary") either by using 'non-voluntary' (Jackson343, Thomson) or by retaining the word
341 Hardie (op.cit., p. 193) writes:
The account I have given of rectificatory justice agrees with Jackson, Ross, J.A.Smith (in 
the Introduction to the Everyman translation), Vinogradoff, Joachim, and Gauthier-Jolif 
that it is concerned with redress or the rectification of wrongs done.
He might have added Grant, p.112-13; Trendelenburg (op. cit., p.405); Trojano (op. cit. 
p.58f.); Masci Etica p. 160 (Naples, 1911); Donati (op. cit. pp.25f.); M.Ostwald (Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1962, p.121). Since Hardie wrote A.Edel (Aristotle and his Philosophy, 1996 p.299), 
J.O.Urmson (Aristotle's Ethics, 1988, p.95), McNeill (op. cit., p.59), Meikle, Miller (1995, 
pp.72-73), and Judson (op. cit.) have continued to repeat this extremely widely held view.
342 Joachim for example (pp. 144, 146) treats the terms 5iop0coTiKov and ETravopGcoTiKOV as 
equivalent, without comment.
343 Jackson however also inserts (p.27) the term 'corrective' "Thus to [SiopGcoTiKov] 5ikcxiov 
is a mean between a sort of profit ... in matters not voluntary", as does Williams (Welldon 
(1912, p. 149) also imports "That which is just then in corrective justice" that is not in the 
MSS).
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'voluntary' (Chase344, Peters, and the Latin tradition: see § 5.3). In many translations 'involuntary' is 
substituted (Grant, Williams, Welldon, Ross* (quoted above), Rackham, Ostwald, Litzinger, 
Thomson, Dirlmeier) and the connexion is lost. Irwin does not translate the expression at all345. It is 
a detail, but one of those little turns of phrase which helps to reveal the broader viewpoint; the whole 
section from 1132a7, and especially from 1132b 13, explains justice for involuntary exchanges in 
terms o f voluntary onesm . The spirit o f the section is to emphasise the correspondence between the 
two sub-groups. In line with this close connexion Aristotle chooses itapa to ekouctiov where, were 
it not for his purpose of explicating one branch of the subject in the terms belonging to the other, he 
could more easily have written aKOuaiov. You may say that nothing hangs on such a small point; 
on its own nothing does, but the reversal of Aristotle's own preferred expression (and if the subjects 
fall under different genera or species, as many think, it is one that is pointlessly contrived), even 
though it is at the merely verbal level, is a distortion. As with £7ravop0aniKov, with Ttapa to 
ekouctiov Aristotle uses a different mode of expression where that different mode does some work. 
The expression indicates that the two groups are parallel subaltern classes of the same species, 
reinforcing the "strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice"347. Ignoring 
or denying Aristotle's sensitive modification of expression contributes to the overall distortion to the 
meaning of the text.
5. 11 (F ) (1132b24)
Now reciprocity fits neither distributive nor rectificatory justice 
The only place where the text unequivocally has Directive justice without referring to exchanges is at 
the last mention of this second form of justice. It occurs in connexion with Aristotle’s opposition to 
the doctrine of the Pythagoreans that reciprocity (&vtiji£7iov0o5) is just. His view is that reciprocity 
must be based on proportion. At this point Aristotle refers to justice as either Distributive or as 
Directive— which appears to undermine my argument. My claim is that 'directive' is an adjective,
344 1847, though in much later editions (Everyman, 1912) this is reversed to 'involuntary' 
without comment.
345 Irwin (op. cit.) alters the Bekker sequence slightly and loses the phrase.
346 Joachim (p. 138) says Aristotle's reason for the explanation of justice in Involuntary 
matters in terms of contracts (1132al2, b 13) was probably the absence of any single name for 
issues o f (involuntary) active and passive conditions in law.
347 Burnet (1900 pp.222-23 n. 13).
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not the noun, and applies to both species. It could not then be used to distinguish one species from 
the other. Well, suppose Aristotle needs a taxi, and there are two taxi-drivers, both wearing hats. He 
says "I'll take the one in the hat". It might appear that he had picked out the very attribute whereby 
they couldn't be distinguished. Not so, Aristotle replies that there are hats and hats; as he had said 
"the one in the hat" it is perfectly clear which o f the two he chose. In dropping the reference to 
transactions in F Aristotle emphasises the contrast between a complex four-term set of relations 
needed to account for Distributive justice— elaborated at 1131 a 15-b24— and the simpler two-term 
relation between loss and gain which applies in transactions. By this stage Aristotle is sliding past 
the proportional nature of the arithmetic mode of analogy (§ 2 .1 above); he habitually refers to the 
geometric analogy as "proportion", and the arithmetic proportion as "equality" alongside his more 
elaborate designation treating them both as proportions. Here, in the further repetition of the two 
species, Aristotle picks on the distributive use of the first and the simply directive character of the 
second. It does not mean that the first species is not directive, any more than the second is not 
proportional, but merely that Aristotle has a natural tendency to be elliptical. Any simple directive 
disposal of quantities is inadequate and inappropriate to distributive issues, whereas in non­
distributive issues what is adequate and appropriate is the simple directive process applied to simple 
quantities— that simplicity is what stands out, like the hat, as the striking feature. Intent on rejecting 
the Pythagorean doctrine which failed to distinguish simple from complex reciprocity (see below) 
Aristotle glides over the whole expression, picking out its distinctively simple character from the 
proportionally complex character of the other species. But what is absent from Distributive justice is 
not rectitude or direction, but simplicity', the ellipse has fostered the misinterpretations of the text 
which place the adjectival differentia as the sortal noun (an entangling of differentia with species 
which violates a central tenet of Aristotle's thinking— see § 3.2).
5. 12 Sum m ary
The two forms of Particular justice which Aristotle distinguishes are the one which regulates 
according to a complex quasi-geometric formula for matters ot distribution, and the other according 
to a simpler quasi-arithmetic formula for interactions of every sort which do not directly involve the 
polis. To avoid the confusions which the emphasis in his last reference to the second species has
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generated, and to display the pattern o f his argument in the text, the full contrast which Aristotle 
makes between the two species o f Particular justice should be read as:
1 Geometrically complex directive Justice in Distribution
2 Arithmetically simple directive Justice in Exchanges.
Looking at Aristotle's references to the second species in detail has shown that Aquinas's treatment 
o f  it was much more accurate than later commentators:
(A ) he parsed so as the diorthotic term functions adjectivally.
(B ) he disambiguated in a way that did not rest on the non-sequitur involving the scope of what is 
negated.
(C ) is purely transactional, with no diorthotic qualification at that point.
(D ) was not adequately translated for him so he did not see the fine logical distinction Aristotle 
makes in fixing the purely reactive sub-species (in chapter 4), distinguishing it from the broader pro- 
and re-active quality of the whole species. Yet he nevertheless respected the careful balance which 
Aristotle sets up in bringing together the two branches of exchange (explaining the one sub-group in 
terms to display the structure of the other) and treated the ellipsis as expressing 'directive Justice-in- 
Exchanges'.
(E ) Unlike D had the nuance preserved by the Latin tradition of translation. This may have helped 
in seeing the two classes of exchange— voluntary and "along-side the voluntary" (in praeter 
voluntarium or circa voluntarium) as belonging to the same species.
(F) he treats as plainly elliptical.
The misapprehension that Aristotle had divided Particular justice into Distributive and 
Corrective fields led Felden and subsequent writers to the supposition that vitally important concerns 
fall outside the initial account. The modern orthodoxy requires Aristotle to have been hopelessly 
muddled both about the role these important issues play in his account of justice and in the structure 
o f the whole book. In opposition to all this I believe, as did Aquinas, that Aristotle does what he sets 
out to do. He does not set-out the plan (1130b30ff.) to examine the modes o f equality appropriate to 
each sort o f case only to ignore it. He does not leave vacant the final sub-division of the plan to turn 
rather to some otherwise unmentioned species (or as some think, yevo<;) under which to place the 
later issues, all the while insisting that there are only two, the originally prescribed, species. Many
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scholars think Aristotle explores the later issues under this undeclared third class o f justice (though
not all, Burnet, del Vecchio, Irwin, and Hutchinson see no such construction). Even though there
are many signs that his thoughts on justice occupied Aristotle for some considerable period (not so
much from its mere appearance in the Common Books348 and MM, but from related discussions in
the Politics, and from his having written a long lost dialogue Justice349), Peters said that Aristotle's
thoughts on the justice of exchanges "upon which the existence of the polis depends" was "an
afterthought" (and many have echoed him350). Trendelenburg and Stewart argued for this third
species to be aligned with the first (Distributive) and to have priority over the second351. The less
radical of the interpretations for a third class see it as an additional species o f justice alongside the
Distributive and the Corrective352 (Marc-Wogau is one who holds that the class for Voluntary
exchanges is a sub-species of the Involuntary, see § 4.9, note 285(iii), and § 5.6, note 333). The
more radical of the claims for a third class o f justice stress the great importance of the issues omitted
from the initial division of the genus; Finnis, for example, writes353:
The real problem with Aristotle's account is its emphasis on correction, on the remedying of the 
inequality that arises when one person injures or takes from another, ...This is certainly one area 
of problems of justice, but even when added to the field of distributive justice it leaves untouched 
a wide range of problems. 'Correction' and 'restitution' are notions parasitic on some prior 
determination of what is to count as a crime, a tort, a binding agreement etc.
i f Aristotle had differentiated 'Corrective' from Distributive justice then this concern at the
inadequacy of his treatment would be justified. St Thomas's radical alteration of such a text would
have represented a profound advance; he would have filled the "conceptual gaps left by Aristotle's
emphasis on correction". But there weren't any. The conceptual gaps appear only with the general
348 A  point made to me by Professor Rowe.
349 In four books according to Diogenes Laertius who cites Cicero and Suetonius, see Select 
Fragments, Ross ed., op. cit., p.vii.
350 See § 5.1 and note 301.
351 Trendelenburg (op.cit., p.412). Stewart pp.415-19; a view strongly rejected by Zeller 
(Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol.2, 1897, pp. 170-73 note 3).
352 In addition to the writers mentioned earlier from Felden onwards who hold this very 
common opinion were H.A.Fechner ( Uber der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des Aristoteles, p.35) 
and E.Haecker ('Das fiinfte Buch der Nicomachischen Ethik', Zeitschrift f.d. Gymnasialwesen 
d. Berlin Gymnasiallehre-Vereins 16, 1826, vol.2, p.554). L.Berns (Aristotle and Adam 
Smith on Justice: Co-operation between Ancients and Moderns?', in Review o f Metaphysics 
48(i), 1994, pp.71-90) thinks that there is a third class that is "like" the earlier species, but he 
leaves it extremely vague whether it forms a definite species or a distinct genus. Edel's view 
(op. cit.), endorsed by Sparshott (op. cit.), is that the classification is all too vague to fit exact 
species or genera.
353 1980, ppl78-79.
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misapprehension of that emphasis by the translators and commentators354. Ritchie was especially 
influential in stressing the priority of the issues treated by the 'third class' of Particular justice; he, 
and those who have adopted his approach355 hold that it is their very importance which places the 
issues beyond the extension of Particular justice. Contrary to Ritchie's claim, it is this importance 
which makes it impossible for them to fall outside Particular justice. Particular is the branch of 
Universal justice which Aristotle designates for issues of fairness and equality, i.e., it is the genus for 
appropriate equality. Chapter 5 is concerned with the means to ascertain appropriate equality; it 
deals exactly with the central theme for which Particular justice was devised. The more important 
the issues there, the more centrally they must occupy Particular justice. Ritchie's view, for all its 
celebrity, is bizarre: that Aristotle abandons his treatment of the justice which locates appropriate 
equality just as he approaches the issues which most require it. He leads the (already misguided) 
interpretations of Felden, Trendelenburg and Jackson even further astray; they only dislodged the 
questions of voluntary exchange from their place at the heart of the genus, Ritchie kicks them out 
altogether.
All these difficulties and obscurities disappear with Aquinas's reading of the text. Rather than 
his shifting the meaning, it is more natural to regard him as following the logic in Aristotle's 
classification, treating D and F as ellipses for 'simply directive Justice in Exchanges'. The misplaced 
emphasis on correction has given rise to the incongruity of defining the species according to differing 
criteria and has saddled Aristotle with the blame for an amazing range o f confusions. Every one of 
these interpretations which reject Aquinas's presentation of the structure and character of Particular 
justice results in absurdities, confusions which the mediaeval understanding escapes. The absurdities 
are fully recognised by all scholars, but they blame them on Aristotle, not their own constructions. 
The tenor of Finnis's remarks is to support Aquinas's deepening of Aristotle's theory. Aquinas ought
354 The conceptual gap that was left had nothing to do with the emphasis on correction; it is of 
quite a different kind— that left by the answer Aristotle would give to the question 'Who 
counts?'; see § 4.3 (iv).
355 Including Ross, Gauthier-Jolif, Hardie, Miller (1995, p.70) and Meikle (p. 130). Harrison 
(op.cit pp.44-45) makes no reference to Ritchie, but effectively follows him, he seems to think 
that exchanges fall outside the remit o f Particular justice (and thinks Aristotle's account 
unsatisfactory). J.Spengler ('Aristotle on Economic Imputation’, in Southern Economic 
Journal, 1955 pp.371-89, reprinted in Blaug 1991 pp.55-73) claims to follow Ritchie but 
treats the justice of exchanges as merely a third species. Professor Finnis tells me that he does 
not follow Ritchie, yet I believe his approach is in line with that initiated by Ritchie.
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to be defended to a considerable extent; apart from the distortion of the nature of Universal justice he 
gave an accurate presentation of Aristotle's theory, avoiding the non-sequitur which led to the errors 
o f the modern interpretations of the text. The 'Latin tradition' was not guilty of mistranslating 
Aristotle, even though it failed to bring out an informative change o f expression at one point in the 
original. It succeeded in preserving the two ambiguities present in the Greek where the modern 
tradition has disambiguated one of them wrongly, and the other it has failed to notice. More 
important than supporting St Thomas is to give the credit to Aristotle that all modern interpretations 
deny him: for having produced a carefully considered, comprehensive, and unified theory. Being 
clear as to the structure of the theory, and the nature of the species defined are necessary not only 
(rather obviously) for the understanding of the theory itself, but to have much hope of grasping what 
his solution to the problem of exchange-value is.
1 3 4
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Chapter 6
THE DOCTRINE OF EXCHANGE
6. 1 Th e  'th ird  species'
We found that by the end of Book V chapter 4 Aristotle has completed his account of the 
Involuntary sub-class of exchanges; he then turns, exactly in line with his stated purpose 
(1 130b30ff.), to the remaining Voluntary sub-species. This progress, clear and rational as can be, 
nevertheless has been found baffling by most commentators. What has thrown them out of 
reckoning is the imagined Corrective species. Inevitably, were there such a species, the issues would 
become murky. Once set off-course by the fatal non-sequitur (see § 5.7), limiting the function of the 
species to the remedying of actions that have gone wrong leaves out of account the need for guidance 
in voluntary relations between members o f the polis. This call for guidance and remedy is supposed 
by some commentators to have occurred to Aristotle only as an afterthought; but even those who do 
not accuse him of such gross absentmindedness think his approach to these issues is inadequate and 
muddled. The commonest interpretation of the theory over the last century and more (despite the 
opposition of Grant, Burnet, del Vecchio, Marc-Wogau, Irwin, and Aubenque) has been that these 
matters are dealt with through the undeclared third class o f justice.
The first objection to "the afterthought" approach is that even if he had thought about such 
great issues "upon which the existence of the polis depends" (1132b34) only afterwards, and they 
turned out to be more important than his forethoughts, the natural action would have been to re­
arrange the presentation of the theory— at the very least to make some reference to it in the layout of 
the plan. (O f course it would then not be known that it had been an afterthought.) There is no 
natural location for a third species in his plan, nor for a parallel yevoq that Ritchie claims stands 
apart from Particular justice altogether. These omissions are indeed sins Aristotle is charged with, 
but his not mentioning any third class, and his not providing for it in the layout of the subject, are 
clues that there isn't one, not that there is one that he handles badly.
Having read the plan for Particular justice (fig. 1, § 4.4) we should expect to find, even before 
looking in any detail into its contents, that (i) the examination of Voluntary exchanges will follow-on
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immediately from the discussion of Involuntary ones, (ii) That the subject will continue to be 
presented in terms of proportionate equality (locating the relevant mode of equality being the 
function of the whole genus of Particular justice). These features are precisely what we do find in 
chapter 5. The mysterious fog covering the sequence of the inquiry clears once we set aside the 
supposed Corrective and return to St Thomas's Commutative as the second (and final) species. We 
then see that there is no unannounced departure from the plan, rather, Aristotle turns in the correct 
order in a sequence that is clear as day.
6 .2  Reciprocity
The examination of Voluntary exchanges begins with the remark that although their justice
involves reciprocity, simple reciprocity does not fit either o f the classes (a remark which has been
taken to open the door to the third species). Distributive justice is mediated through the geometric
formula, and the simpler arithmetic proportion guides the justice of exchange. Reciprocity does not
appear in Distributive justice because distribution is a one-way process356, and whatever Aristotle
means exactly by reciprocity it must at least be some kind of two-way activity. For the justice o f
exchanges (whether Involuntary or Voluntary) what simple reciprocity fails to do is to distinguish
objects or actions from their value. This is Aristotle's objection to the Pythagoreans, that for
Involuntary exchanges the doctrine later known as lex talionis is unjust because the reciprocation in
'an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth' concept might not be of the truly like-for-like. Neither in
Voluntary transactions might the exchange of one item (or equal portion) for another. They would
only be really like-for-like if their values were equal. Ascertaining the equal value is the business of
chapter 5. It must first be understood (what is easily misunderstood) that the rules for the exchange
o f the goods— whether the initial exchange itself, or the rules to rectify any injustices that might
follow (see § 5.9)— are not the same as the rules which guide the valuation. Among the several
confusions that have beset the treatment of this chapter, not distinguishing the evaluation ol the
356 Heliodorus gave another reason why reciprocity does not apply in Distributive justice; that 
is that in receiving dividends what is received is different in kind from the original 
contribution. Stewart, who upholds this claim (p.446), retails the example ot a musician who 
is paid in money, not music. The argument is unsatisfactory, Distributive justice does not 
guide commercial dividends (see § 4.9), nor the payment of musicians; these are transactional 
issues. Heliodorus’s point that a service is different in kind from its recompense is, however, 
a valuable one, and goes to the heart o f the difficulty facing chapter 5.
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action (or the object357) from the exchange stands as peculiarly damaging358. The transactional rules 
are arithmetically proportional, or to put it as Aristotle sometimes does (compressing the proportion), 
rules of simple equality rather than geometric proportion, but that principle is not adequate to the 
evaluation process which must precede the exchange. Different principles o f proportion are needed 
to achieve that. As he does not here employ the arithmetic proportion it has been widely assumed 
that Aristotle reverts to the geometric (see § 4.9), but I do not think this is so. He makes no mention 
whatsoever of the geometric proportion in chapter 5 ; that fact alone should have alerted 
commentators to its likely absence from the chapter. In chapter 3, where Aristotle does obviously 
use it he refers to the geometric proportion constantly, and explains it in detail, using diagrams. 
Similarly in chapter 4 when invoking the arithmetic proportion, that proportion is repeatedly 
referred to and explained. If Aristotle uses the geometric proportion as the model tor the evaluation 
o f goods it is strange that he doesn't mention it.
Aristotle dislikes the Pythagorean concept of justice (as he represents it359) for its crudity; he 
immediately gives an example to illustrate where the Pythagorean model breaks down: at 1132b29 
he speaks of a case in which an officer strikes a subordinate. The blow is an authoritative action ot 
discipline or education, but if the subordinate returns the blow that would be an act o f mutiny. The 
same actions (objects) therefore may carry widely differing values36", and their exchange might not 
be genuinely like-for-like. The principle of just reciprocity may be seen as that of receiving the same 
(or sometimes perhaps receiving the opposite) in return; simply conceived the same action here (a 
blow of much the same force or physical damage) is not of the same worth (dcqiav), whereas the just 
reciprocation is that of the a^iocv, not o f the action361.
357 For Involuntary exchanges what is to be evaluated will be an action, but so it also would be 
for Voluntary ones where services will need to be assessed.
358 Meikle (p.131) says that the issue of economic value is usually overlooked, the chapter 
being thought to be about fair exchange.
359 Some (e.g., Heath, 1949 p.272, Stewart pp.444-45, H.Cherniss Aristotle's Criticism o f  
Presocratic Philosophy, p.226 n.39) hold that Aristotle misrepresents the Pythagorean view. 
But Soudek (p.54) wisely says "we can trust Aristotle's knowledge of Pythagorean philosophy 
which was much more complete than ours can possibly be".
360 A  point familiar to many commentaries, see for example Joachim (pp. 144, 146) who cites 
Burnet and Vinogradoff.
361 As this is being written a Bill is going through Parliament which directly reflects the point 
being made. It is proposed that differing a^iai are to be assigned in some cases where a 
particular malice towards the class to which the victim ot an assault is thought by the 
assailant to belong. The proposal implements exactly the distinction Aristotle makes in this
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Aristotle appears to choose this example as one o f Involuntary exchange that is, nevertheless, 
on the border between the Involuntary and the Voluntary— it is placed on the border between the two 
chapters. He says "it makes all the difference in the world whether the action was voluntary or 
not"362 (intention is still a criterion for serious crimes such as murder), and indeed assessing whether 
an action is voluntary or involuntary can be tricky. You might need to take into account the 
possibility that the blow was intended for someone else, or that the soldier was merely reckless, or 
that it was a joke, or the hand was controlled by a third party363. As with the rest o f Particular 
justice, here justice is achieved where the appropriate equality is found. There is to be reciprocity but 
it must be of the like-for-fr«/v-like (the whole value of the blows), not like-for-apparently-like (the 
physical description of the blows). The example serves to draw together the two branches o f 
Exchange; it is discussed in the chapter on Voluntary exchanges, but is principally a matter o f the 
Involuntary. As such it inverts and reciprocates the latter part of the previous chapter where the 
issues of Involuntary exchanges were explained in the language o f Voluntary ones (and excused as 
such by Aristotle (1132a 1 1 )364. The two passages indicate the equivalences in the two branches of 
the species (again a point which ought to have guided commentators towards the generic structure 
I've been arguing for365).
6. 3 Reciprocal proportion
Reciprocity is to be based on proportion. There are a number o f difficulties to be faced in 
sorting out what this involves, but they broadly divide into two classes. First, the surviving MSS 
appear disordered and repetitive, and perhaps parts of the text are missing (the diagrams certainly
chapter between the physical damage (pAocpoc; or damnun) and the harm done (ocSiiacc or 
iniuria).
362 1 132b31.
363 There are a number of complications to the example; the officer is an agent of the polis, 
and so the issue is not private but is a public exchange. It takes place between the polis and 
one of its members (parts). Apart from this illustration Aristotle does not discuss the justice 
o f public exchanges', the justice of exchange is specifically the justice for members interacting 
among themselves, with the polis as arbitrator (the notion of criminal justice did not then 
properly exist). Where the polis is a party to a transaction the rules of Commutative justice 
would probably apply; where the transaction is Involuntary the majesty of the state might 
demand a high valuation of the dignity, safety, and well-being of its officers, so the arithmetic 
rule governing the redress is likely to result in a stiff penalty.
364 Joachim p. 138 refers to this "avowed inaccuracy" but he doesn't notice the structural 
reason for it.
365 See § 5.10 and note 347.
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are). The disorder is regretted by all editors (see e.g., Jackson and Stewartm  for extended discussion 
o f the difficulties) and I have only one point to add to the issue of repetition (in § 6.9). Secondly, 
and much less reasonably, there is near universal dissatisfaction bound up with objections to 
Aristotle's habit of expressing the essence of Particular justice in quasi-mathematical terms. Meikle, 
following a long tradition, and citing Hardie and Salomon367, dismisses the mathematics (e.g., 
p. 143); Finley remarks368 that this chapter isn't one of Aristotle's more transparent discussions; 
Bonar369 complained it is "much tortured". Soudek thinks it "belongs to the obscurest parts o f his 
writings", and Joachim says "it is in the end unintelligible to me"370. This common aversion is 
summed up by Smith371:
The whole treatment [of Particular justice] is confused by the unhappy attempt to give a precise
mathematical form to the principle o f justice in the various fields distinguished.
What the critics have not appreciated is that Particular justice is exactly the area of virtue that is 
concerned purely with the rightness o f greater and less. All the factors involved in this kind of 
justice relate to some magnitude being wrong and some other magnitude being right. Determining 
what the precise quantity is is then as close to purely mathematical principles as are straight lines or 
volumes. Treating the proportion language as extraneous simply fails to recognise either the 
character or the structure of Aristotle's programme. It is this failure that generated the confusion and 
the unhappy attempts to account for Aristotle's theory.
The form of the mathematics Aristotle uses throughout is analogical, and is exceptionally 
simple, yet part of the difficulty in this chapter has been in deciding just what the reciprocal analogy 
is. As with the earlier chapters Aristotle clearly invokes proportion, but it has not been obvious 
which proportion. Unlike the geometric and arithmetic forms, which are clearly recorded, the 
reciprocal proportion is difficult to pin down, and different candidates for it have been identified. 
The main contenders are as follows:—
366 Pp. 437-38 have a detailed explanation of the likely reason for the passage 1133a 14-16 
also appearing in chapter 4 .
367 M.Salomon Der Begriffder Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (1979).
368 M.I.Finley 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis', Past and Present 47, 1970a, pp.3-25 (p.13).
369 J.Bonar Philosophy and Political Economy (1909, p.40).
37(1 Soudek, p.45; Joachim, p.150.
371 J. A.Smith Nicomachean Ethics, (Introduction, Everyman edition, pp.xviii-xix).
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(i) Soudek discusses the influence of Archytas on Aristotle; he says (p.57) that Archytas 
introduced the term 'reciprocal proportion', and he draws attention to the role of proportion in the 
Archytan treatment of the justice o f exchanges (auvaAAocYimTcov)372. Soudek is in two minds (pp.56 
and 59ff.) whether the proportion spoken of is the third of the classical forms, or whether it is that 
based on Elements VI. The implication is that Archytas regarded the proportion in question as being 
both harmonic and reciprocal373. (The harmonic proportion was especially associated with Archytas 
(see §§ 1.7, 2.1), and there can be little doubt that Aristotle obtained knowledge of it from 
Aristoxenus, even if he did not know o f it already374). After rehearsing the harmonic Soudek goes on 
to treat the proportion used in the chapter as the entirely different figure associated with Elements VI.
(ii) Lowry (p.53) thinks that it is mysterious how the harmonic proportion came to be confused 
with Euclid’s demonstration of reciprocal figures. He regards the proportion employed in chapter 5 
as the harmonic375. Lowry offers an alternative to the traditional figure of exchange which Aristotle 
indicates at 1133a6. The usual diagram is given as a box, or a rectangle with a single diagonal, or a 
crossed pair o f diagonals. Any o f these376 could be contained by a diagram such as this:
A B
(figure 3)
A
372 The Archytan expression auvaAAayjiocTa is evidently the source of Aristotle’s own usage 
for the justice of exchanges. In the surviving fragment from the school o f Archytas it has 
been translated as 'mutual problems' by E.L.Minar from contractus by G.A.Mullach 
(Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum /, 1875, p.562), and as 'business contracts' by 
Freeman (op. cit. p.80), both from the Diels Fragment 47(3). A.Dalette (Essai sur la 
Politique Pythagoricienne, 1922, pp.259ff.) argued that Archytas had applied proportion 
theory to the affairs of Tarentum, and that this experience stimulated Aristotle's interest in the 
use o f proportion theory in the fields o f politics, economics, and jurisprudence.
373 Soudek cites Stewart p.445. Stewart refers to Alexander's record from the pseudo- 
Archytas, but it is not clear that this does suggest the identification of the two expressions.
374 See §1.7, note 55.
375 Pp.55ff.; he cites Select Fragments (i.e., 25 p.96 notes 3 and 5 in Ross's edition).
376 Grant and Williams presented a single intersection at the corner; Jackson (p.95) objects 
to this and gives the figure as here, as did St Thomas (see pp.291, 295, Sententia 47ii). 
Stewart has a blank box, Welldon a rectangle; Burnet has crossed diagonals as do Joachim, 
Rackham, Soudek, Ostwald, and Dirlmeier. Peters used diagonal dots; Gauthier-Jolif 
tentatively use the crossed diagonals (1959 II, p.376).
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Lowry (pp.57-58) traces the box figure to Oresme's Le Libre de Ethiques d'Aristote (14th century), 
but it appears to have been used by Albertus in his commentaries377; it is certainly very ancient (being 
a form of the square of opposition— see § 1 .6) yet is not much help in explaining the issues at stake 
in chapter 5. The principal notion to be illustrated is that of (diagonal) (assignment, see §
4.10 and below), but as I do not think they are likely representations o f the text, or in any way 
helpful in understanding Aristotle's argument, I will not explore the conflicting accounts of the 
relationships between the terms in these illustrations. In their place Lowry suggests a figure taken 
from J.Hambridge's The Elements o f Dynamic Symmetry™. Like Lowry I think that Aristotle may 
have used some other diagram (perhaps a little less elaborate than Hambridge's), and I offer other 
possibilities below. What is remarkable in Lowry's account of the issues of exchange is that having 
considered the possibilities and explored the harmonic proportion in detail, he traces the influence of 
Eudoxus on Aristotle's thinking but refers only to the Eudoxian method of exhaustions in relation to 
the problems and completely ignores his theory of proportions.
(iii) Much more common than the views of Soudek or Lowry has been the belief that the 
reciprocal proportion is a : b :: d : c (see § 2.9), but if this is a proportion its a rum one. It is true 
only where c happens to equal d. It is said to be justified by (Simson's reconstruction of) Elements 
VI.2, but the justification is dubious. VI.2 may be illustrated:
(figure 5)
377 See Super Ethica, op. cit. p.243.
378 1948, pp.17-18.
Hambridge constructs "reciprocal 
figures in dynamic symmetry" in which 
a rectangle is divided through crossing 
diagonals such that pairs of 
proportionally smaller rectangles
may be rotated, gradually reducing the 
overlap that has been created.
(figure 4)
141
142
Propositions 6.14 and 6.15 stem lrom definition V7.2, and 6.15 especially is taken (e.g., by Jackson 
p.89, Stewart p.443) to be the exemplar for the reciprocal proportion. 6.1537W is proved with the aid 
o f a figure such as:
(figure 6)
Euclid says that the alternating sides about the same angle in equal (i.e., equiangular) triangles are 
&VTi7t£7tov0otcnv (reciprocally proportional). The definition generates two possibilities: a : c :: d : b, 
and a : d :: c : b, not a : b :: d : c; the writers who perceive this last pattern do not explain how they 
derive it. There is no advantage in referring to the off-chance that c might happen to equal d as a 
proportion-, together with the use of such jejune figures as 3 Aristotle is made to describe in 
unnecessarily cumbersome ways that a gets d in exchange for c. Neither the formula nor the 
diagram show how the exchange is just; not surprisingly the case presented by such models has been 
thought to be feeble.
(iv) There is a further use of the notion of reciprocity in Elements VI but it is not generally spoken of 
in connexion with the chapter38". This proposition (6.16, see § 2.9) is an extrapolation of 6.14, 
which was the implementation for parallelograms of the loose (see § 2.9) definition VI. 2. Unlike that 
definition, or 6.14 and 6.15, it has universal application; i.e., although it treats purely geometric 
figures (rectangles) it is applicable to quantities o f any class381. 6.16 stipulates the biconditional:—
379 6.15 (Heath):
In equal triangles which have one angle equal to one angle the sides about the equal 
angles are reciprocally proportional; and those triangles which have one angle equal to 
one angle, and in which the sides about the equal angles are reciprocally proportional, are 
equal.
38(1 Perhaps because the word 'reciprocity' is used only at a point in the working-out of the 
proof.
381 As 6.16 is a special case o f 6.14, and 6.14 is derived from VI. 2, VI.2 and 6.14 could be 
regarded as being of universal application.
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a : b :: c : d (=> a ■ d = b ■ c.382 
There is a proportion if and only if the products (in the mathematical not economic sense) of the 
reciprocal alignments are equal. Requiring that unless the product o f a and d equals the product of b 
and c there is no proportion gives precisely the rule Aristotle is demonstrating (by whichever 
diagram he finds most useful). The correct valuation of the products (in the economic not the 
mathematical sense of the word product) will enable the reciprocation to be just, and will be correct 
only when the value of a x d equals the value of b x c. The format o f 6.16 would have been familiar 
to Aristotle383 in a simple diagram such as this:
T
AA
A
B
1
Br
______________ ,
(figure 7)
r
The task he faces is to apply this truth to everything capable of being quantified and exchanged. 
How he does this is examined below in §§ 6 .7-6.9, but note that as the proposition is a variant of the 
kvaXXat; principle the terms will be homogeneous.
6. 4 Reciprocity  in the text
Looking through the candidates for the reciprocal proportion that have been suggested in 
connexion with chapter 5 we have scarcely been able to find mathematical evidence for it. What is 
clear is that the reciprocal was not a proportion on a par with the two earlier ones (this is why 
Soudek and Lowry turn to the harmonic as the proportion in question). Aristotle undoubtedly uses 
the terms avTiTCTtovGoq and avaXoyia in the chapter, but does the text really support the belief that 
the combination of these terms refers to this farouche proportion? There are eight occurrences of the
382 6.16 (Heath):
I f  four straight lines be proportional, the rectangle contained by the extremes is equal to 
the rectangle contained by the means; and if the rectangle contained by the extremes be 
equal to the rectangle contained by the means, the four straight lines will be proportional.
383 See Artmann's Euclid's Elements and its Prehistory (op. cit., p.20), but also Aristotle 
refers to a similar diagram in Topics 158b29 (see § 2.5).
143
1 44
word dvxiJtEJtovGo^ (including dvTiite7tov0Evai once) in chapter 5, these are (with Ross s 
translation):
( i )  1132b21, (i i ) 32b22, (i ii) 32b25:
Aokei 8e t io i  kou to  avTiTtETtovOoq e iv a i anXcoq 8ik<xiov cxntEp o i FI'oOaYOpEioi etpccaav 
cbpi^ovxo yap anXaxq to  Sikouov to  dvTiJtEnovOoq (dX.X.<n) T o  8 avTirc£Jtov0o<; ouk
£Cp(Xp|J.OTT£l OUT £111 TO 8lOCV£p.T|TlKOV SlKCtlOV OUT E7U TO 8lOp0COTlKOV
Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said, for they 
defined justice without qualification as reciprocity. Now  'reciprocity fits neither distri utive nor 
rectificatory justice
( i v )  1132b33:
to &vTi7tE7Tov0o<; koct’ cxvaXoyiav koci jir| KaT iaoTT)Ta
reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis o f  precisely equal return
(v )  1133al 0:
£av ouv TTpcoxov fi to  KccTa TTiv avaX oyiav  iaov  fiiTa to  dvTiJtEitov0o^ YevTl'cai ^aTa l 
XeYO)J.£VOV
If, then, first there is proportionate equality o f  goods384 and then reciprocal action takes place, the 
result we mention w ill be effected
(v i )  1133a33:
ecttou Sri «vTiTt£7tov0o<; otccv iaaa0f|
There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated
(v i i )  1133b6:
fii 8’ outco )xr| f[v avTiit£nov0£vai ouk a v  f)v Koivcovia
I f  it had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus effected, there would have been no association
(v i i i )  1134a24:
IlC0<; (J.EV ouv exei to  aVTlJt£TCOV0O(; Jtpo^ to SlKCUOV EipTlTCXl TtpOTEpOV.
N ow  we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just;
The first three occur together in the passage which opens the chapter with Aristotle claim ing that 
simple reciprocity is unsuited to either sort o f  Particular justice. The fourth follows up with 
adjustment that reciprocity must be based on analogy, not equality. The fifth speaks o f proportion 
equality being necessary before reciprocation takes place (not reciprocal proportion taking place). At
384 Interpolated by Ross, as they are by Jackson, Rackham, and Ostwald. but not by others 
such as W elldon, Thomson, and recently Judson, who are more accurate.
1 4 4
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(v i) Aristotle says that producers' respective products must be rated according to a proportion that is 
based on the relative worth of the parties. Sandwiched between (vi) and (vii) is an account of 
proportion but there is no suggestion that the proportion is reciprocal. Again the passage says that 
unless there is a proportional valuation there can be no (just) reciprocation, i.e., no just exchange of 
like-for-like. The last mention of reciprocity simply refers back to the discussion relating the issue 
to justice. There is, then, little sign o f the mathematical reciprocal proportion in the text:
(a) First of all the passages make sense as claiming that the proportion must be achieved to facilitate 
what is to count as fair reciprocation.
(b) There is little connexion between the words avTiJt£7tov0o<; and avaA.OYia; they appear together 
in only (iv) and (v). Of these, (iv) refers to reciprocation according to (some) proportion, and (v) to 
the requirement that there must/Irs? be proportional equality and then reciprocation. In the earlier 
chapters where modes of proportion are clearly used Aristotle labels them firmly (when speaking less 
directly of the character of proportion he ignores the proportional nature of the arithmetic but not 
when he is introducing and defining transactional justice in terms o f proportion). In chapter 5, on 
the other hand, there is no correspondingly clear account of the suggested third mode of proportion. 
No expression corresponds to "geometric proportion" or "arithmetic proportion". In fact in (iv), the 
one place where reciprocity and proportion are used in the same phrase (in (v) the terms occur in 
separate phrases linked through a conjunction), the connexion is reversed; rather than some 
expression such as 'proportion according to reciprocity' he says 'reciprocity according to proportion .
Stewart says (p.442, citing Jackson p.93):
To avTi7t£7tov0o<;, literally 'that which has suffered or received in return, is somewhat strangely
used instead of to dvTiro:7Tov0£vca.
I take it that Stewart does not mean merely that it is strange of Aristotle not to use the infinitive, but 
that the correct mathematical expression is not used. I.e., that Stewart thinks Aristotle is using the 
reciprocal proportion at (i) and (ii) but has referred to it slightly improperly. Stewart claims (p.443) 
that the terms dvTi7t£7iov0o<;, dvT;7t£7tov0£vai, and ctvTi7T£7tov0eai<; are unambiguously reciprocal 
proportion'" but that once used outside mathematics they become ambiguous. If the mathematical 
proportion is being used then the vagueness is not only in its extrapolation to non-mathematical 
topics but (as Stewart picks up) in the word chosen. Referring to this proportion as to avxi7tejiov0o<;
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rather than avaXoyxa kolt avTi?rETrov0o<; (or the more definite tcata to dvTineTtovGoq) would 
mark an extraordinary stylistic departure from his previous custom. (This divergence alone would be 
reason enough to doubt that the reciprocal mode of proportion is being invoked.)
(c ) Aristotle does not explain what reciprocal proportion is. He goes to great (many think excessive) 
pains to explain the earlier, very simple, proportions, but then when he uses a more elusive and 
complex one he neither names it as he does the others, nor explains how it works. Especially in view 
o f the elaborate explanations of the geometric and arithmetic analogies whose meaning is far more 
obvious, his not explaining this proportion would be strangely inconsistent.
(d ) What commentators (both those who see it in the text— such as Grant, Jackson, Stewart, 
Burnet,— and some of those who don't— such as Heath385 and Hardie) have called reciprocal 
proportion (a : b :: d : c) is not properly a proportion (§§ 2.9, 6.3), and there is no reason to suppose 
that Aristotle thinks that it is.
6. 5 The problem  o f exchange-value
Having decided which proportions Aristotle doesn't use we need to discover the one he does.
To appreciate his use of proportion in chapter 5 we ought first to re-state the problem Aristotle
tackles, a problem which I do not think that any later thinker has faced as squarely as he does. What
Meikle calls "this notoriously intractable problem" at its most stark and extreme is this:
How is it possible to compare things with nothing in common?
Later writers— I think all later writers— have sought some commensurating element lurking behind
the infinity of interactions, of goods and services, that are brought to an exchange. It has been
simply assumed that some elusive factor (some x) must be found in virtue of which a just or at least
acceptable valuation will be possible. Not only has this quest been assumed to be necessary, Aristotle
is credited with having started it. Soudek quotes Kaulla admiringly386:
Aristotle has brought into the world the thought .... that the comparability o f values of different 
economic goods has as its condition a something which is common to the magnitudes to be 
compared.
385 Heath (1949 p.274) wonders if the proportion being spoken ot is that "defined in Euclid 
V I.35" (which I suppose is 15), but decides that it isn't. Hardie, op. cit., p. 199.
386 Soudek p.75; R.Kaulla Die Geschichtlichte Entwicklung der Modemen Werttheorien 
(1906, p.52).
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So deeply fixed is this supposition that it has prevented even his closest admirers from seeing 
Aristotle's actual argument. Meikle expresses the unquestioned supposition perfectly (p. 14):
So the problem is to discover the property they ["the most various things"] must all share, in
virtue of which they are commensurable, as they must be since they are equated3*7
The quest parallels both the anthyphairetic attempts of Theodorus and Theaetetus (see §§ 1.1, 1.2, 
2.5-2-7, 2.9) to locate some magnitude (some x) in virtue of which incommensurables might be 
resolved, and the assumptions of mathematicians throughout the Middle Ages in their attempts to 
represent Elements V (see §§ 2.2, 2.9, 3.7). The later writers have, in effect, been stuck in a pre- 
Eudoxian rut. In the belief that Aristotle is searching for "a something which is common he is held 
to have generated (or at least to have pre-figured) different and conflicting schools o f economic 
thought. On the one hand the various demand-led, neo-classical, and utilitarian theories, and on the 
other the labour theories o f value.
A possibly complicating factor in supposing there to be, and then identifying, this common 
substance" (as Marx called it) has been a consciousness o f the danger o f anachronism. Two e^eic; 
have emerged; there are some ('modernists'388) who believe that all societies, ancient or modern, 
share common properties, sufficiently so at any rate to justify treating ancient societies as simpler 
models of modern economies. Others ('primitivists'389) say that modern society is different in kind 
from ancient communities; projecting notions drawn from modern economics onto them is then, they 
think, radically inappropriate390. Supporters of both these tendencies, nevertheless, when speaking of 
the issue of exchange in chapter 5, simply assume the problem to be one of determining some 
common element (some jc). The Austrian school o f marginal-utility theory, for example, 
"discovered" that in chapter 5 Aristotle proposes their own approach to the determination of value391.
387 P. 14; Karl Marx, for example, was prevented from appreciating the depth of Aristotle's 
account of value by assuming there must be some "common substance".
388 E.g., E.Meyer, M.Rostovtzeff (see Meikle, pp.3 and 158); Lowry (The Archeology o f 
Economic Ideas, 1987); W.E.Thompson ('The Athenian Entrepreneur', L'Antiquite Classique 
51, pp.53-85, 1982).
389 E.g., Finley (The Ancient Economy, 1973); K.Polanyi (Aristotle Discovers the Economy, 
in Dalton 1986); Meikle (chapter 8) reviews the debate from a Primitivist stance.
390 A  case of the errors Primitivists fear was that discussed in § 4.9 in which commentary and 
then translation imposed capitalistic constructions on the text grossly distorting the nature 
and scope o f Distributive justice.
391 Notably J.Zmavc ('Die Werttheorie bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquino', Archiv fiir  
die Geschichte der Philosophie 12, pp.407-33, 1899) and O.Kraus ( ’Die Aristotelische 
Werttheorie in ihren Beziehungen zu den Lehren der Modernen Psychologenschule', 
Zeitschrift fiir  die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 61, pp.573-92, 1905).
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This claim was made in conscious opposition192 to the then traditional view that the chapter gives a 
form of labour theory of value393. This older view goes back at least to Albertus Magnus who, 
commenting on the rather ambiguous passage 1133al4-16, says that equal amounts o f labour and 
costs must be exchanged394. Aquinas adopted St Albert's reading; he determined value according to 
labore et expensusm, but he also saw need as "the real measure ot value . In doing so he was 
faithful to Aristotle, but it places him just as much in the other camp396. Over and above (or perhaps 
as a result of trying to reconcile) these interpretations it is also claimed that Aristotle has no theory 
o f  value at all397, "not even a bad one" some say398.
The 'value' about which Aristotle either did or didn't have a theory has been taken to be a 
quantifiable unit of (depending on your preferred school of thought) labour or need or skill or 
demand or labour-time or desire that, however difficult it might be to measure, will generate the 
right price. Accounts of the value in terms o f skill (which Soudek interpolates continually) or 
labour-time or utility, merely replaces the incommensurability of the products by additional factors
392 The xpeia-based interpretation (variously treated as need, demand, want) was also held by
E.Barker (The Political Thought o f Plato and Aristotle, 1906); W.Gelesnoff (History o f 
Economic Thought, 1917); Van Johnson ('Aristotle's Theory of Value', American Journal o f 
Philology 60, pp.445-57, 1939); Joachim (pp. 149-51); Soudek (who calls it "a 'pre-marginal' 
utility theory" insists throughout that 'skill' is the defining factor, yet this term (texvti) is not 
used by Aristotle); J.Schumpeter (History o f Economic Analysis, 1954). B.J.Gordon 
('Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics 78, 
pp. 115-28, 1964; reprinted in Blaug, pp. 113-26) credits E.Kauder ( ’Genesis o f the Marginal 
Utility Theory from Aristotle to the End of the Eighteenth Century’, Economic Journal 63, 
pp.638-50, 1953; reprinted in Blaug, pp.42-54) with demonstrating that Aristotle anticipated 
the Austrian school (see Meikle, p. 111).
393 Apart from Marx who was inspired by what he interpreted as a labour theory of value in 
chapter 5 (see McNeill, op. cit. and Meikle) others who see it as labour-theoretic include 
Adam Smith (Wealth o f Nations I  chapter v; pp.31-32 o f W.R.Scott edition, 1921), Ritchie,
H.R.Sewall (The Theory of Value before Adam Smith, American Economic Association Series 
3, 2(3), p. 3, 1901), A.A.Trever A History o f  Greek Economic Thought (1916), Grant, Stewart, 
Burnet, Ross, and Hardie.
394 Albertus (Opera Omnia XIV(i) Liber V, lectio V II (404) pp.342-43) says:
scilicet quantum ad expensas et quantum ad laborem, et si non est patiens, idest recipiens 
retributionem, passus tantum et tale, quantum recepit, quia communicatio non est eorum 
qui sunt euisdem artis, ...
395 R.H.Tawney traced the labour theory of value to Aquinas (Religion and the Rise o f 
Capitalism, pp.38-39 in the 1947 Penguin edition).
396 A  point noted by M.Beer (Early British Economics from the XHIth to the Middle o f the 
XVIIIth Century, p.166, 1938).
397 By E.RolI (A History o f Economic Thought, revised ed., pp. 26-27, 1942) for example, and 
Meikle p. 190.
39S D.Winthrop ('Aristotle and Theories of Justice', The American Political Science Review 
72, pp.1201-16, 1978), repeated by Sparshott (op. cit. p.175).
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that are equally immeasurable: different skills (or needs or uses) do not share a common measure399. 
These replacements do not, then, advance the solution, they merely shift the problem sideways4*1".
Schumpeter claimed that Aristotle tried to analyse "actual market mechanisms" at 1133; that
he was:
groping for some labor-cost theory of price which he was unable to state explicitly.401
M eikle (chapter 1, § 2, especially) elaborates this view; he believes that Aristotle makes at least two
attempts402 before admitting failure. On pp.25-26 he says:
Aristotle is giving up as a bad job the attempt to explain commensurability ... His statement is 
tantamount to an admission that he does not know what is equalized in fair exchange of tood, 
shoes, and houses ... and that he does not know what exchange value is in its technical sense of 
'what x is'.
It has escaped all sides that Aristotle is the one thinker who makes no attempt to determine what x 
is’. Attempting to solve the problem of how to compare things with nothing in common by seeking 
this Economists Stone with which to transmute the base elements of use, need, labour, or skill, into 
Value is never even considered by Aristotle. He has no reason to fudge this logical impasse, indeed 
he is the one writer connected with economic issues who fully accepts that incommensurable means 
incommensurable. The problem had been solved for him by Eudoxus with the theory of proportions. 
As we have seen (§§ 2.8, 3.4-3.6 ) Aristotle makes use of the theory repeatedly throughout his work, 
yet the problem of the irrationals is much closer to that of exchange-value than to any of the other 
fields for which he borrows the solution. It has simply not occurred either to the writers on the 
philosophy or history of economics who discuss Aristotle, or with the commentators on the Ethics, 
that the problems of exchange-value and of the irrationals were equivalent. It seems to me, however, 
inconceivable that it didn't occur to Aristotle.
It will sometimes be feasible to measure one product against another, but more frequently no 
relevant comparison will be possible (a Stradivarius, a cabbage, and a paleontological report will be
399 Labour-time alone among these replacements is easily measurable, but that, in turn, rests 
on a prior valuation of the labourers (even piece-work operates only for those with roughly 
comparable skills, and within a highly restricted range of operations).
400 Meikle (chapter 2 ) argues against the xpeia-based valuations as being impossible to 
generate a common measure— there is no way to measure needs, wants, utilities or 
satisfactions. He also opposes (in chapter 9) any idea that Aristotle proposes labour-based 
valuations, but for metaphysical reasons connected with the incommensurability (very often) 
o f the categories into which the objects to be exchanged will fall.
401 Op. cit. pp.60-61, note 2.
4,12 The attempts being first through money and then through xpeia.
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commensurable in weight, but tor nearly all purposes that would be as irrelevant a common measure 
as that connecting Occelated turkeys with the blood of antelope). Aristotle does not, as Schumpeter 
and Meikle claim, attempt but fail to commensurate the incommensurable; on the contrary, he 
accepts from the outset that incommensurables, either within or across genera, cannot be approached 
through any common substance. Indeed to avoid any temptation to rely on some underlying 
commensurating element (such as need, skill, use, or labour) for some cases, and to guarantee the 
completely general character of the solution for all cases, the method he adopts is the reverse ot that 
attributed to him (and the reverse of that of later economists). Aristotle takes full advantage o f 
Eudoxus's leap of the imagination from the 'first-order' to a 'second-order' conception of the solution. 
Following Eudoxus (who inverted the antaneiretic and anthyphairetic procedures attempting to 
locate some x to commensurate the incommensurables), Aristotle applies a precise and exhaustive 
indirect comparison to the factors ready to hand (not some x), and allows for the total absence ot any 
shared property.
The principles underlying his use of the general proportion theory may best be shown by
paraphrasing and adapting the description given above in § 2.9 o f that theory:
Goods or services of any kind will always be comparable with some others o f the same kind. All 
extraneous (non-productive) attributes of the producers of the goods (such as their social 
standing, physique, and aesthetic tastes403) are to be set aside. The comparisons will form ratios 
between the products and their producers (this heterogeneity issue to be argued below). The 
quantities involved measure one another by co-ordinating their multiplication. In carrying out 
this project Aristotle removes the supposition that some measure (some x) has to be found to solve 
the problem.
Just how he solves it Aristotle shows with simple diagrams.
6. 6 A ris to tle 's  use o f  reciprocal figures
What the survey of the putative reciprocal proportion (§§ 6 .2-6.4) showed was (i) that there 
has been speculation that it might have been the harmonic; (ii) that it might have been based on the 
same source as the 18th century reconstruction of Elements VI definition 2; (iii) that that definition, 
and (iv) its usually cited extrapolation 6.15, does not apply to quantities in general but only to similar
403 Which is not to say that these or any other given attributes might not be productive, and so 
relevant to the assessment of the value o f their products: the strength and agility of 
professional athletes are directly related to their value; a Society columnist’s social standing or 
an art critic's sensibility could be necessary to their products.
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plane figures; (v) that in any case, the definition does not justify the rogue formula a : h :: d : c that 
is widely imposed on the text, (vi) The figures traditionally presented at 1133a6 are unhelpful, and 
unlikely to have been Aristotle's own (I have as yet merely asserted this, not argued it; the argument 
follows in the next two sections). That the box figure or crossed diagonals are ineffectual can hardly 
be denied; they are the target o f the greater part of the abuse hurled at the text, (vii) The 
mathematical principle of reciprocation as it appears in 6.16, however, looks more promising as a 
guide to the issue faced by the chapter. (In chapter 5 the problem o f finding the correct proportion is 
that of how to guarantee the biconditional 6.16 where the terms refer to elements that are not o f the 
same genus.)
To support my claim that Aristotle uses a diagram different from 3 when speaking ot the need 
for a diagonal assignment of the terms I believe it would be worthwhile to look at the kind of figures 
he would have been familiar with, and especially at any closely associated with notions o f reciprocity 
and proportion. The obvious diagrams to use would then be of the proof in 6.16 (above) and those 
for 6.14 or 6.15 that I have been opposing as giving the 'reciprocal proportion'. Apart from its 
connexion with the cluster of principles which went to make up the notion ot a model (and so known 
to Aristotle— see §§ 1.9, 2.8 note 144) 6.15 is closely related to a figure he twice uses in Mechanics 
in connexion with reciprocity. In Mechanics (850a39: to rcpo<5 to jj.r|K:o<; dvTinenovGev, and
at 854a25) Aristotle4'4 refers to the reciprocal in speaking of the action of a lever. The diagrams 
there sketch the principle of the lever as used by dentists and for nutcrackers:
(figure 8)
The figures 2, 5, 6 , and 8 combine two features useful to the demonstration ot the case he is making,
(i) the diagonal auCEuqiq, with (ii) the principle of reciprocity (which the traditional box figure or 
crossed diagonals fail to do). It seems most likely that Aristotle takes whichever figure he uses from
404 Mechanics may have been written by an early Peripatetic trom Aristotle's lectures.
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the same source as Euclid, and as Elements VI implements rules o f proportion developed in Book V, 
the source would appear to have been Eudoxus or his associates.
The question of which proportion is used in chapter 5 can now be settled. It has been left until 
this point because, unlike the forms of proportion in the earlier chapters, the actual mode o f 
proportion used here turns out to be a comparatively minor issue. For Distributive justice the 
geometric proportion was a vital criterion, and Aristotle accordingly explains it at length. Similarly 
for the justice o f Exchanges the arithmetic proportion is a defining marker, and is thoroughly 
explained. In both cases the use o f the specific mode of analogy distinguishes it from the other. But 
the choice o f the mode of proportion within the Voluntary sub-class o f Exchanges has no such 
central role. I believe that the analogy used is the third of the three classical forms, called by others 
harmonic, but left unnamed by Aristotle. His use o f that proportion is only to preserve the equal 
divisions across the ratios: "some portion" of one producer's output is to be valued against some 
portion o f another's. The corresponding division is retained in the proportion whole : part:: whole . 
part'. What is vital to the argument is not so much the specific form of the proportion but the 
general theory which manipulates it. Whether the ratios in a : c and b : d report the equivalent 
multiples, quantities, or divisions, what matters is that they are ratios, not the ratios that they happen 
to be.
6. 7 The first stage
Aristotle deploys the general theory through two stages; i.e., that in addition to the distinction 
to be made between the valuation and the exchange (mentioned earlier), the valuation itself has two 
stages. It should be emphasised that the 'mathematics' he uses here (and throughout his account of 
justice) is of the simplest possible; everything is explained through obvious geometric patterns. The 
first step is presented with a figure at 1133a3ff., which I suggest is a diagram such as Keyser s for 
Distributive justice (figure /, § 4.10), but tilted somewhat:—
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(figure 9)
T h is  first stage of the argument could also be demonstrated by a rectangular model simi g
7, or by any number o f  figures. (Besides, Aristotle may have used different figures at differ 
just as he uses examples o f different products and producers.) But his argument cannot be 
demonstrated by the box or crossed diagonals traditionally presented. The reasons f  p 
(v e ry  slightly) different figure from Keyser's chapter 3 diagram are.
(a )  to contrast the two species o f justice. Aristotle makes and keeps to a firm distinc 
them (and we have seen the damage to the understanding o f the theory when the distinc 
blurred). He may have preferred to underline the difference between the two models 
justice by keeping the demonstrations distinct.
(b ) T h e  diagonal alignment o f  the issues is more prominently displayed in a figure 
uses in the Mechanics.
(c )  Th e  notion o f reciprocity is used throughout the account o f  the evaluation, so a g 
from  the use o f simple implements familiar to an audience (such as the nutcrackers and p 
Mechanics used to demonstrate the principle o f the lever) which v iv id ly  em ploy (and d 
the principle o f reciprocity m ight be more helpful than an equivalent diagram which lacks 
associations.
(d ) Th e  figure is in part the same as one needed to demonstrate the p roof o f  6.15,
use o f  the principle o f reciprocal relations, and which also bears a marked similari y 8
used in the Mechanics (as mentioned above).
These are, o f course, far from com pelling reasons, but they are sufficient to prompt the a j 
d iagram , but what is necessary is that the figure used shows.
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( i )  the comparison between the producers (A  and B) where they may not be equal (1133a 18)
( i i )  the link between the producers and their own products (A -T  and B-A)
( i i i )  the Sia^etpov au^eui^, the diagonal assignment whereby the value of part o f producer A ’s 
product and the value o f part o f B's product are related and contrasted.
T h e  diagonal assignment is stressed by Aristotle to contrast with the side-alignment which connects
the producers to their own products (the terminology reflects the traditional contrast between side
and diagonal number values). The usual box figure or crossed diagonals do not demonstrate (i) or
( i i i ) ,  whereas figures such as 9 or 2 show at a glance any difference in value (represented by
magnitude) between A and A's product and B and B's. As with the case o f Distributive justice the
diagonal crosses at the mean point (E) between A and B so as to demonstrate the ratio between the
parties: physician : farmer (1133a 18) or builder : cobbler (1 133a23).
There may be two immediate objections to the claims either that Aristotle uses some diagram
such as 9 or 2, or that by the use of such figures the argument makes sense. The first objection is
'What are to count as the 'wholes' of which the items to be exchanged are "portions"?1405. I believe
this objection can be met in two ways. First, self-assessment formed the basis o f taxation for war and
liturgies at Athens406; it is possible that some such periodic assessment might supply the 'whole from
which a part would be for sale. More commonly a fixed-term agreement, a fee charged, an agreed
contract, or military campaign, or the farming, fishing, or building season, would form the relevant
'whole'. Whatever does count as the whole product would have to be agreed as being the relevant
whole by the parties to an exchange, and be based on custom and practice (and probably recognised
as being the whole of what is produced by the community in general). I do not think there needs to
be an a priori stipulation as to what the whole must be for the principle that Aristotle is appealing to
(and so the figure demonstrating it) to be respectable.
Secondly, the diagram may be adjusted to show that whatever division of the producers output
is to be exchanged, they correspond. I.e., that relative to the respective producers the parts are the
corresponding divisions:—
1 5 4
41)5 This objection was made by Dr Meikle in a letter responding to an earlier draft of 
chapter.
4116 See § 4.9, note 282.
1 5 4
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Notice how by merely pointing to such diagrams the argument is seen immediately
whereas to explain the relationships would be both long winded and likely to be much
Part o f the reason for the difficulty universally experienced with chapter 5 has been merely because
Aristotle's argument is easily explicable through the simple diagrams he uses in his le
are lost. We can just 'see' that the corresponding triangles capture our intuitions as to t
in value.
6. 8 P roducers and their products
The second objection to the proposed diagram might be that these figures could only represent
producers and their products if producers and products were of the same genus. Fi 
clearly treats these heterogeneous elements as representable by the variables, the sugge g 
or 9 keep to his own usage. That still leaves the question how the aqiai ot producers and their 
products can be in ratio; Aristotle undeniably does equate these heterogeneous & *i«i when 
stipulating the diagonal through which one producer justly acquires the other's product.
For any ratio to hold between the terms-and any consequent interaction-the terms must represent 
homogeneous entities (as I elaborated in § 1 . 1  and repeatedly since, especially in connexion with the 
ivaXXa^ principle which must be employed for the interactions here). I have argued against the
(figure 10)
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claim  that Aristotle was indifferent to, or unaware of, the issue o f homogeneity in mathematics (§ 
3.6), yet the generic or special differences are far more obvious between producers and artefacts than 
among the several species of mathematics. He must, then, be aware that a farmer is not the same 
kind o f thing as a turnip. Yet it appears that they need to be treated as belonging to the same genus 
either for the diagonal to be measurable or for the assessment o f the value of the goods to
be made "as farmer is to cobbler". Aristotle does not spell out how the cc^vai of products and of 
producers are connected, yet he says at 1133a24, and repeats at 33a34, that for the valuation which 
precedes an exchange the a^ia of the product depends on that of the producer. The justification for 
equating the heterogeneous dciou o f producers and products would be as follows:
The initial problem is that there will often be no direct link or comparison possible between 
products to be exchanged. However, there is always a direct link between a product and its own 
producer. Producers qua producers are logically bound to their products, and products to their 
producers, in a formal symbiosis: buildings are built by builders qua builders. The producer is not 
only indicated by the product but is defined by it: an upholsterer qua upholsterer does not grow 
cabbages, nor does a market-gardener refurbish arm-chairs. What it is to be a product, and what it is 
to be a producer requires their analytical and necessary connexion; even i f  it is a posteriori. Other 
attributes of producers should be set aside when assessing their function purely as producers. As 
with other objects to be measured, i.e., sensibles treated qua mathematical objects4*17 which have their 
mathematical properties (i.e., continuous or discrete instantiations o f greater and less) abstracted 
from their other attributes, producers' productive qualities need to be individuated and abstracted 
from their other characteristics. Abstracted in this way just as any other object in applied 
mathematics, and in virtue of the merely analytical relation between product and producer, for the 
purpose of assessing the exchange-value of what is produced, the producer "collapses into their 
product". Such equivalence and replacement of producers by their products is a perfectly standard 
practice of evaluation. The worth of a farmer is assessed as the worth of the farm; the value of a 
shopkeeper is calculated as the 'whole' made up of the value of the shop, its contents, good debts and 
good will, less any liabilities. It is in this spirit that Aristotle speaks o f the ct^ia of the farmer,
4(17 See §§ 1.3, 3.6, and Metaphysics M ; also E.Hussey ('Aristotle and Mathematical Objects',
Apeiron 24(4), pp. 105-33, 1991) or Annas (op. cit) or Mueller (op.cit.).
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builder, physician, or cobbler. And it is in this way that producers and their products, albeit 
heterogeneous, may be assessed homogeneously. This, it seems to me, is the general justification lor 
Aristotle's assigning first T, and then A to A (and A and then T to B). Regarded as homogeneous in 
this way and for this purpose a ratio is possible between producer and product.
The most useful ratio will probably be that of whole ->  part which Aristotle indicates at 
1133a9. Some amount will be part of a producer's product, quite logically, whatever is produced, a 
whole : part ratio will then correspond to the producer-product relation. Aristotle presen 
relation both through quotidian examples (builder : house, cobbler : shoe) and variables as A . T (
B : A). Any whole-part comparison (A : T) is comparable with any other (B . A), such that 
be a proportion A : T :: B : A that is equivalent to a comparison producer : product:: producer : 
product' (and to whole : p a rt:: whole': part'). Figure 10 shows such comparisons of whol p 
ratios, but so also do figures 2 and 9, where T and A are used by Aristotle to measure the part 
producer's output that is for sale.
The first diagram (figure 9) showed the value of the products as proportional to their 
producers, i.e., that the first step towards the right equality is achieved where the goods 
to be exchanged are the equivalent divisions of their respective totals. The goods up for s 
necessarily these same divisions; furthermore in an exchange (1133al2, Thomson).
nothing prevents the product of one of the parties from being better value than that of the 
which could mean either (i) that because of a difference in quality or standing between the producers 
the equal portions of their output is unequal (shown by figures 9, 2 or 10), or (ii) that one produc 
might be worth more because there is more of it, even though of lesser quality (shown in figure 10 
where A BE > T'AE). In either event the values need to be equalised. To bring this about Arist
moves to the second stage of his argument.
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6. 9 The second stage
In § 12 of the chapter, as it has survived, Aristotle indicates a second diagram to demonstrate 
this second part of the argument. The section has usually been seen as merely repeating what has 
gone before*"1 but it seems to me that the jumble and repetition is evidence o f a development in an 
argument (that would originally have been clear and distinct). The thread o f argument in the 
unsatisfactory surviving text— with its criss-crossing accounts o f money and product exchange—  
should be seen as having become entangled later, probably due to the loss o f the original diagrams 
(aggravated by the lack o f an algebraic notation). An explanation of any subject that relies on 
diagrams would almost inevitably become jumbled when the diagrams are lost.
We are told that the products are to be equalised "as builder is to farmer"; such repeated 
comparisons (farmer : physician, builder : cobbler) serve a purpose when there is some expected 
difference in value among farmers, cobblcrs, physicians and builders, and consequently producers 
and exchangers in general. If there is no difference between producers then this re-iterated 
comparison is pointless4'1''. Their products may not be comparable but the producers clearly are; on 
this point Aristotle reflects our common experience. Those charged with fixing wage levels make 
use o f such comparisons continually both within and across industries: MP's salaries are pegged to a 
given grade of the civil service; miners are rated against factory workers, teachers against nurses, etc. 
Circumstances will affect what the exact ratio will be, but some ratio (such as 8 : 5 , 3 : 2 , 100  : 1 ) is 
to rate the difference between physician and farmer. Where the producers are unequal A would be
rated as some line A ________________________E, to differ from some other line B ----------------- E.
The equivalent portions of their products T and A are then correspondingly (see Topics 158b29 and § 
2.5) worth:
(figure 11)
4<)S See e.g., Stewart p.464.
409 Meikle (chapter 7) claims that the parties are equal.
158
159
T o  b ring about the desired equality some adjustment is therefore necessary to reduce the greater or 
increase the less, i.e., some multiple must be applied. As Aristotle is speaking o f some ratio o f 
fa rm er : cobbler to guide the value, the value w ill be found when
a : c :: b : d :: a : b.
N o te  that b might not be division o f  a  (see Elements V. 1 and V.2 and §1 .1  and notes 3 and 4), i.e., 
that provision must be made for any ratio (8 : 5, 4 : 1 ,3 :2 ,  12 : 7, or whatever). Whatever may be 
the ratio  of A : B, the factors are to be "reduced to a proportion" (1 133b) and "A equalised" (1 133b5). 
T h is  is all shown by Aristotle at 1133a34ff. with the second diagram410 demonstrating very simply 
h ow  the existing elements should be multiplied-out so that the value of the products can be equalised. 
Suppose the builder: farmer ratio (A  : B) is 3 : 2 (A E  : EB = 3 : 2) then
/
/
/
/
y
(figure 12)
the multiples 2 and 3 w ill equalise the exchange-value: 2(ArE) =  3(BAE) (the expansion in figure 
12 in fact shows these quantities doubled: 4 (A T E ) =  6(BAE)). N o  matter what the disparity o f 
producers and their prcxlucts, and no matter what part o f their output is to be exchanged, the ratios 
can bc multiplied-out until they are equal. For all magnitudes, there are natural numbers m, n such 
that w(ArE) = /i(BAE). It is the equal divisions o f  the extended figure that can be fairly exchanged. 
Th is is a geometric demonstration o f the application o f  the ivaXXaE, variant ol Elements V.5. 
m(a : c ) =  n(b : d).
410 O r by the further use o f  the same diagram with additional lines
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A  diagram such as figure 12 also shows how that unless the terms are multiplied-out in this 
w ay  (1133h):
one o f  the two extremes will have both the excesses, 
i.e., the excess o f /VB and I7A (the excess o f  the <x£ia o f  one producer over the other, and the excess 
o f  the value o f  one product over the other)4" .  Once the adjustment has taken place along these lines 
the exchange may justly proceed, fu lfilling the requirement ( Elements 6.16) that: 
a • d = h ■ c <=> a : b  :: c : d.
411 The expression which follows "when they have their own" appears to have been a proverb, 
Aristotle uses it twice in chapter 4— at 1132al8and 1132b 17.
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CONCLUSION
The actual calculations and formulae in the solution are (to repeat) very simple, but the 
solution applies whether or not the parties are equal, whether or not the products are homogeneous, 
and whether or not they share a common measure. It is a procedure which acts upon an existing 
comparison (it compares the comparisons o f greater and less posited in the relation between the 
producer and product). These factors are grasped immediately by the use of a simple diagram (which 
is why Aristotle uses the diagrams— they are integral to his analysis, not mere idiosyncrasy) but with 
the loss o f the diagrams and the lack of a convenient algebraic notation even these mathematically 
primitive manipulations quickly became opaque. Considering the fate o f the crucial definitions of 
the theory o f proportion (explored in chapters 2 and 3 above) which Aristotle here implements, the 
obscurity which descended on his use of those definitions seems to have been inevitable.
I have not looked in any detail at the roles of %peia or money in chapter 5, for three 
interconnected reasons: (i) the theme of the work is the role of analogy, to which they are not closely 
tied, (ii) They have been extensively discussed by others (and recently reviewed in Meikle). I 
broadly agree with his view that xpeia provides the framework and purpose of exchange but has no 
part in the actual calculation of the value, (iii) I have little to add to what has been said about these 
topics. There is only one point I need to make about Arisotle's treatment of xp^ia and money. He 
says (1133b 13):
it is proper for all things to have their price set.
In economic theory there is often a difference made between economic value (that is defined one way 
or another, as we have seen) and price formation. This is not a distinction Aristotle makes; indeed 
he sees through the supposition upon which the distinction largely rests: that there is some element 
in virtue of which there is a value. It is not really that he side-steps the question of the economic 
value being something other than the price— an object needs to exist (or at least be thought to exist) 
to be side-stepped— and he demonstrates that there is no subjacent metaphysical common value to be 
accounted-for. His concern is with the moral question of how the price ought to be fixed; his answer 
is that it is to be arrived at through the two stages o f calculation (outlined above).
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I don't think he says so, but it is a reasonable inference from what he does say that in 
Aristotle's view if there is scarcity of important products (of food for example, or shelter, medicine, 
or clothing) their supply would cease to be a matter of private exchange but would become the duty 
of the 7ioA,i<; to supervise. The issue would clearly then be one of Distributive not Transactional 
justice. Scarcity is not then for him a factor in (he moral determination of prices. And since he 
ignores the other great parameter of economics— fashion— only the productive factors are used to 
assess the value of items to be exchanged.
My arguments oppose the various modern accounts that have been given of Aristotle's theory 
on a number o f points. Against the current orthodoxy I support St Thomas's treatment of the theory. 
In particular Aquinas avoided prescribing a Corrective species of any stripe. That solecism emerged 
from the mis-parsing of expressions such as corrective justice in exchanges, and from the non- 
sequitur that because Aristotle doesn't state that the first species directs (or corrects) distributions, it 
doesn’t. There is no semi-detached third class of justice dedicated to commerce, and once the 
structure of the theory has been grasped there is no call for such an addition. The full understanding 
of Aristotle's programme, however, depends on the appreciation of his use of analogy. Aristotle uses 
classical analogy— not what analogy has come to mean— to relate the principle of function to that of 
generic order. With this fusion he develops a comprehensive as well as consistent account of the 
issues.
There are frequent objections to Aristotle's insistence on mathematical terminology and 
diagrams as lurching from the central principles of justice towards an irrelevant mathematical 
construal. These complaints are misdirected. Justice as a special virtue takes as its subject the 
occurrences of inequality. Since it is concerned purely with finding the right stance to adopt among 
the wrong sorts of equality, and between inequalities (principally between citizens), he borrows 
techniques that had been devised expressly to resolve the corresponding difficulties in mathematics. 
He would only be wrong to use that language if the primary conception is mistaken. But if he is 
right that, quite apart from its job governing the specific virtues o f character, there is a further 
quality o f justice concerned with equality (wherever and however any mode of equality is possible), 
he is right to use the notions o f proportion to explain that quality.
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Aristotle's use of proportion language is unfortunate in (only) one respect: sometimes he 
presents analogies fully, but more often, usually after the initial complete presentation, his references 
to proportions and notions associated with them are highly compressed. When focusing on some 
distinction to be made he will combine the geometric, the complex, and the proportional 
characteristics of the subject that is to be set against the notions of simplicity, of arithmetic, and of 
plain quantitative equality of another subject. He will often take just one term from either o f these 
clusters to stand for the rest— and not usually the generically corresponding term. This habit has 
created extreme difficulty for interpreters. But that synecdoche and metonymy apart Aristotle's 
choice of expression is often sensitive and exact, notably where he is thought to be vague, napa xo 
eKooaiov, ejtavopSraxiKOV and avxaveipeau; for example, are all terms carefully chosen to meet 
subtle logical requirements.
The diagrams and the very simple calculations are not foibles but valuable tools o f analysis 
and presentation. Their strengths have been grossly under-rated for at least three reasons:
(i) as just mentioned, Aristotle's whole theory is conceived as parallel to applied mathematics 
(the nature of which is the interaction and relation of the greater and the less, qua greater and 
less). This equivalence of subject-matter has not registered with commentators as central to the 
programme.
(ii) With the crucial definitions of the general theory from Elements V lying unrecognised the 
intimate association with the corresponding problems dealt with in this section of the Ethics was 
broken.
(iii) The text of the Ethics survived, but only without the diagrams which vividly and simply 
portrayed the relations between the magnitudes.
The total exclusion of the Eudoxian theory of analogy has marred the understanding of exchange- 
value even more than the failure to recognise Aristotle's use of analogical inference in general has 
his account of Particular justice. My aim has been to help restore Aristotle's original concinnity.
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